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PROPORTIONAL 


REPRESENTATION 


SECOND 'EDITION 

WITH CHAPTERS ON THE INITIATIVE, THE 
REFERENDUM, AND PRIMARY ELECTIONS 


BY 

JOHN R. COMMONS 

Professor of Political Economy, University 
OF Wisconsin 


Neijj gork 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., Ltd. 

1907 

Ali rights reserved 




LIBRARY of CONGRESS 
Two Copies Recelveci 
JUN 11 190r 
,n Copyneht 

^LASS fX XXCm No. 

^ /77/f^ 2, 

COPY b. 


J 


Copyright, 1896, 

By THOMAS Y. CROWELL & COMPANY. 
Copyright, 1907, 

By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 

First published elsewhere. New edition May, 1907 



Noriuaoh 

J. 8. Cushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. 
Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 








PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 


It is intended in this book to show the his¬ 
torical significance of the recent movement for 
Proportional Representation, and a detailed appli¬ 
cation of the reform to American politics. Spe¬ 
cial consideration is given to city government, 
where, at present, other reforms are being tried, 
and where, it is believed, this one, if it were un¬ 
derstood, woip i also be heartily accepted. 

I am grateful for expert criticism on the proof, 
received from Professor J. W. Jenks of Cornell 
University, and Mr. Stoughton Cooley, Secretary 
of the American Proportional Representation 
League; and for helpful suggestions from Pro¬ 
fessor Richard T. Ely. 

JOHN R. COMMONS. 


January, 1896. 



► ♦ 



















PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 


The principal events in the history of Propor¬ 
tional Representation occurring since the publica¬ 
tion of the first edition, in 1896, have been the 
adoption, in 1899, of the system in Belgium and its 
rejection in Switzerland for the election of the 
national legislatures. The rejection in Switzer¬ 
land was made under the initiative and referen¬ 
dum law. The adoption in Belgium applies to 
both the upper and lower houses of parliament. 
The system employed is that proposed by M. 
D’Hondt, fully described in this book, pp. 122-130 
and 271-278. 

Appendix I. is retained as offering my proposi¬ 
tion for simplifying the mathematical calculations 
required in the “distribution of seats.” I believe 
the plan proposed, which consists merely in ex¬ 
cluding insignificant parties from the calculation, 
removes the only technical or complicated feature 
of proportional representation. 

Appendix II., “The Legalization of Political 
Parties,” written in 1898, is a stronger apprecia¬ 
tion of the part to be filled by the system of direct 
vii 



PBEFACE. 


viii 

primary elections than the paragraphs written two 
years earlier and contained in the body of the book. 
Likewise, the chapters on direct legislation and 
the referendum and initiative are intended to 
attach more importance to these reforms than they 
seemed to me at first to possess. The relations of 
these different reforms one to another and the 
stages which they necessarily follow are brought 
out in Appendix V., “ Proportional Representation 
from an American Point of View.” 

I have omitted the list of books and periodicals 
on account of the excellent and much more com¬ 
plete bibliography published in 1904 by the 
Library of Congress under the title, “ A List of 
Books (with references to periodicals) relating to 
Proportional Representation.” 

In preparing the first edition I was glad to 
acknowledge the aid of Professor J. W. Jenks of 
Cornell University, of my teacher and colleague. 
Professor Richard T. Ely, and of Mr. Stoughton 
Cooley, Secretary of the American Proportional 
Representation League. In preparing this sec¬ 
ond edition I am indebted for suggestions to Mr. 
Robert Tyson of Toronto, Canada, the present 
secretary of the League, and to Mr. George H. 
Shibley, Secretary of the National Federation for 
People’s Rule. 

Recent statistics of elections do not inodify the 
disproportions shown on pages 55 to 80. In the 
congressional election of 1904 the Democrats cast 


PBEFACE. 


IX 


41 per cent of the votes and elected 85 per cent of 
the congressmen, while the Republicans cast 54 
per cent of the votes and elected 65 per cent of 
the congressmen. The Republican majority of 112 
should have been a majority of 49. In 1906 the 
proportion was more nearly accurate. The Demo¬ 
crats with 44 per cent of the votes elected 42 per 
cent of the congressmen, and the Republicans 
with 51 per cent of the votes elected 59 per cent. 
The Republican majority of 60 should have been 
a majority of 38. In other words, the change in 
the popular vote, instead of reducing a Republi¬ 
can majority of 112 to one of 60, should have re¬ 
duced a majority of 49 to one of 38. 

The congressional delegation elected in Ohio in 
1906 contained 5 Democrats and 16 Republicans. 
The popular vote should have returned 10 Demo¬ 
crats and 11 Republicans. One Republican vote 
in Ohio has the value in Congress of 2.7 Demo¬ 
crats. 

In the British parliamentary election of 1906 
the Ministerialist groups had 56 per cent of the 
votes and elected 72 per cent of the members, and 
the Conservatives had 44 per cent of the votes 
and elected only 28 per cent of the members. 
The unprecedented Ministerialist majority of 256 
should have been the safe majority of 68. 

In the Oregon State election of 1906 the Repub¬ 
licans with 55 per cent of the votes elected 83 
members of the legislature, and the Democrats 


X 


PREFACE, 


with 34 per cent of the votes elected only 7. It 
required 4499 Democrats to elect one represen¬ 
tative and only 619 Republicans to elect one. 
Socialists and Prohibitionists with 11 per cent of 
the votes are unrepresented. In Wisconsin 32 per 
cent Democrats elected 19 per cent of the lower 
house, 57 per cent Republicans elected 77 per 
cent, and 8 per cent Socialists elected 4 per cent. 
In New York 49 per cent Democrats elected 30 
per cent of the assembly, and 49 per cent Repub¬ 
licans elected 69 per cent. 

In the New York aldermanic election of 1906 
a proportional count would have returned 18 
instead of 41 Republicans, 27 instead of 26 Demo¬ 
crats, 26 instead of 6 municipal ownership candi¬ 
dates, and 2 instead of no Socialists. 

JOHN R. COMMONS. 


University or Wisconsin. 



CONTENTS, 


CHAPTER. PAGE. 

1. The Failure of Legislative Assemblies . 1 

II. The Origin and Development of Repre¬ 
sentative Assemblies. 10 

III. The District System at Work. 36 

IV. The General Ticket, the Limited Vote, 

THE Cumulative Vote.86 

V. Proportional Representation. 99 

VI. Application of the Remedy. 132 

VII. “ Party Responsibility ”. 163 

VIII. City Government. 197 

IX. Social Reform. 223 

X. The Progress of Proportional Repre¬ 
sentation . 236 

APPENDIX 

1. The Distribution of Seats. 271 

II. The Legalization of Political Parties . 279 

III. Direct Legislation—the People’s Veto . 291 

IV. Referendum and Initiative in City 

Government. 311 

V. Proportional Representation from an 

American Point of View. 341 

VI. Representation of Interests. 355 

xi 
















PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER I. 

THE FAILURE OP LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 

The American people are fairly content with 
their executive and judicial departments of gov¬ 
ernment, but they feel that their law-making 
bodies have painfully failed. This conviction per¬ 
tains to all grades of legislatures, municipal, State, 
and Federal. The newspapers speak what the peo¬ 
ple feel; and, judging therefrom, it is popular to 
denounce aldermen, legislators, and congressmen. 
When Congress is in session, the business interests 
are reported to be in agony until it adjourns. The 
cry that rises towards the end of a legislature’s 
session is humiliating. The San Francisco Bulle¬ 
tin is quoted as saying : — 

«It is not possible to speak in measured terms of the 
thing that goes by the name of legislature in this State. 
It has of late years been the vilest deliberative body in the 
world. The assemblage has become one of bandits instead 
of law-makers. Everything within its grasp for years has 
been for sale. The commissions to high office which it con¬ 
fers are the outward and visible signs of felony rather than 
of careful and wise selection.” 


1 



2 pbopoetional representation . 

Every State in the Union can furnish examples 
more or less approaching to this. Statements 
almost as extreme are made regarding Congress. 
Great corporations and syndicates seeking legis¬ 
lative favors are known to control the acts of both 
branches. The patriotic ability and even the per¬ 
sonal character of members are widely distrusted 
and denounced. 

These outcries are not made only in a spirit of 
partisanship, but respectable party papers denounce 
unsparingly legislatures and councils whose ma¬ 
jorities are of their own political complexion. 
The people at large join in the attack. When 
statements so extreme as that given above are 
made by reputable papers and citizens, it is not 
surprising that the people at large have come 
thoroughly to distrust their law-makers. Charges 
of corruption and bribery are so abundant as to 
be taken as a matter of course. The honored 
historical name of alderman has frequently become 
a stigma of suspicion and disgrace. 

As might be expected, this distrust has shown 
itself in far-reaching constitutional changes. The 
powers of State and city legislatures have been 
clipped and trimmed until they offer no induce¬ 
ments for ambition. The powers of governors, 
mayors, judges, and administrative boards have 
been correspondingly increased. The growing 
popularity of the executive veto is one of the 


FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 3 

startling facts of the times. President Hayes 
vetoed more congressional bills than any prede¬ 
cessor, and his record has been excelled by Presi¬ 
dent Cleveland. A city has been known to turn 
out in mass-meetings, and to illuminate the heav¬ 
ens with bonfires, in honor of a mayor’s veto which 
rescued it from outrages and robberies perpetrated 
by its own lawfully elected “city fathers.” The 
prevailing reform in municipal government is the 
transfer of legislative functions, and even legis¬ 
lative discretion, from the city council to the 
mayor. 

Our municipal institutions were transplanted 
from England. As in the English system, the 
municipal council was supreme. It engrossed all 
the legislative and administrative powers of local 
government. It elected the mayor and heads of 
departments. It governed its appointees through 
its own committees. New York was the first city 
to break from this simplicity, as it has since gone 
farthest in stripping the council of power. Uni¬ 
versal distrust led first to the mayor’s appoint¬ 
ment by the governor, then to his popular election, 
and later to popular election of heads of depart¬ 
ments. Again, the control of finances was taken 
from the council and placed in an ex-officio Board 
of Estimate and Apportionment. The council 
still retained the right to confirm or reject the 
mayor’s appointees. Thus the unity of govern- 


4 


PROPOR TIONA L REP RESENT A TION. 


ment was lost. Responsibility was ravelled out 
into scores of aimless threads. Mr. A. H. Green, 
a few years ago, found “eighty different boards 
or individuals who could create debt indepen¬ 
dently of each other.” ^ Here was the oppor¬ 
tunity of the “ boss ” and the party machine. 
Unity must somehow be secured. The “boss,” 
a mere private citizen, gathered into his hands 
these scattered threads, and centralized the gov¬ 
ernment of the city in himself. He controlled 
nominations and elections. He appointed and re¬ 
moved officers. He pitted council against mayor, 
boards against council, subordinates against chiefs, 
making them all responsible to him. But he was 
responsible to no one. The latest movement in 
municipal reform is to legalize the boss in the 
person of the mayor, to give him sole power to 
appoint and remove all heads of departments, but 
to elect him by popular vote and make him re¬ 
sponsible to the people. The movement is not 
yet completed. The council remains a shrivelled 
and vicious relic. Logically, it should be abol¬ 
ished or reformed. 

A similar movement, though later in time, is 
affecting State legislatures. The governor has 
been considerably exalted, but the movement is 
as yet mainly in the stage of independent boards, 
clothed with certain legislative and administrative 

1 L. Williams, Arena, vol. ix., p. 644. 


FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 5 

authority. Where the governor at first appointed 
these boards, as in the case of the Railway Com¬ 
missioners of Iowa, popular election is substituted. 
The Constitutions of the new States of North and 
South Dakota, Montana, and Washington, may be 
considered as stating the thought of the American 
people at the present time regarding their legisla¬ 
tures.^ Several administrative boards are created 
in these new States, all filled by popular elec¬ 
tion. Among these are commissions to supervise 
and regulate insurance, railroads, agriculture and 
labor, prisons, and public lands. These commis¬ 
sions absorb, in various degrees, the powers of 
legislatures, executives, and judges. They are the 
nondescript, many-headed agents of the people 
distrusting the legislature, but not yet ready to 
confide everything to the governor’s autocracy. 

If it be inferred that these commissions are 
created not to belittle, but to enlighten, the 
legislature, and to act as its agents, we need 
only notice the maze of constitutional restrictions 
thrown about all legislative acts. ‘‘The articles 
in the new State Constitutions on the ‘ legislative 
department ’ are long and detailed. They seem 
to be composed by the framers in order to declare 
what the respective State legislatures cannot be 
permitted to do. . . . [They declare] by what 

1 See article by F. N. Thorpe in Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, September, 1891. 


6 


FEOFOBTIONAL BEFBESENTATION, 


procedure the legislature shall act, on what it 
shall not act, and to what extent it may act. 
The chief limitations on the legislature are with 
respect to special or private legislation, corpora¬ 
tions, political corruption among members, taxa¬ 
tion, and power to use the credit of the State.” ^ 

These constitutional restrictions, extending to 
legislatures and municipal councils, have forced 
another branch of government, the judiciary, to 
the front. Conscious of popular approval, judges 
have steadily encroached upon the field of legisla¬ 
tive discretion, and reluctantly, it may he, have 
more and more assumed the right to set aside 
legislative statutes. This interference, however 
justifiable the reasons, is fraught with danger to 
the judiciary. It is thereby, at the expense of its 
integrity in the field of administration and justice, 
forced into the political arena, where are the 
heated questions of political expediency. Popular 
election of judges, short terms, and partisanship 
will result. “ The executive,” says Judge Horace 
Davis,2 “ all-powerful at the beginning [of colonial 
history], was reduced to a mere shadow of its 
former glory, and in these later days is regaining 
some of its lost power. The legislature, at first 
weak, afterwards absorbed the powers of the other 

1 Thorpe, as above, p. 17. 

2 “American Constitutions,” “Johns Hopkins University- 
Studies in History and Politics,” 3d series, pp. 55, 59. 


FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. T 

departments, but is now much reduced again. 
Throughout all these changes the dignity and 
power of the judges have steadily increased. . . . 
Their greatest power, most amazing to Europeans, 
is the authority to set aside a statute which they 
hold to be in conflict with the written Constitu¬ 
tion. No other courts in the world possess tliis 
unique power. . . . The scope of this power 
is much broadened by the modern tendency to 
limit legislation. The early Constitutions were 
very brief, containing usually little more than a 
bill of rights and a skeleton of the government, 
leaving all details to the discretion of the legisla¬ 
ture. Now all this is changed; the bounds of the 
different departments are carefully defined, and 
the power of the legislature is jealously curbed, 
particularly in the domain of special legislation. 
It will be seen at a glance that this enlarges the 
relative power of the courts. It limits the legisla¬ 
ture and widens the field of the judiciary at one 
stroke.” 

Not only do the judges pretend to override 
the legislatures, but their exalted position renders 
them confidently autocratic in other directions. 
They are learning to dispense with juries, to dan¬ 
gerously widen the scope of injunctions, and to 
punish for contempt in cases not contemplated in 
our Constitutions. The legislatures and Congress, 
which are legally in a position to check these usur- 


8 


PROPOBTIONAL BPPBESENTATION. 


pations, are practically helpless from their lack of 
ability and their loss of popular confidence. 

This demoralization of legislative bodies, these 
tendencies to restrict legislation, must be viewed 
as a profoundly alarming feature of American 
politics. Just as the duties of legislation are in¬ 
creasing as never before, in order to meet the vital 
wants of a complex civilization, the essential or¬ 
gans for performing those duties are felt to be in 
a state of collapse. The legislature controls the 
purse, the very life-blood of the city, the State, 
the nation. It can block every other depart¬ 
ment. It ought to stand nearest to the lives, the 
wishes, the wisdom, of the people. It is their 
necessary organ for creating, guiding, watching, 
and supporting all the departments of govern¬ 
ment. Above them all, then, it ought to be 
eminently representative. But it is the least rep¬ 
resentative of all. Surely, then, for the American 
people beyond all others, and in a high degree, 
too, for all peoples who are developing popular 
government, it is pertinent to inquire carefully 
into the fundamental nature of these representa¬ 
tive institutions, the causes of their failures, and 
the means, if any can be found, to adapt them to 
the exigencies of modern times. 

Why is it that a legislative assembly, which in 
our country’s infancy summoned to its haUs a 
Madison or a Hamilton to achieve the liberties 


FAILURE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 9 


of the people, has now fallen so low that our 
public spirited men hesitate to approach it ? The 
municipal council in early times, as now in Eng¬ 
land and Germany, comprised the stanchest men 
of the community. The American Congress was 
once the arena for a Webster, a Clay, a Calhoun, 
whose debates a nation followed. If it can be 
shown by what means representative assemblies 
formerly enrolled the honored leaders of the peo¬ 
ple, and met precisely the problems of the day, 
we may be able to see how the social and political 
conditions of to-day, resulting from changes of the 
past fifty years, have outgrown those early institu¬ 
tions, and rendered their original fitness a dis¬ 
astrous encumbrance. 


10 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER II. 

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OP 
REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 

A STRIKING feature of social evolution is the 
decay and obstruction of institutions which in 
their day were essential to progress. The funda¬ 
mental changes in society are unobtrusive. The 
increase of wealth and intelligence, the rise of cor¬ 
porations, the combinations of labor, the spread of 
democracy, the deepening of religion, the unfold¬ 
ing of new ideals and hopes, — these are the fun¬ 
damental motives and objects of social growth. 
Laws, legislatures, commissions, courts, are the 
machinery and devices whereby the people work 
out their ideals. If the work to be done changes, 
the machinery becomes obsolete. It may be aban¬ 
doned altogether, as was slavery; or it may be re¬ 
vised and readapted, as when the king, an heredi¬ 
tary executive, was displaced by the president, an 
elected executive — provided always that the good 
fruits of the past be not jeopardized. 

Representative assemblies were devised to meet 
certain social ends; they sprang from historical 
conditions. It is in the changing character of 
these ends and conditions that the modern prob¬ 
lems of representation have arisen. 


REPRESENTA TIVE A S8EMBLIES. 


11 


1. The original object which produced repre¬ 
sentative assemblies was nationalization. This is 
shown in the twofold aspect of the union of local 
governments into a nation, and the coalescence of 
social classes in a single representative assembly. 

(1.) The English nation, from which our repre¬ 
sentative institutions were inherited, was formed 
by welding together independent local communi¬ 
ties into a central organization, without destroy¬ 
ing the local governments. Previous experiments 
in nationalization had resulted in the tyranny of 
the capital city and the slavery of the provinces. 
The reason is plain to every historical student, 
and the same forces were working to the same 
outcome in England. But the principle of rep¬ 
resentation, almost unknown to the ancients, was 
discovered; and it permitted the unity of a nation, 
while preserving the freedom of the localities. 

The primitive idea of a law-making body was 
the primary assembly of all the warriors. The 
king and his chief advisefsagreed on resolutions, 
and offered them to a simple yea and nay vote of 
the army. Every freeman had the right to appear 
in his own person in the national assembly. After 
the Norman conquest this right was retained in 
theory, but abandoned in practice. Gradually 
only the wealthy land-owners, the tenants in chief, 
and the higher clergy appeared. The distances 
were too great, the expense too heavy, and their 


12 PEOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


influence too slight, for the small land-owners to 
continue attendance. And as for the serfs and 
the town merchants and artisans, they never had 
the right. Thus the king and his council of 
magnates became the sole government of Eng¬ 
land. They enacted the laws and controlled their 
enforcement. The people had no voice, neither 
were they represented. 

Slowly two forces were at work. The king 
gave away his private estates, upon which he was 
supposed to support himself and his administra¬ 
tion, and was therefore compelled to look else¬ 
where for funds. During the same time the 
unrepresented classes of small farmers and town 
merchants and workmen were acquiring wealth. 
The king was forced to ask them for contribu¬ 
tions, or “subsidies,” to help him in his wars. 
Experience showed that these aids could not be 
secured by compulsion. The king must obtain 
the consent of his subjects. Neither could their 
hearty consent and co-operation be obtained when 
they were approached privately and individually. 
They must have the king’s affairs laid before them 
in assembly, and the state of his exchequer ex¬ 
plained. But a national primary assembly of all 
the people was impossible. However, there was 
in existence the more or less well-organized county 
government, with a history running far back into 
Anglo-Saxon times. Here was a convenient pri- 


BEPBESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 


13 


mary assembly of all the landowners, twice a year 
at the county seat, when the king’s justices made 
their circuit. Here the germs of representation 
had appeared in the practice of electing juries to 
present the criminal matters of the county before 
the king’s judges, and of electing assessors to levy 
the king’s taxes upon the countyAlso there 
was a true legislative representation in the prac¬ 
tice of the rural towns and the boroughs, which 
sent delegates to the county courts. Very natu¬ 
rally, it occurred to the king to ask this county 
primary to elect “ two good and discreet knights,” 
who should represent the land-owners before him, 
and hear and act upon his demands 

In the towns, also, had quietly grown up the 
merchant and craft guilds, compact organizations 
of tradesmen and manufacturers, with mutual in¬ 
terests mutually protected. When the king could 
no longer wring from them money by coercion, he 
invited them to send their two accredited dele¬ 
gates for a national gathering of guild represen¬ 
tatives. 

What is the significance of these devices ? In 
ancient Rome the tax collectors swarmed from the 
imperial city with proconsuls and armies at their 
backs, to exact arbitrary tribute from the prov- 


1 Stubbs, “Constitutional History,” vol. i., p. 586. 

2 These were first summoned in 1254, by Henry III., on occa¬ 
sion of a military campaign into Gascony. 


14 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


inces. Pi*ovincial self-government, and with it 
liberty and rights of property, were destroyed. In 
England the provinces joined with the central 
government, tlirough their elected representatives, 
in determining the rate of taxation and in assess¬ 
ing it to individuals. Concessions in turn were 
made by the king, grievances were redressed, local 
self-government, and with it liberty and rights of 
property, were maintained. 

(2) The union of localities alone does not 
form a nation; there must he added the union of 
classes. The first was the work of the thirteenth 
century, the second of the fourteenth. At the 
end of the thirteenth century there were at least 
four legislative assemblies, each representing a 
distinct class. They hardly deserved the name 
of legislatures; they were rather conventions of 
different social classes, negotiating with the king 
at separate times and places, regarding their own 
particular class interests. They did not meet to¬ 
gether. Each convention separately enacted laws 
with the consent of the king. In 1336 a council 
of merchants from twenty-one cities agreed with 
the king “to increase customs on wool, to extend 
monopolies, and enlarge the privileges of trade.” ^ 
Such matters were considered to affect only mer¬ 
chants and townsmen. In the thirteenth century 
military tenants and land-owners, including the 

1 Stubbs, “Constitutional History,” vol. ii., p. 379. 


BEPBESENTATIVE AUSEMBLIES. 


15 


representatives from the counties, enacted the great 
statutes, De Donis, Quia Emptores^ and others, — 
regulating the holding of real property, without 
consulting the burgesses and clergy. The clergy 
also managed their large estates and voted taxes 
thereon without reference to other assemblies; 
and the laws of a political nature, such as those 
affecting Ireland and Wales, or foreign relations, 
which were not supposed to affect clergy, knights, 
or burgesses, were enacted by the Great Council 
without consulting these popular bodies.^ 

By the end of the fourteenth century, these as¬ 
semblies were combined in the House of Lords 
and the House of Commons. Here were the 
steps: The clergy were gradually deprived of 
their power to legislate. The higher clergy then 
simply retained the place they had always held 
in the Great Council, and this became the modern 
House of Lords. The lower clergy were merged 
into the electorate of the counties and towns. 
Again, the representatives from the small land- 
owners of the counties, and those from the guilds 
of the towns, were drawn together by common 
interests against king and nobility. They elected 
a ‘‘speaker” to present their petitions to the king, 
and thus, in time, became the House of Com¬ 
mons. 

This legislative assembly, therefore, was based 

1 Heam, “ Government of England,” pp. 423^8. 


16 PBOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


upon two principles, the representation of local¬ 
ities and the representation of the two organized 
social classes, town capitalists and country farm¬ 
ers, which governed those localities. 

This was the original problem of representation. 
How different is it now! Not only the kingdom 
of England, but the “ United Kingdom ” of Eng¬ 
land, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland, has become a 
nation. Localities have lost their significance 
and their sanctity. Certain sections, like Ireland, 
retain apparently local, but really class, griev¬ 
ances. On the whole, railw^ays, telegraph, the 
press, internal trade, and representation itself, 
have brought the people together. Foreign rela¬ 
tions, a world-wide system of colonies, national 
armies and navies, have exalted a national flag 
and inspired a national patriotism. No longer 
would it be tolerable to leave the laws upon the 
tariff to merchants and importers, land-laws to 
real-estate owners, foreign relations to the nobil¬ 
ity, or church taxation to the clergy. The repre¬ 
sentative to-day is therefore not a mere agent of 
a close corporation or a social class. After five 
centuries, Edmund Burke could say, “ Parliament 
is not a congress of ambassadors from different 
and hostile interests, which interests each must 
maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other 
agents and advocates; but Parliament is a deliber¬ 
ative assembly of our nation, with one interest, — 


BEPBESENTA TIVE ASSEMBLIES. 


17 


that of the whole, — where not local purposes, not 
local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general 
good, resulting from the general reason of the 
whole. You choose a member, indeed, but when 
you have chosen him, he is not a member of 
Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament.” ^ 

In America, too, the problem of representative 
government has been that of nationalization. It 
has passed three stages. First, counties and towns 
were united into colonies; second, colonies united 
in the Confederation; third. States formed the na¬ 
tion. By the first, the State legislatures arose; 
by the third, the national Congress. 

Just as the physical child, according to the 
biologists, repeats in a brief time its ancestral 
history of geological ages, so did the colonies, 
the children of English political institutions, re¬ 
peat in a few years the slow and painful evolution 
of centuries. The stages are best recorded in 
Maryland.2 Originally the Constitution, as framed 
by the proprietor, consisted of the governor, ap¬ 
pointed by the proprietor, a council, appointed by 
the governor, and a primary assembly of all the 
freemen. At first all could attend. But settle¬ 
ments expanded over a wide area. At the second 
assembly, in 1638, those who could not attend 

1 Address to the electors of Bristol, “ Collected Works,” 
London, 1854. Bonn, vol. i., p. 447. 

2 See Doyle, “ English Colonies in America. Virginia, Mary¬ 
land, and the Carolinas,” p. 286 ff. 


18 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


in person were allowed to send proxies. But 
proxies were apparently bought up by the governor 
and his council in order to override the popular 
wish. In 1639 the third assembly met. On this 
occasion the various “ hundreds ” were instructed 
to elect representatives. Yet, after the election, 
one person, at least, came forward and claimed the 
right of appearing in person, on the ground that 
he had voted in the minority and so was not 
represented. The claim was allowed. In 1642 
the assembly became typically representative by 
excluding the proxies and those appearing in 
their own right, and limiting its membership to 
those elected by the localities. Thus the linger¬ 
ing hope of doing justice to the unrepresented 
minority was abandoned. But the colony was 
united on the basis of local interests. 

In the colony of Massachusetts Bay we find 
again similar conditions and a similar outcome. 
“ The growth of fresh settlements brought with it 
an expansion of the constitutional machinery of 
the colony. . . . The Constitution of Massachusetts 
was older than the existence of the colony. The 
legislature of the colony was simply the general 
court of the company transferred across the At¬ 
lantic. At the same time the dispersal of the 
settlers at once unfitted that body for the work 
of legislation. The remedy first applied to this 
difficulty was, not to substitute a representative 


BEPBESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 


19 


assembly for a primary one, but to limit the func¬ 
tions of the court. It is clear that there was an 
oligarchical temper at work among the leading 
men in Massachusetts. The action of this was 
plainly shown by the transfer of all legislative 
rights from the court of freemen to the governor, 
deputy-governor, and assistants. At the same time 
the election of the governor was handed over from 
the freemen to the assistants. . . . 

“ True to English precedent, Massachusetts 
found the salvation of her constitutional liberties 
in a question of taxation. When the governor 
had intended to change his abode to Newtown, 
the assembly resolved to fortify that settlement at 
public charge. ... To meet the cost a rate was 
levied on each town by order of the governor and 
assistants. Against this the men of Watertown 
protested. . . . Though the men of Watertown 
gave way on the main issue, their protest seems 
to have borne fruit. In the next year the powers 
of the governor were formally defined by an act. 
It was also enacted by the General Court, in the 
following May, that the whole body of freemen 
should choose the governor, deputy-governor, and 
assistants. A farther step towards self-govern¬ 
ment was taken in the resolution that every town 
should appoint two representatives to advise the 
governor and assistants on the question of taxa¬ 
tion. We can hardly err in supposing that this 


20 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATION. 


was the direct result of the protest made by the 
men of Watertown.” ^ 

It was in Connecticut that the origin of repre¬ 
sentative government first appears as a federation 
of independent towns, rather than a local repre¬ 
sentation to resist a central authority. The three 
towns which had been settled along the Connecti¬ 
cut River united in 1638, and “ formally declared 
themselves a commonwealth with a Constitution 
of their own. ... A system of representation 
was adopted at once, instead of being slowly 
worked out through a series of expedients and 
compromises. The legislature was to consist of 
a governor, six assistants, and deputies. The gov¬ 
ernor and assistants were to be elected annually 
by the whole body of freemen, met in a general 
court for that purpose. The deputies were to be 
elected by the three existing towns, four from each. 
As fresh towns were formed, their number of repre¬ 
sentatives was to be fixed by the government.” 2 

Other colonies passed through similar experi¬ 
ences. A common form of representation was 
developed in them all. It was exactly suited to 
the needs of an independent, but busy and scat¬ 
tered farming and land-owning constituency, in 
their efforts to combine and resist the royal and 
oligarchical tendencies of the times. 

1 Doyle, “ The Puritan Colonies,’’ vol. i., pp. 103-106. 

2 md., pp. 159,160. 


UEPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 


21 


The Confederation was a temporary experiment 
in nationalization which served the purposes of 
revolt against England, but failed in peace. 

In the Constitution of the United States two 
principles are recognized, — representation of States 
in the Senate, representation of the people in the 
House. But in both cases representation is based 
on residence. Pre-eminently, sections are repre¬ 
sented. 

The problem of nationalization has been solved, 
not by Congress, however, which proved inade¬ 
quate, but by civil war. The days of the bright¬ 
est glory of Congress were those preceding the 
war, when the question of the Union was de¬ 
bated. Sections have yet their claims in a nation 
as wide as ours, but social and economic and class 
questions have overshadowed them. Foreign re¬ 
lations, currency, customs duties, are national 
questions. The war amendments have brought 
citizenship and rights of property under Federal 
protection. Federal control has reached out for 
the two most important business interests, banking 
and railways. Federal interference has grown into 
marvellous ramifications; and, with the consolida¬ 
tion of national trusts and syndicates^ we may 
expect to see it still further extended. The sig¬ 
nificance of these momentous changes will appear 
when we proceed to the development of modern 
political parties. 


22 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


It has appeared from the preceding pages that 
the origin of representative assemblies in State 
and national governments depended upon the pre¬ 
vious existence of organized local governments 
separated by wide territorial areas. This neces¬ 
sitated the adoption of what has become the 
district system of electing single delegates to 
represent semi-autonomous governments. Such 
a system has still its justification in many re¬ 
spects, especially in a country as extended as the 
United States, with its sectional differences of 
climate, resources, products, and people. But 
why this system should survive to the present 
day in the election of city legislatures is one of 
the enigmas of politics, to be solved by reference 
to the traditions and inertia of mankind. In the 
United States and new countries there are not 
even historical reasons for the growth of this 
system. Here the transition from primary assem¬ 
blies was made simply by way of imitation. It 
was to England that the framers of our municipal 
constitutions turned when our cities had advanced 
beyond a size convenient for the ancient popular 
assembly. It is, therefore, in the origin of Eng¬ 
lish cities that we shall find the explanation of 
the origin of the district system. 

The earliest records seem to indicate that Eng¬ 
lish cities were simply concentrated hundreds and 
counties. In Norman times, the larger cities were 


BEPBESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 


23 


organized like counties, with their sheriff, their 
county court, composed of all the freeholders of 
the county, and the historical representatives from 
the townships. Here we have the origin of coun- 
cilmen elected from the wards, the condensed 
townships. But the city was not at all an or¬ 
ganic body, with recognized common interests. 
It was a curious mixture of all the different in¬ 
terests which happened to be thrown together in 
the neighborhood. In primitive London ^ there 
were the original military tenants of the crown, 
with their independent manors and courts and 
their agricultural serfs; there were the parishes, 
governed by the bishop and the chapter and the 
monasteries; and there were the guilds, admin¬ 
istered by their own officers and administering 
their own property. Over all these jarring inter¬ 
ests the sheriff presided as the representative of 
the king. 

But the circumstances of the times and the 
needs of defence drew the residents nearer to¬ 
gether in common interests. This appears first 
in the development of the guilds of merchants. 
Through commerce they gained wealth; this 
brought political power; and soon the merchant 
guild absorbed the law-making power of the en¬ 
tire city, its charter became the city charter, and 
its maire the city mayor. 

1 See Stubbs, vol. i., p. 407. 


24 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


In still later times, when manufactures arose 
into prominence alongside merchandizing, new 
guilds were organized, representing different 
trades. There were the weavers, the shoema¬ 
kers, the goldsmiths, the butchers, and many 
others. Each of these craft-guilds had its own 
president, the alderman. They soon demanded 
a share in the city government, which was finally 
granted; and their aldermen were given the right 
to sit together as a law-making body, each rep¬ 
resenting his own guild. In the reign of Ed¬ 
ward II., “ all the citizens were obliged to be 
enrolled among the trade-guilds, and in the reign 
of Edward III. the election of the city magis¬ 
trates was transferred from the representatives 
of the ward-moots to the trading companies.” ^ 
Thus, to-day, “London, and the municipal system 
generally, has in the mayor a relic of the com¬ 
munal idea, in the alderman the representative 
of the guild, and in the councillors of the wards 
the successors to the rights of the most ancient 
township system.” 2 

The question arises. How came it that so ra¬ 
tional a system as the election of aldermen by the 
different organized interests of the cities should 
have been displaced by the arbitrary system of 
election by territorial districts or wards ? The 

1 Stubbs, vol. i., p. 419. 

» Ibid., p. 424. 


BEPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 


25 


answer is brief. The ancient system itself was 
practically an election by wards, because the dif¬ 
ferent trades were grouped together, each in its 
own district of the city. And when the federa¬ 
tion of guilds was abolished and elections thrown 
open to a widened suffrage, it seemed wholly nat¬ 
ural to continue that district system which was 
seen to be in vogue in the counties and in the 
election of councilmen. 

When American cities adopted representative 
government, they adopted the English district 
system. The transition is vividly portrayed in 
the history of Boston.^ Until the year 1822 the 
government of Boston had been a primary as¬ 
sembly. On the 1st of May, 1822, the popula¬ 
tion had grown to 45,000, the qualified voters to 
7,000 or 8,000, too many for a primary assembly. 
In that year the General Court of Massachusetts 
drew up a charter entitled “ An Act establishing 
the City of Boston.” It was presented to the 
voters of Boston, and accepted by a vote of 2,797 
to 1,881. “. . . As authorizing the first depart¬ 

ure from the system of local government which 
had been in operation nearly two centuries, it was 
regarded as a measure of the very highest impor¬ 
tance. Not a few of the old residents, who had 

1 J. M. Bugbee, “ The City Government of Boston,” in “ Johns 
Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science,” 
6th series, p. 95. 


26 peopobtional bepeesentation. 


fought under the eyes of Washington in the field, 
and under the eyes of Samuel Adams in the town 
meetings, looked upon the act which divided their 
great folk-mote into twelve separate and silent 
gatherings, where men delegated their rights to 
others, as the beginning of the end of democratic 
government.” 

Little need be said about the differences be¬ 
tween the original problems of representation in 
cities, and those of their present development. The 
city is, above all political organizations, a unit 
in itself. Aldermen and councillors should not 
represent wards, they should represent the city. 
The ward has no place in city politics except, 
perhaps, as an administrative division. It is well 
recognized that cities present the most aggravated 
failures of American politics; and, so far as the 
legislative branch is concerned, the failure lies 
mainly in this unnatural partition into petty dis¬ 
tricts. 

2. Proceeding from these historical conditions, 
we can perceive the impressive significance of the 
modem growth of national political parties. Be¬ 
fore there were national questions there were no 
national parties, and even the early development 
of party divisions was on territorial lines. The 
Whigs were almost unknown in the counties, and 
the Tories unknown in the cities. Consequently, 
there was no important minority in either division 


REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 


27 


which was unrepresented. Cities were unanimous 
on national questions, and so were the counties, 
because the only important question they had to 
meet was the demand of the king for additional 
subsidies. More or less, the distinction between 
city and county continues in England to the 
present day. The original representatives of the 
agricultural and the capitalist classes, whose co¬ 
alescence formed the nation, have carried their 
different interests into the House of Commons. 
And now that the king is only a figurehead, and 
the House of Lords an occasional check, the 
House of Commons has become almost supreme; 
Social and economic questions divide- its members; 
and they group themselves in national parties, to 
contend, not against king and lords, but among 
themselves. 

In the United States, on the other hand, the 
corporate, autonomous character of local govern¬ 
ments is scarcely recognized in the creation of 
representative districts. District lines are fre¬ 
quently changed; cities have grown up, and have 
been grouped with rural areas; the apportion¬ 
ment of representatives is wholly territorial. Con¬ 
sequently, in the country at large the national 
parties which have grown up are often evenly di¬ 
vided in the territorial districts, and a representa¬ 
tive of the majority, therefore, does not represent 
the opinions and wishes of the mass of his con- 


28 peopobtional eepbesentation. 


stituency. The minority is simply discarded for 
the time being. 

In the United States the power of political 
parties has reached a vigor unattained by those 
of any other country. This power is the growth 
of not more than fifty years. It has made its 
greatest advances since the period of the civil 
war. The peculiar feature of this development 
has been the supremacy of that new force in polit¬ 
ical parties, the “machine.” Party organization 
is an essential element of party government; but 
the extent, perfection, and detail of this organiza¬ 
tion in the United States are bewildering. It con¬ 
trols both candidates and voters with an iron-like 
grip, and they glory in their subjection. These 
parties are not divided on territorial lines. They 
are divided mainly on national questions. 

In colonial times parties were unknown. Or 
rather, we might say, there was a court party, or 
a party of prerogative, represented by the gov¬ 
ernor and his council, while the legislatures, the 
representative bodies, stood practically for a united 
people. The upper house being appointed by the 
governor, the lower house was drawn together as 
a single unit, representing all the people. No 
matter from what county a representative was 
returned, he was the ablest man in the county, 
for the people were unanimous in their wishes to 
withstand the party of prerogative. Furthermore, 


REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 


29 


the districts were all alike, being exclusively agri¬ 
cultural, and the representative from one was in 
harmony with the people of the others. There 
was no minority in any district to be unrepre¬ 
sented by a delegate chosen by the majority. 

But to-day the legislature, whether in city. 
State, or nation, instead of being the organized 
representatives of those who protest against the 
government, is itself the government. Within its 
walls occur the struggles for the control of the 
fortunes and destinies of the people. There is no 
outside, enemy whose constant presence enforces 
harmony and mutual help. Two national parties 
stand face to face in constant conflict, and which¬ 
ever masters the legislature masters the people. 

3. Furthermore, from the earliest times, the suf¬ 
frage, both in England and the United States, was 
narrowly limited. The masses of the people were 
not considered as citizens, or entitled to politi¬ 
cal weight. In the counties, serfs, copyholders, 
and the lesser freemen were excluded from the 
suffrage. Only the freehold knights were voters. 
The cities were close corporations, made up of 
the mayor and aldermen, and a few of the leading 
men of the guilds. Altogether, perhaps not one- 
fifth of the adult male population was entitled to 
vote for representatives to Parliament. As a re¬ 
sult, on the few questions of national interest on 
which they were required to select representatives. 


80 PEOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


the ruling classes in their respective districts were 
practically unanimous. The trial of representa¬ 
tive government in England on a democratic basis 
did not really begin until after the years 1867 and 
1884, when the town and country laborers were 
enfranchised. And if the failure of these institu¬ 
tions is more complete in the United States than 
in England, it is mainly because we have been 
longer trying to solve the problems of democracy 
with an aristocratic and capitalistic form of repre¬ 
sentation. For it must be remembered, as already 
shown, that the local government and liberty 
which representation preserved to Englishmen 
was the government and liberty of land-owners 
and capitalists, and not primarily of serfs and 
laborers. 

In colonial times, also, the local governments 
were close corporations, and the representation by 
districts suited their purposes. In the South a 
few aristocratic slave-holding families, united by 
ties of blood and marriage, controlled each county 
government. They could come together often 
in social and business meetings, and, like the di¬ 
rectors of a modern business corporation, could 
choose their agents and attorneys to conduct the 
county government and to represent them in the 
State and national legislatures. They selected 
the ablest men they could find. They wanted 
their property and their independence well pro- 


REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 


31 


tected. And in New England the church mem¬ 
bers alone, that is, the wealthy and educated 
classes of the community, held the suffrage. In 
Massachusetts, in 1780, only 4 per cent of the 
population were voters; in 1890, 29.7 per cent.^ 

In the United States, to-day, not only the origi¬ 
nal Anglo-Saxon is admitted to the suffrage, but 
also millions from antagonistic races. Especially 
is this true of the large cities, where 50 per cent 
to 80 per cent of the voters are foreign-bom and 
children of foreigners.^ If England is threatened 
by the widening of the suffrage, far more is the 
Republic of America. The great political ques¬ 
tions of to-day are those which grow out of the 
citizenship of the manual laborers, the former 
serfs. These questions have to do directly or re¬ 
motely with the profound problem of the owner¬ 
ship of wealth and the betterment of the social 

1 See A. B. Hart, “ Practical Essays on American Govern¬ 
ment,” pp. 35, 54. 

A representative assembly may be seen to-day emerging in 
the Empire of India, and the methods of election there to be 
observed illustrate precisely the advantages of limited suffrage 
and viva voce voting in primitive English and colonial constitu¬ 
encies. The natives are unrepresented in the British government 
of the empire, but they have recently instituted representative 
assemblies to consult and petition the India Council and the 
Crown. The delegates to these assemblies are voted for in the 
various localities by only the high-caste, educated, and wealthy 
classes, numbering, perhaps, 15 per cent of the population, and 
they are elected by acclamation. They are in all cases the most 
distinguished men of their constituencies. 

2 Hart, as above, pp. 196, 198. 


32 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


conditions of the lowest classes. These classes are 
distributed throughout all districts. They form 
the wide foundation structure of every community, 
upon which the other classes are built. They 
compose the majority of the voters. They feel 
that they have not heretofore been represented in 
the councils of the city, the State, or the nation. 
They are unaccustomed to political control, and 
therefore they are the fertile soil for demagogues 
and partisans. They hold the balance of power. 
They must be placated and pacified. The party 
or candidate who presents to them the most spe¬ 
cious appeals wins the day. They themselves are 
not allowed to combine according to their natural 
divisions, and elect their acknowledged leaders to 
the council, the legislature, and Congress. Could 
they combine throughout the nation, the labor 
unions, scattered as they are through a hundred 
districts, would unite, and the more intelligent of 
the laborers would have influence in selecting 
those who represent them as a body, just as they 
select their national presidents and secretaries. As 
it is, they are forced into artificial territorial di¬ 
visions, and are compelled, along with the whole of 
the electorate, to submit to the candidates who 
appeal to the more ignorant, thoughtless, preju¬ 
diced and easily influenced masses.^ 

It is in the wide extension of suffrage that we 

1 On this point see also below, Chapter VIII. 


REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES. 33 

find the underlying cause of the “machine” and 
the “boss.” Close organization, with its minute 
attention to details, and personal supervision of 
the rank and file, is the secret for wielding great 
armies of unthinking men. The Catholic and 
Methodist churches and the Salvation Army are 
striking triumphs of organizing ability dealing 
with the unprivileged and disorganized masses. 
The party machine does the same for the neg¬ 
lected, isolated, ignorant voters. 

4. Again, legislation in the olden times was 
very limited, both in the number of subjects dis¬ 
cussed and the details of the regulations. The 
people were satisfied to live according to the cus¬ 
toms of their ancestors. Government was simply 
a matter of administration. The king, his council, 
his officers, and his judges were not called upon 
to make new laws, but to learn what were the 
customs of the land, and then to act accordingly. 
But to-day legislation is the most intricate of arts, 
depending upon the profoundest sciences, and dom¬ 
inating the most vital of human interests. There 
are hundreds of pressing problems, requiring legis¬ 
lative direction, which the assemblies of Edward 
I., or even the parliaments of George III., never 
dreamed to be of social importance. “Time was,” 
says Woodrow Wilson,^ “in the infancy of na¬ 
tional representative bodies, when the representa- 
1 “ The state,” New York, 1890, page 583. 


34 fbopobtional bepbesentation. 


tives of the people were called upon simply to 
give or to refuse their assent to laws prepared by 
a king or by a privileged class in the state; but 
that time is far passed. The modern representa¬ 
tive has to judge of the gravest affairs of govern¬ 
ment, and has to judge as an originator of policies. 
It is his duty to adjust every weighty plan, pre¬ 
side over every important reform, provide for 
every passing need of the state. All the motive 
power of government rests with him. His task, 
therefore, is as complex as the task of governing, 
and the task of governing is as complex as is the 
play of economic and social forces over which it 
has to preside. Law-making now moves with a 
freedom, now sweeps through a field, unknown to 
any ancient legislator; it no longer provides for 
the simple needs of small city-states, but for the 
necessities of vast nations, numbering their tens 
of millions.” 

The modern legislator must, therefore, be well 
equipped. He must give the greater part of his 
time to parliamentary duties, and, above all, must 
have a long experience in his particular art. No 
more striking evidence of obsolescence can be cited 
than this, that, while the duties of legislation have 
increased as never before, the law-makers them¬ 
selves have sunken into incompetence and obloquy. 

5. There is one external influence on modern 
legislation so extremely important as to demand 


EEPItESENTA TIVE A S SEME LIES. 


35 


special notice. This is the private corporation, 
with its professional lobby. Corporations are as 
recent as party machines, and both have grown 
up together like Siamese twins. The professional 
lobbyists are nearly always the managers of the 
political machine. They carry in their pockets 
the political fortunes of the legislators. The 
“ third house ” is the modern legislature, at least 
in the United States. Corporations, from their 
very inception and in their daily activities, are the 
creatures of government. Their life is legislation. 
They cannot, if they would, dispense with their 
lobby. 

This is an entirely new feature in the constitu¬ 
tion of representative assemblies. The first general 
corporation laws in the United States were enacted 
in the ’50’s, following the rapid extension of rail¬ 
ways and the organization of banks. A legislature 
that may have sufficed for simple duties in the 
days of isolated individual industries, is almost 
sure to wither in an era of private corporations 
with public functions and fabulous resources. 


36 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER III. 

THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 

In the preceding chapter the main differences 
have been shown between the ancient and the 
modern problems, constituencies, and conditions of 
representation. We have now to inquire into the 
actual workings of this primitive institution in the 
midst of modern surroundings. 

The position of the American voter who attempts 
independence is well known to be unenviable. 
When he comes to the polls to cast his ballot, he 
finds but one candidate to be chosen for any given 
office. He finds that, through the machinery of 
the political party with which he has acted, there 
is one candidate offered to him. There are practi¬ 
cally but two candidates in the field, those of the 
two great parties. If the voter is dissatisfied with 
the nominee of his own party, there are three 
courses open to him, to vote for the opposing can¬ 
didate, to vote for a third candidate, or to stay at 
home. It is likely that his dissatisfaction with the 
opposing candidate is more intense than with his 
own. Only in times of exceptional unrest, or as a 
protest against an exceptionally corrupt nomina¬ 
tion, do large numbers of voters so radically revolt 
as to go entirely over to the enemy. The majority 


THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 37 


of the dissatisfied simply stay at home. This is 
their only comfortable way to condemn their party’s 
nominee. But should they be intensely exasper¬ 
ated, or should they be of an uncompromising turn 
of mind, they may go to the extreme of nominating 
and voting for a third candidate. In this case 
their offence is even worse than if they vote for 
the principal opposing candidate. They indeed 
give him a half vote, just as they do when they 
stay at home; and they gain the opprobrium of 
“crank,” and the scorn of having “thrown their 
votes away.” 

In this way the party machine is the master of 
the situation. It alone can name the candidate; 
the only check upon it is the fear of a “bolt” on 
the part of the voters. This fear is reduced to a 
minimum. Though there may he loud protests 
and a vigorous show of independence, it is well 
known that most of the protesters will fall into 
line on election day, rather than see the other 
side win. 

Add to the foregoing the fact that wards and 
election districts are hounded more or less arbi¬ 
trarily, that they include a heterogeneous and poly¬ 
glot population, and that boundaries are frequently 
changed, and we have an additional reason for the 
supremacy of the party organization. The voters 
have very few interests in common. They see 
little of each other; they have few of those so- 


38 PBOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


cial and business relations that would accustom 
them to join and work together. They do not 
meet in mass-meeting, as in the New England 
town-meeting, where individuals of all parties 
come together and discuss in public the affairs 
of their district and the qualifications of candi¬ 
dates, before the candidates are nominated. They 
must, therefore, look to their party organization 
for the dictation of a policy and the designation 
of a candidate. It is in the party that they find 
their common meeting-place. The strength of 
Tammany Hall, with its affiliated saloons, is in 
the social and fraternal life which it furnishes to 
the thousands of neglected voters who have no 
home, no church, no club. 

The party organization is a more or less close 
corporation, composed of a series of practically 
self-perpetuating committees, the committees cor¬ 
responding to the different election areas. The 
party primary of the smallest division—precinct, 
township, or ward — is the foundation of the sys¬ 
tem ; but the primary is.in the hands of its stand¬ 
ing committee. A very small percentage of the 
party voters, for one reason or another, attend the 
primaries. In cities the percentage ranges from 
two to ten,i in the townships from ten to forty. 
A majority of the voters in these primaries elect 

1 A. C. Bemheim, in Political Science Quarterly, vol. iii., 
p. 99. 


THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 39 


delegates to the nominating conventions, or they 
nominate ward or township candidates. This is 
the case with both the ruling parties. These 
candidates are the only ones between whom the 
voters can choose at the elections. The primaries 
and the nominating conventions, controlled by the 
party managers, are therefore practically the elect¬ 
ing conventions. 

I do not mean that the party managers who have 
this power can use it autocratically. They must 
keep before themselves always the qualities of their 
candidate which would promote or mar his popu¬ 
larity. They must nominate a man who, as they 
say, is “available.” But within this limit, unless 
the popular interest has been aroused by some 
unusual emergency, they have a wide field of 
autocracy. 

Such a system results in the selection of weak 
and inefficient representatives. They are not 
necessarily corrupt, but they are tools and figure¬ 
heads. 

In the first place, the area of choice is arbitrarily 
limited. It is a principle in elective constituencies 
that the larger the area over which a district ex¬ 
tends, the more distinguished and capable are the 
candidates of all parties. In all districts repre¬ 
sentatives can he elected only from the ranks of 
the party which happens to have the majority. 
It is wholly improbable that the able men of a 


40 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


party will be distributed about, one by one, in the 
small districts where the party has its majorities. 
But, even were they so benevolently scattered, the 
conditions are against their nomination. The po¬ 
litical managem must have men who will do their 
bidding. At the same time, with only one to 
nominate and elect, the selection of candidates 
is subject to the dictation of cliques. In wards 
where the party has a safe or overwhelming ma¬ 
jority, the party managers often flagrantly override 
the honesty and decency of the community by 
nominating the basest of men. And, in close 
districts and wards, a compact faction, bent on 
its own aggrandizement and threatening to help 
the other party, can often name a candidate, or, at 
least prevent the nomination of an outspoken and 
capable one. The influence of saloon-keepers in 
city and State politics is well known to depend on 
the power which close organization and unscrupu¬ 
lous methods give them over party leaders in the 
primaries and conventions. 

Besides operating within the party lines, these 
same factions, as well as other classes of voters, 
hold the balance of power between parties. Hence 
candidates must placate them. Now, it is char¬ 
acteristic of the greatest of party leaders that they 
raise up about themselves a body of strong ad¬ 
mirers, and a body of equally vigorous haters. 
Consequently, we seldom find in American politics 



THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 41 


that a great party leader can be elected repeatedly 
in a close district. This principle comes out dis¬ 
tinctly in the election of the President of the 
United States. Those men who have achieved the 
highest honors in the leadership of their party in 
the halls of Congress and in political battles, are 
seldom elected to that high office. They are not 
often even nominated; and, if nominated, they are 
almost destined to be defeated. Unknown and 
obscure men, or men whose record has been made 
entirely apart from leadership in political debate, 
are hunted out and given the place that in the 
affection and admiration of the party voters be¬ 
longed to others. The true leaders must be con¬ 
tent with appointive positions. 

In congressional and legislative elections, also, 
it is well known that, when a party leader has 
achieved prominence, the entire resources of the 
opposite party throughout the nation or State are 
thrown into his limited district to compass his 
defeat. And these extraordinary exertions are 
usually successful, if the district be in any way 
a close one. Several leaders in Congress, after 
serving a few terms and acquiring familiarity 
with the rules, and then becoming the recognized 
leaders of their parties, have been defeated in their 
districts. In this way the Democrats lost the 
services of their leader, William R. Morrison, and 
the Republicans lost also their tariff leader, William 


42 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


McKinley, Jr. Only in the case of a man like 
Blaine or Garfield, who happened to live in over¬ 
whelming Republican districts, could the leaders 
be kept in the public stations where their services 
would redound to their party and their country. 
In the case of Mr. McKinley, a Democratic legis¬ 
lature had used the gerrymander to create for him 
a strong Democratic district. 

The same forces operate still more inexorably 
the further down we go to the lesser and lesser 
districts; until, when we come to ward politics, we 
reach the very narrowest area of choice, with, con¬ 
sequently, the lowest extreme of ability and the 
highest power of greedy factions and combines. 

This is the main reason why our legislative 
bodies are composed of inexperienced men. A 
careful analysis of State legislatures will probably 
show that, in the average election, one-half the 
representatives are new men, with no legislative 
experience. An actual count of the Indiana legis¬ 
lature of 1893 shows that, in a house of one 
hundred representatives, there were 63 men who 
were there for the first time, 16 men who were 
serving their second term, 12 men their third 
term, one man his fourth term, and one man 
his fifth term. And this was not the result of 
a “landslide,” bringing a new party into power; 
but the legislature was of the same political 
complexion which it had borne for several years. 



THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 


43 


Professor Hart asserts ^ that in Connecticut, in the 
year 1790, 64 per cent of the members of the 
legislature had sat in it before, while in 1889 
the number was only 5 per cent. It is well known 
that the American House of Representatives is 
becoming more and more a body of one and two 
term men. In the Fifty-third Congress (not a 
“ landslide ” Congress), out of a membership of 
353, there were 133 new men, 78 men serving 
their second term, and only 142 — i.e., 40 per cent 
— who were serving their third term and upwards. 
And everywhere the aldermen have learned to be 
content with one or two terms, but meanwhile to 
make a heavy “ strike,” and then give way to 
another of ‘‘ the boys.” Throughout the country it 
may be asserted, as a general rule, that the laws 
of the people are enacted by a majority who have 
had no previous experience in law-making. 

This is the explanation of two significant facts 
in American legislation, the power of the speaker 
of the House, and the power of the lobby. 

The American speaker, unlike the English and 
Canadian, is a man of dictatorial power. In the 
national government he is ranked next to the 
President. He appoints the committees, lays 
down the rules, and controls legislation. He has 
a similar position in all State legislatures, and in 
many municipal councils. The reason for this 
1 “ Practical Essays on American Government,” p. 90. 


44 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


dictatorship is the same as that which explains 
the power of a tribal chieftain or an imperial 
Csesar — the ignorance, incapacity, and faction of 
his subjects. Leadership is essential wherever a 
body of men are compelled to act in concert. But 
there are two kinds of leadership. One is that 
of debate, argument, and statesmanship, depend¬ 
ing upon ability and enthusiasm, where the fol¬ 
lowers have confidence in their chief, and accept 
his leadership, and act in concert with him volun¬ 
tarily. This is the leadership of Gladstone in the 
House of Commons.. The other is that of coer¬ 
cion, growing out of necessity and circumstance, 
where followers distrust the ability of any leader 
they may choose, where they distrust their own 
ability to follow, and therefore they consent to the 
abdication of self-government and the elevation of 
a tyrant. This is the leadership of the American 
party speaker. It proceeds from the lack of ac¬ 
quaintance among the members of the legislative 
bodies, and from their mutual incompetency. 
They serve short terms, they come together for 
the first time knowing little of the qualifications 
of each. If they should keep the control of affairs 
in their own hands, there would be wrangling and 
wire-pulling over the appointments of committees, 
and then factions and mutiny on account of their 
final disposition. The only escape from this evil 
is in the power of the speaker. 



THE BISTEICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 45 


If our representative bodies were composed of 
able men, if their terms of service were longer 
and their legislative acquaintance wider, if the 
natural party leaders were not excluded from their 
midst by a petty district system of election, — then 
the representatives would claim for themselves 
the power which they bestow upon their autocrat. 
They would appoint their own committees, as in 
the United States Senate, control their own rules, 
make their own laws, and the speaker would be 
simply a moderator instead of a dictator. 

Though the speaker has a unique dominion, 
there is another power in American councils, legis¬ 
latures, and Congress, still more ominous — the 
lobby. It is the lobby which controls legislatures 
to-day. If any law demanded by the people at 
large, or even by a majority of the law-making 
body, is defeated or emasculated, its fate can be 
traced to the dominating influence of the lobby. 

The lobby is a new feature of representative 
government. It is coincident with the very re¬ 
cent growth of large private corporations. It is 
organized by them. They have such immense 
interests at stake on the turn of legislation, that 
their lobby, with unlimited resources at its dis¬ 
posal, is almost irresistible. 

But the lobby could not have acquired its pow¬ 
erful influence were it not for certain qualities in 
the legislative bodies themselves which place them 


46 PnOFORTlONAL REPRESENTATION. 


at its mercy. Corruption is not the only explana¬ 
tion. Legislators fall into the nets of lobbyists 
largely because of inexperience and incapacity. 
The lobbyists themselves are the shiewdest, 
brightest, and most influential men of the State 
or nation. They often control the party spoils, 
and an ambitious legislator cannot afford to antag¬ 
onize them. The lobby is organized as well as 
the legislature itself. It has its chiefs, who hand 
together. All of the corporations and enterprises 
interested in legislation practically combine as a 
unit. Then these able and honorable chiefs em¬ 
ploy their resources of argument and suggestion 
with individual legislators and before committees. 
They take the dimensions of every individual who 
comes in their way. But if their honorable 
methods are inadequate, they then turn the legis¬ 
lator in question over to the petty lobbyist who 
carries the pocket-book. Their own hands are 
clean. 

The power of the lobby is found mainly in the 
fact of the party machine. The lobbyists are 
usually the managers of the machine. They 
control State and national party spoils and offices. 
They have the political fate of individual law¬ 
makers in their hands. They are the actual 
leaders in party politics. The wealth of a Tam¬ 
many “ boss ’’ comes from his employment as 
a corporation lobbyist. There must be leadership 


THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 47 


somewhere. The only question is, Shall the 
leaders be elected to the legislature by the people, 
or shall they control the legislature from outside 
as mere irresponsible private citizens? As long 
as the people are prevented from electing their 
leaders to positions of responsibility, there will 
surely arise these self-constituted leaders, whose 
shrewdness gives them control over the weaklings 
and hirelings who are actually elected. 

The absence of true leadership and the opportu¬ 
nity of the lobby are shown in the fruitless bick¬ 
erings and factious combinations which so often 
prevent a legislature from accomplishing anything 
good. A party in the majority needs to be held 
together through confidence in some leader or 
leaders. But their forces are often scattered, and 
legislation is blocked. The opportunity of the 
lobby is of most value in the election of a speaker, 
who, when once elected, becomes the instrument 
of those who created him. 

It is not to be inferred that the lobby alone is 
responsible for corrupt legislatures and councils. 
It is equally true that corrupt legislatures are re¬ 
sponsible for the lobby. Law-makers introduce 
bills attacking corporations for the express pur¬ 
pose of forcing a bribe. This is called a “strike,” 
and has become a recognized feature of American 
legislation, to meet which the corporations are 
compelled to organize their lobby. 


48 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


A very apparent weakness and injustice of the 
district system is the opportunity it gives a ma¬ 
jority party to crush out and disfranchise the 
minority. This is seen flagrantly in the “gerry¬ 
mander.” But, even where the system is not thus 
abused, it is almost wholly a matter of chance 
whether the opinions of the people are justly 
expressed or not. This danger was not imminent 
under the earlier conditions of representation, as 
has already been shown, when electoral districts 
were natural units and the problem of represen¬ 
tation was the federation of local communities. 
But now that party lines are drawn through the 
midst of every community, it nearly always hap¬ 
pens that one party gains in the elections an un¬ 
just proportion of representatives at the expense of 
others. From the theory of the matter it is pos¬ 
sible to exclude minority parties altogether, and 
to give the entire legislative body to the majority. 
Suppose a legislature to be composed of forty 
members elected from forty districts, and that the 
popular vote of the political parties stands respec¬ 
tively 120,000 and 100,000. If the districts are 
so arranged as to have 5,500 votes each, and the 
parties happen to be divided in the districts in 
the same proportion as at large, we should have 
in each district a vote respectively of 3,000 and 
2,500. All of the forty candidates of the ma¬ 
jority would be elected, and the minority wholly 


THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 49 


excluded. An extreme result like this seems 
improbable, but it sometimes occurs. 

Again, it may happen, and often does, that a 
minority of the popular vote obtains a majority 
of the representatives. In the case assumed, 
parties may have been divided in the several 
districts as follows : — 


PARTY A. 

Majority of 100 in 25 districts, 2,800 X 25 = 70,000 votes. 

Minority of 1,600 in 15 districts, 2,000 X 15 = 30,000 votes. 

Total, 100,000 

PARTY B. 

Minority of 100 in 25 districts, 2,700 X 25 = 67,500 votes. 

Majority of 1,500 in 15 districts, 3,500 X 15 = 52,500 v otes. 

Total, 120,000 

In this assumed case, Party A, with a total of 
100,000 votes, obtains twenty-five representatives; 
while Party B, with a total of 120,000 votes, 
obtains only fifteen representatives. 

Where a system offers in theory such fruitful 
opportunities, it is too much to expect party man¬ 
agers to refrain from using them. Consequently, 
the district system, combined with party politics, 
has resulted in the universal spread of the gerry¬ 
mander. It is difficult to express the opprobrium 
rightly belonging to so iniquitous a practice as 
the gerrymander; but its enormity is not appre¬ 
ciated, just as brutal prize-fighting is not repro¬ 
bated, providing it be fought according to the 






50 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


rules. Both political parties practise it, and 
neither can condemn the other. They simply do 
what is natural: make the most of their oppor¬ 
tunities as far as permitted by the constitution 
and system under which both are working. The 
gerrymander is not produced by the iniquity of 
parties, it is the outcome of the district system. 
If representatives are elected in this way, there 
must be some public authority for outlining the 
districts. And who shall be the judge to say 
where the line shall be drawn ? Exact equality is 
impossible, and who shall set the limits beyond 
which inequality shall not be pressed? Every 
apportionment act that has been passed in this 
or any other country has involved inequality; and 
it would be absurd to ask a political party to pass 
such an act, and give the advantage of the ine¬ 
quality to the opposite party. Consequently, 
every apportionment act involves more or less of 
the gerrymander. The gerrymander is simply 
such a thoughtful construction of districts as will 
economize the votes of the party in power by 
giving it small majorities in a large number of 
districts, and coop up the opposing party with 
overwhelming majorities in a small number of 
districts. This may involve a very distortionate 
and uncomely “ scientific ” boundary, and the 
joining together of distant and unrelated locali¬ 
ties into a single district; such was the case in 


THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 51 

the famous original act of Governor Gerry of 
Massachusetts, whence the practice obtained its 
amphibian name.^ 



But it is not always necessary that districts be 
cut into distorted shapes in order to accomplish 
these unjust results. A map of all the congres- 

1 The term “ Genymander,” though not the practice, origi¬ 
nated with the Democratic party in Massachusetts in 1811, when 
Elbridge Gerry was elected governor. Says Professor Ware, in 
The American Law Review, January, 1872, from whose article 
the accompanying illustration is taken: — 

“ In order to secure themselves in the possession of the government. 





52 PBOPORTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


sional and legislative districts of the United States 
would by no means indicate the location of all the 
outrageous gerrymanders. In fact, maiiy of the 
worst ones have been so well designed that they, 
come close within all constitutional requirements. 
The truth is, the district system itself is so faulty 
that constitutional restrictions cannot correct it. 
The national Congress has attempted to do so by 
requiring the districts for congressional elections 
to be compact and of contiguous territory, and 
of nearly equal population. But the law is every¬ 
where disregarded. Parties are compelled to dis¬ 
regard it, for a gerrymander in a Democratic State 
can be nullified only by a gerrymander in a Re¬ 
publican State. 

As a result of the district system, the national 
House of Representatives is scarcely a representa¬ 
tive body. In the Fifty-first Congress, which 
enacted the McKinley tariff law, a majority of the 
representatives were elected by a minority of the 
voters. 


the party in power passed the famous law of Feb. 11,1812, providing for 
a new division of the State into senatorial districts, so contrived that 
in as many districts as possible the Federalists should be outnumbered 
by their opponents. To effect this all natural and customary lines were 
disregarded, and some parts of the State, particularly the counties of 
Worcester and Essex, presented singular examples of political geogra¬ 
phy. rt is said that Gilbert Stuart, seeing in the office of the Columbian 
Centinel an outline of the Essex outer district, nearly encircling the 
rest of the county, added with his pencil a beak to Salisbury, and 
claws to Salem and Marblehead, as shown in the engraving, exclaim¬ 
ing, ‘There, that will do for a salamander.’ — * Salamander,’ said Mr. 
Russell, the editor, ‘ I call it a Gerry-mander.’ ” 



CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, OHIO, 1888. 










CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, INDIANA, 1892. 


64 


PR OP OR TIONAL REPRESENTA TI ON. 



LA OfUHet’STEUBtM 


iSTj06£PH-|EUKMART 


,IA POATe 




N06VE 


I lo ; 

StARKE 


lusno 




ryHlTLCVj 


FVLTON 


PUiASKI 


ICARROLU! 


BENTON 


GRANT 


HOVy/ARO 


[warrbn 


[CLtNTON|T,pTON 


•rakdolph 


BOONE 


HENRY 


WAYNE 


MARJONJ 


’OLIS.t 


MOROANI 


FRANKLIN 


brown 


.SULUVAN 


JACKSON 


yEFFERSON, 


X 3 '.SCOtTl 

vv—V 

O^NclaRK 


ORANGE 


OUBOIS 


Tpike 


IFLOYO 


GIBSON 


POSEY 






















THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 55 


FIFTY-FIRST CONGRESS — ELECTION, 1888. 


PARTIES. 

CONGRESSIONAL 

VOTE. 

ELECTED. 

PROPORTIONAL. 

Republican 

. . 5,348,379 

164 

158 

Democrat. 

. . 5,502,581 

161 

162 

Prohibition 

. . 184,937 


5 

Scattering 

. . 56,889 




11,092,786 

325 

325 


CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS, SOUTH CAROLINA, 1890. 






56 PROP OR TIONA L REPRESENTA TION. 


The Republicans, instead of having a majority of 
three, should have been in a minority of four, as 
against the Democrats. The Republicans, with 
48.2 per cent of the votes, elected 50.4 per cent 
of the representatives; and the Democrats, with 
49.6 per cent of the votes, elected 49.6 per cent 
of the congressmen. 

That this Congress did not represent the people, 
is emphasized by the “avalanche ” of 1890. 


FIFTY-SECOND CONGRESS — ELECTION, 1890.^ 


PARTIES. 

VOTE. 

ELECTED. 

PER CENT 
OF VOTE. 

PER CENT OF REP¬ 
RESENTATION. 

Republican 

4,217,266 

88 

42.9 

26.5 

Democrat 

4,974,450 

235 

50.6 

71.1 

Populist 

354,217 

9 

3.7 

2.4 

Prohibition 

207,814 


2.1 


Independent 

76,788 


.7 



9,830,535 

332 

100 

100 


This election again displays the fortuitous results 
of the system. The Democratic minority of 49.6 
per cent of the congressmen in the Fifty-first Con¬ 
gress was changed to a Democratic majority of 71.1 
per cent in the Fifty-second Congress, while in 
the popular vote the Democratic proportion of 49.6 
per cent of the total was increased only 1 per cent. 
The Republicans, with 42.9 per cent of the vote, 
secured only 26.5 per cent of the representatives. 

1 Calculations for the Fifty-second, Fifty-third, and Fifty- 
fourth Congresses are made by Mr. Stoughton Cooley in Propor¬ 
tional Representation Review, March, 1894, based upon returns in 
the Chicago Daily News Almanac. 



THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 57 


The Republican vote fell off 4.9 per cent of the 
total; their representation decreased 24.1 per cent. 
It required 47,923 votes to elect a Republican, 
44,276 votes to elect a Populist, and only 21,078 
to elect a Democrat. The Democratic majority of 
147 over the Republicans, and 138 over all, should 
have been a Democratic majority of 2. 

For the Fifty-third Congress, elected in 1892, the 
total vote polled for congressmen was 12,032,203, 
of which the Republicans polled 5,031,360; the 
Democrats, 5,670,148; the Popuhsts, 1,046,392; 
the Prohibitionists, 244,726; and 39,577 were scat¬ 
tering. The result of this poll was that the Repub¬ 
licans elected 131, the Democrats 213, and the 
Populists 12 congressmen. This is to say, the, 
Republicans, with 41.9 per cent of the total vote, 
(a decrease of 1 per cent below that of the pre¬ 
vious election), secured 36.8 per cent of the repre¬ 
sentatives, an increase of 10.3 per cent; the 
Democrats, with 47.2 per cent of the vote (a de¬ 
crease of 3.4 per cent), got 59.8 per cent of the 
representatives ; the 8.7 per cent of the Populists 
obtained 3.4 per cent of the representatives; the 
Prohibitionists’ 2 per cent secured nothing.” In¬ 
stead of a Democratic majority of 79 in Congress, 
there should have been a Democratic minority of 
10, as against all other parties. 

The stupendous Repubhcan victory of 1894 was 
equally illusory. The total vote cast for congress- 


58 PROPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


men was 11,288,135. Of this number the Repub¬ 
licans cast 5,461,202; the Democrats, 4,295,748; 
the Populists, 1,323,644; the Prohibitionists, 182,- 
679; and 24,862 were scattering. The result was 
the election of 245 Republican, 104 Democrat, and 
7 Populist congressmen. Or, in other words, the 
Republicans, with 48.4 per cent of the total vote 
(an increase of 6.2 per cent), elected 68.8 per cent 
of the congressmen; the Democrats, with 38.1 per 
cent of the vote (a decrease of 9.1 per cent), se¬ 
cured 29.2 per cent of the representatives; the 
11.7 per cent of the Populists obtained 2 per cent 
of the representatives; and the 1.6 per cent of the 
Prohibitionists failed of recognition. The Repub¬ 
lican majority of 134 in the present Congress 
should be a minority of 7, as against all other 
parties. 

The injustice of the district system is extreme 
in its effects on new parties. Such parties suffer 
for two reasons. In the case of the dominant par¬ 
ties there is a rough equality, because a Democratic 
gerrymander in one State is likely to be balanced 
in another by a Republican gerrymander. But a 
new party cannot establish a gerrymander to suit 
itself until it gets control of a State government. 
Also, a new party is usually scattered throughout 
a large number of districts and States, and the dis¬ 
trict system prevents its members from combining 
to elect their fair share of representatives. For 


THE DISTBICT SYSTEM AT WOBK. 59 


example, in the Fifty-first Congress, the Prohibi¬ 
tionists should have had 5 representatives, they 
received none; in the Fifty-third Congress the 
People’s party should have had 31 instead of 8, 
and the Prohibitionists should have received 8 
instead of none ; and in the Fifty-fourth Congress 
the Populists were entitled to 42 votes instead 
of 7. 

Many examples might be given from individual 
States to show the unrepresentative character of 
congressional representation. Those States which 
are close in their majorities, and whose legislatures 
alternate frequently, show an endless seesaw of 
gerrymanders. Ohio has, perhaps, had more of 
these partisan displays than any other State. It 
was during the war that the first Republican legis¬ 
lature overthrew a long-standing Democratic ap¬ 
portionment act. The results were brought out 
forcibly by Mr. Garfield in a speech in Congress 
in 1870. He said:— 

“ When I was first elected to Congress, in the fall of 1862, 
the State of Ohio had a clear Republican majority of about 
25,000 ; but, by the adjustment and distribution of political 
power in the State, there were 14 Democratic representa¬ 
tives upon this fioor, and only 5 Republicans. The State 
that cast a majority of nearly 25,000 Republican votes was 
represented in the proportion of one Republican and three 
Democrats. In the next Congress there was no great politi¬ 
cal change in the popular vote of Ohio — a change of only 
20,000 —but the result was that seventeen Republican mem- 


60 PBOPOETIONAL BEPRESENTATION. 


bers were sent here from Ohio, and only two Democrats. We 
find that only so small a change as 20,000 changed their 
representatives in Congress from fourteen Democrats and 
five Republicans, to seventeen Republicans and two Demo¬ 
crats. 

“ Now, no man, whatever his politics, can justly defend a 
system that may in theory, and frequently does in practice, 
produce such results as these.” 


The Republicans retained power in the Ohio 
legislature from 1862 to 1876, with a consequent 
unfair advantage in the distribution of congres¬ 
sional seats. In the latter year a Democratic legis¬ 
lature passed a new apportionment act. Since that 
time there have been eight such acts, the results of 
which upon the fortunes of the two parties are de¬ 
picted by the following statistical analysis : — 

REPRESENTATION OF THE STATE OF OHIO IN 
CONGRESS. 


CONGRESS. 

YEARS. 

CONGRESSION¬ 
AL. VOTE. 

REPRESENTATIVES. 

ACCORDING TO 
ACTUAL 

REPRESENTATION. 

Actual. 

Propor¬ 

tional. 

Rep. 1 

Dem. 

Rep. 

Dem. 

Rep. 

Dem. 

45th, 

1877-79 

314,529 

310,404 

12 

8 

10 

10 

1 Kep. = IJ Dem. 

46th, 

1879-81 

277,875 

264,737 

9 

11 

10 

10 

1 Dem. =1J Rep. 

47th, 

1881-83 

405,042 

340,572 

15 

5 

11 

9 

1 Rep. = 2§ Dem. 

48th, 

1883-85 

306,674 

268,785 

8 

13 

11 

10 

1 Dem. = 2 Rep. 

49th, 

1885-87 

395,596 

380,934 

10 

11 

11 

10 

1 Dem. = Rep. 

50th, 

1887-89 

336,063 

325,629 

15 

6 

11 

10 

1 Rep. = 2J Dem. 

51st, 

1889-91 

412,520 

395,639 

16 

5 

11 

10 

1 Rep. = 3 Dem. 

52d, 

1891-93 

362,624 

350,528 

7 

14 

11 

101 

1 Dem. = 2 ^^ Rep. 

53d, 

1893-95 

397,320 

407,120 

9 

12 

10 

10 

1 Dem. = 1^ Rep. 

54th, 

1895-97 

407,371 

274,670 

19 

2 

12 

82 

1 Rep. = 6 Dem. 


1 One Prohibitionist. 2 One Populist. 
















THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 61 


It will be seen that the Democrats in Ohio have 
never, since 1862, had a majority of the popular 
vote on national questions, except in 1892; yet in 
four elections they have returned a majority of the 
congressmen. Neither are party calculations al¬ 
ways realized. In the Forty-fifth Congress the 
Democratic gerrymander returned a Republican 
majority of the congressmen, and in the Fifty- 
third Congress a Republican gerrymander returned 
a Democratic majority, although in the Fifty-fourth 
Congress the same gerrymander responded well to 
the Republican designs. 

In Indiana, in 1892, under a Democratic gerry¬ 
mander, the Democrats cast for congressmen 259,- 
190 votes, and elected eleven congressmen; the 
Republicans cast only 5,522 less votes, namely, 
253,668, but elected only two congressmen. It 
required 126,834 Republican votes to elect one con¬ 
gressman, against only 23,565 Democratic votes; 
in other words, one Democratic vote was worth 5.4 
Republican votes. The Democrats, casting 47.2 
per cent of the total vote, secured 85 per cent of 
the representatives ; and the Republicans, with 46.2 
per cent of the vote, secured only 15 per cent of 
the representatives. The smallest majority re¬ 
ceived by any Democratic candidate was 42, the 
largest was 3,081; whereas the smallest majority 
received by a Republican candidate was 4,125, and 
the largest was 8,724. To see that the gerryman- 


62 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


der, though the apparent, is not the essential, evil 
of the district system, it needs only to he noted 
that in the election of 1894, in Indiana, with the 
same gerrymandered districts as in 1892, the Re¬ 
publicans elected the entire delegation of 13 
members; yet the total Republican vote for con¬ 
gressmen in the State was only 50.5 per cent 
(284,447) of the total vote, and the Democratic 
vote was 42 per cent (238,371) of the total.^ The 
Republicans are entitled to only 7, instead of 13 
representatives in the present Congress, and the 
Democrats of the State, who should have elected 
6 congressmen, are wholly unrepresented. 

The inequalities of the district system are not 
confined to the United States. They appear in all 
parliamentary countries. Some interesting results 
from England are given by Sir John Lubbock in 
his tract on “ Representation.” ^ In the parliamen¬ 
tary elections of 1886, there were contested 460 
seats. “ The total number of votes given were 
2,756,900, of which 1,423,500 were for Unionist, 
1,333,400 for Home Rule candidates, or a major¬ 
ity of 90,000 votes for maintaining the Union. 
According to the votes polled, the number of mem¬ 
bers returned should have been 238 Unionists and 
221 Home Rulers, which, adding the members re¬ 
turned without a contest, viz.. Ill Unionists and 

1 8.5 per cent going to Populists and Prohibitionists. 

2 The Imperial Parliament Series, London, Swan Sonnenschein 
& Co., 1890. 


THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 63 


99 Home Rulers, would have given 349 Union¬ 
ists and 320 Home Rulers, or a majority of 29. 
The actual numbers, however, were 394 Union¬ 
ists and 275 Home Rulers. The Unionists, there¬ 
fore, obtained 45 seats more, and the Home Rulers 
45 fewer seats, than they were entitled to from 
the votes polled, making, of course, 90 on a divis¬ 
ion. Thus, then, in 1874 the Conservatives ob¬ 
tained 38 seats more than their votes entitled 
them to, counting 76 on a division. In 1880, on 
the contrary, the Liberals had 44 too many, count¬ 
ing 88 on a division. . . . Thus, whatever side 
has the majority, we are confronted with a violent 
contrast between the voting strength in the con¬ 
stituencies, and the voting strength in the House 
of Commons.” 

“ In my own county of Kent,” continues Sir 
John Lubbock, “ the Liberals polled in the three 
divisions, at the last election, over 13,000 votes, 
against 16,000 given to their opponents, and yet 
the latter had all the six seats. Taking all the 
contested seats in the county, the Liberals polled 
32,000 votes against 36,000, and yet the Conserva¬ 
tives carried sixteen members and the Liberals 
only two.” ^ 

“At the general election (in Ireland) in 1880, 
86 seats were contested. Of these the Home 
Rulers secured 52, the Liberals and Conservatives 
together only 34. Yet the Home Rule electors 

1 Page 17. 


64 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


were only 48,000, while the Liberals and Conser¬ 
vatives together were no less than 105,000. . . . 
If the uncontested seats were estimated for, the 
results would remain substantially the same.” ^ 
The parliamentary election of 1895 brought an 
overwhelming defeat to the Liberal party. There 
were 481 seats contested, of which the Liberals 
obtained 202 and the Conservatives and Unionists 
279, a majority of 77. Yet in the popular vote 
the Liberals stood 1,800,000 and the Conservative- 
Unionists 1,775,000, a minority of 25,000. The 
true representation would have been: — 


CONSEKVATIVE. LIBERAL. 

Contested seats. 239 242 

Uncontested seats .... 132 57 

Total .... 371 299 


giving a Conservative-Unionist majority of 72, 
instead of the actual majority of 152.2 

In the Italian elections of 1884 the popular 
vote stood in the proportion of 1.85 for the 
government to 1 for the opposition, but the rep¬ 
resentation in the Chamber of Deputies was 5.19 
for the government to 1 for the opposition. 

Other election figures might be given to show 
tlmt^in no country are the people accurately repre¬ 
sented in their legislative assemblies. This is true 

1 Pages 19 and 20. 

2 See article by Sir John Lubbock, “ Analysis of English Elec¬ 
tions,” Proportional Representation Review, September, 1895. 



THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORE. 


65 


whether the gerrymander is employed or not. Per¬ 
haps, taking a nation as a whole, the gerrymanders 
of the United States in congressional elections 
do not affect the average result; since, as already 
shown, both parties enact them, and the work of a 
Democratic gerrymander in one State is offset by 
that of a Pepublican gerrymander in another. 

State legislatures, on the other hand, show 
greater inequalities, seeing that the party in 
power outlines the districts for the entire constitu¬ 
ency, and there are no offsetting gerrymanders. 

In the Massachusetts State election of 1892, 
according to Mr. Berry,i 116,708 Kepublican votes 
elected twenty-five Republican senators, while 
119,045 Democratic votes failed to elect the Demo¬ 
cratic candidates for whom they were cast. The 
total Democratic vote of 165,606, elected ten sena¬ 
tors, thus requiring 16,560 Democratic votes to 
elect one. The total Republican vote of 185,479 
elected thirty senators, requiring only 6,182 to 
elect one. In State legislation, therefore, 1 Re¬ 
publican was worth 2f Democrats. 

Indiana in 1892, taking the presidential vote 
as a basis, should have elected to the lower house 
48 Democrats, 46 Republicans, 4 Populists, and 2 
Prohibitionists. There were actually elected 63 
Democrats and 37 Republicans. In 1894, on the 

1 “Proportional Representation,” Worcester, Mass., 1892, 
p. 32. 


66 PBOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

basis of the vote for Secretary of State, the Re¬ 
publicans should have had 50 State representa¬ 
tives, the Democrats 43, the Populists 5, and the 
Prohibitionists 2. Instead, the Republicans had 
82, and the Democrats 18. 

Ohio elected 72 Republicans, 35 Democrats, to 
the lower house in 1892. Had the people been 
truly represented, there would have been 51 Re¬ 
publicans, 51 Democrats, 3 Prohibitionists, and 2 
Populists. 

Michigan in 1894, with a popular vote for 
governor of 237,215 Republicans, 130,823 Demo¬ 
crats, 30,002 Populists, and 18,788 Prohibitionists, 
elected to the lower house of the State legislature 
99 Republicans and 1 Democrat. The repre¬ 
sentation should have been 57 Republicans, 31 
Democrats, 7 Populists, and 5 Prohibitionists. 

For members of the lower house of the New 
York legislature in the last three elections, the 
vote and actual elections, contrasted with what 
would have been the proportionate elections, were 
as follows: — 


NEW YORK ASSEMBLY, 128 MEMBERS. 1892. 


PARTIES. 

VOTE. 

ELECTED. 

PROPORTIONAL. 

Republican . . . 

. 598,012 

54 

60 

Democrat .... 

. 644,988 

74 

65 

Prohibition . . . 

33,012 


3 

Socialist Labor . . 

8,472 


, . 

Scattering.... 

16,463 




1,301,947 

128 

128 






THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 


67 



1893 . 



Republican . . 

. 538,471 

74 

65 

Democrat . . . 

. 510,608 

54 

60 

Prohibition . . 

. 21,525 


2 

Socialist Labor . 

. 8,631 


1 

Scattering. . . 

. 32,357 




1,111,592 

1894 . 

128 

128 

Republican . , 

. . 665,857 

105 

71 

Democrat . . . 

. . 501,015 

23 

53 

Prohibition . . 

. . 21,626 


2 

Socialist Labor . , 

. . 9,575 


1 

Populist . . . , 

. . 6,914 


1 

Scattering. . . . 

, . 9,339 




1,214,326 

128 

128 


The table on the following page is compiled by 
Mr. Geo. H. Haynes/ in order to show the con¬ 
trast between the popular vote and the represen¬ 
tation in the New England legislatures. 

In the four States, Maine, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, and Massachusetts, representation in the 
Senate must, according to the Constitution, be pro¬ 
portioned to population, and the partisan gerry¬ 
mander is therefore responsible for its distortion. 
In two of these states, Maine and Vermont, it 
will be noticed that the theory of the gerrymander 
has been perfected in practice. In Rhode Island 
and Connecticut, representation is fixed by the 

1 Annals of [the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, September, 1895. “ Representation in New England 

Legislatures.” 







68 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


NEW ENGLAND LEGISLATURES. 1894. 


STATE. 


Maine 


New Hampshire 


Vermont 


Massachusetts 


Rhode Island 


Connecticut 



PER CT. OF 

PER CT. 

PER CT, 

PARTY. 

VOTE FOR 

IN 

IN 


GOVERNOR. 

SENATE. 

HOUSE. 

Republican 

64.3 

100 

96.7 

Democrat 

28.3 

0 

3.3 

Prohibition 

2.5 

0 

0 

People’s 

4.9 

0 

0 

Republican 

56.0 

87.5 

72.7 

Democrat 

40.9 

12.5 

27.3 

Prohibition 

2.1 

0 

0 

Republican 

73.5 

100 

94.6 

Democrat 

24.4 

0 

4.6 

People’s 

1.3 

0 

0.4 

Prohibition 

0.8 

0 

0.4 

Republican 

56.5 

90 

81.3 

Democrat 

36.9 

10 

18.7 

People’s 

2.7 

0 

0 

Prohibition 

3.0 

0 

0 

Labor 

0.9 

0 

0 

Republican 

53.1 

94.6 

95.8 

Democrat 

41.3 

5.4 

4.2 

Prohibition 

4.1 

0 

0 

Labor 

1.1 

0 

0 

Republican 

53.5 

91.7 

81.3 

Democrat 

43.3 

8.3 

18.3 

Prohibition 

1.5 

0 

0 

People’s 

1.3 

0 

0.4 


Constitution for towns and cities, regardless of 
population. In the lower houses of these States 
both towns and population are represented, and 
the gerrymander is not responsible for misrepre¬ 
sentation as it is in the other States where popu¬ 
lation alone is considered. 




Ninth Senatorial District, framed under the State Constitution requiring districts “ to be hounded by 
county, precinct, town, or ward lines, and consist of contiguous territory, and be in as compact form as prac¬ 
ticable.” Declared unconstitutional by Supreme Court. —From “The Gerrymander of Wisconsin,” by 
A. J. Turner, Portage, Wis,, 26 pp. 


TUE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT TVORK. 


la CROSSE CO. 



69 


WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT, 1891. 
























TO PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


Municipal elections give results equally dispro¬ 
portionate. Three aldermanic elections in Chicago 
were as follows : — 


ELECTION OF ALDERMEN.—CHICAGO. 



VOTE. 

1893 . 

ELECTED. 

PROPOR¬ 

TIONAL. 

Republican. 

. 89,162 

20 

15 

Democrat. 

. 88,280 

12 

14 

Independent Democrat 

. 17,118 

1 

3 

Independent .... 

. 12,466 

1 

2 

Socialist Labor . . . 

168 




207,194 

1894 . 

34 

34 

Republican. 

. 100,647 

22 

18 

Democrat. 

. 83,008 

12 

14 

People’s. 

. 3,557 

. . 

1 

Socialist Labor . . . 

572 


, . 

Independent .... 

. 6,452 




194,236 

1895 . 

34 

34 

Republican. 

. 136,233 

28 

19 

Democrat. 

. 86,287 

5 

12 

People’s. 

. 17,199 


2 

Prohibition. 

942 

. . 


Independent .... 

. 10,649 


1 


251,310 

34 

34 


In St. Paul, a minority party elects a majority 
of the board. 


ELECTION OF ALDERMEN. —ST. PAUL. 1894. 


Republican . . , 

YOTE. 

. . 12,180 

Democrat . . . , 

, . 11,327 

People’s. 

, . 1,117 

Prohibition . . , 

. . 477 

Independent . . , 

. . 444 


25,545 


11 




















THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 


71 


In this election, six aldermen, a majority of the 
board, received 4,879 votes, less than one-fifth of 
the votes polled. 


The Minneapolis election was 

as follows; 

— 

ELECTION OF ALDERMEN. —MINNEAPOLIS. 

1894. 


VOTE. 

ELECTED. 

PEOPOR- 

TIONAL. 

Republican.. 

, 17,705 

9 

6 

Democrat. 

, 13,378 

3 

4 

People’s. 

, 2,132 


1 

Prohibition. 

, 1,484 


1 

Scattering. 

4 




34,703 

12 

12 

The most startling and seemingly impossible 
results are found in New York City, where, in 

1892, Tammany Hall, 

with 59 

per cent 

of the 

votes, elected every one of the thirty aldermen. 

This election is to he 

compared with the 

! State 

senates in Maine and Vermont.^ 



ELECTION OF ALDERMEN. — NEW 

YORK CITY, 1892. 


VOTE. 

ELECTED. 

PROPOR¬ 

TIONAL. 

Tammany. 

166,693 

30 

19 

County Democracy . . . 

4,384 



Republican. 

99,463 


12 

Prohibition. 

2,105 



Populist and Socialist . . 

7,359 


1 


280,007 

30 

30 


In the election of 1894, strangely enough, the 
results were nearly proportionate. 


1 See p. 68. 












72 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION- 


ELECTION OF ALDERMEN. —NEW YORK CITY, 1894. 



VOTE. 

ELECTED. 

PROPOR¬ 

TIONAL. 

Republican .... 

. . 112,316 

14 

13 

Tammany .... 

. . 106,238 

14 

13 

State Democracy . . 

. . 33,900 

2 

4 

Socialist Labor . • 

. . 5,296 



Scattering .... 

. . 7,861 

- 



265,611 

30 

30 


In the foregoing statistical exhibits, political 
parties have been treated as corporate entities; 
and the revelations of inequality have been based 
upon the total number of votes cast for each, re¬ 
gardless of the variety of opinions and interests 
within the party. This comparison does not re¬ 
veal the extent of a still more serious evil, the 
fact that nearly one-half the votes are cast for 
unsuccessful candidates. The candidates who are 
actually elected, while they may he said to repre¬ 
sent their parties, do not represent all the voters 
within the parties. They are elected only in the 
strongholds. Parties tend to become sectional- 
ized, and their antagonisms are thereby intensi¬ 
fied. Of the 105 Democratic representatives in 
the Fifty-fourth Congress, only 14 are from the 
Northern States, while only 28 of the 241 Repub¬ 
licans come from the South. As the following 
table will show, there are 3,062,383 Democratic 
voters in the Union who are not represented by 
congressmen in whose nomination and election 







THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 73 


they have had a voice. The large majority of 
them are from the Northern States; and they must 
be content to have their views on national ques¬ 
tions represented by men from an entirely dis¬ 
similar section of country, with different interests 
and prejudices. The same is true of Southern 
Republicans. The table on pp. 74 and 75 shows 
that 44^ per cent of the voters are in tliis way 
unrepresented in Congress. 

This table shows the percentage of unrepre¬ 
sented voters in a “ landslide ” Congress, and 
might therefore be considered as an extreme case. 
Mr. Salem Butcher, in his work on minority 
representation, published in 1872, made similar 
calculations for three congressional elections in 
which there were only two political parties con¬ 
cerned, and the representation was fairly propor¬ 
tionate (see Table, p. 76). 

In the Assembly of New York State, as shown 
by the table on p. 76, the voters are misrepre¬ 
sented, not only in the numerical proportion, but 
also in the personnel of assemblymen. Only 23 
assemblymen represent 501,000 Democrats, and 
13 of these, constituting a caucus majority, are 
elected by 47,700 Tammany votes; 352,000 
Democrats in the State at large have no spokes¬ 
men whom the}^ can truly acknowledge as their 
own. Republican voters of the city, too, must 
depend upon rural Republicans for the protec- 


VOTES FOR CONGRESSMEN IN 1894.1 


P BOP OR TIONAL BEPRESENTA TION. 


Y4 


UNKEPRESENTED. 

Scat¬ 

tering 

Vote. 

208 

915 

640 

644 

29 

1,537 

45 

Prohi¬ 

bition 

Vote. 

7,133 

4,497 

2,349 

587 

16,042 

9,669 

3,699 

3,907 

2,396 

2,644 

6,368 

3,280 

15,382 

8,038 

451 

CC 

oP 

Cm 

26,610 

3,927 

65,164 

34,223 

1,636 

4,469 

78,218 

7,547 

64,331 

26,267 

48,799 

82,781 

18,477 

5,303 

1,056 

10,583 

40,893 

55,956 

12,097 

Demo¬ 

cratic 

Vote. 

3,452 

81,404 

1,847 

64,582 

18,559 

6,834 

290,294 

238,281 

136,430 

41,472 

77,070 

14,545 

29,505 

49,263 

116,075 

112,076 

73,574 

« w 

& ^ B 

Ph 2 

20,797 

10,089 

9,785 

42,369 

■ 

33,101 

16,391 

70,448 

22,507 

44,801 

10,732 

* • 

165 

REPRESENTED. | 

1 People’s. 

•saau 

-waiV 


o 

6,838 

47,703 

16,585 

1 Democratic. | 

•ssaa 

-HaiM 

OOCDrH • • -Cai-I '(M • • •COCO - COr-l • ‘fc- 

Vote. 

69,847 

38,177 

14,748 

21,608 

127,422 

33,172 

. 

83,310 

78,630 

47,365 

11,469 

26,865 

1 Republican, j 

1 •gaaa 

-waK 

• •COiHt*<,H • •iHOM^COlO •Tj^COCacat- 

Vote. 

100,777 

47,710 

86,178 

19,699 

10,303 

413,964 

284,447 

230,692 

133,620 

87,649 

69,487 

54,623 

178,597 

234,139 

150,021 

State. 

Alabama . . 
Arkansas . . 

California . . 
Colorado . . 
Connecticut . 
Delaware . . 

Florida . . . 

Georgia . . . 
Idaho . . . 
Illinois . . . 
Indiana . . . 
Iowa .... 
Kansas . . . 
Kentucky . . 

Louisiana . . 

Maine . . . 
Maryland . . 
Massachusetts, 
Michigan . . 

. Minnesota . . 

Mississippi 














































THE HISTBICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 


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Total represented, 6,188,503 = 55.5 per cent; total unrepresented, 5,149,949 = 44.5 per cent; grand total, 11,338,452. 
1 This and the Tables for New York are based on returns given in The New York World Almanac, 1895. 


















































76 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


VOTES FOR CONGRESSMEN. 



REPRESENTED. 


UNREPRE¬ 

SENTED. 

VOTES. 

MEMBEBS. 

PEB 

CENT. 

VOTES. 

PEE 

CENT. 

Fortieth Congress. 






Republican . . . 

1,751,804 

142 

. . 

427,841 

. . 

Democrat.... 

583,813 

49 

• • 

1,242,115 

• • 

Total .... 

2,335,617 

191 

58 

1,669,956 

42 

Forty-first Congress. 






Republican . . . 

2,356,421 

159 

. . 

820,824 

. . 

Democrat.... 

1,167,914 

83 

• • 

1,731,254 

• • 

Total .... 

3,524,335 

242 

58 

2,552,078 

42 

Forty-second Congress. 






Republican . . . 

1,826,338 

136 


960,209 


Democrat.... 

1,360,170 

106 

• • 

1,366,330 

• • 

Total .... 

3,186,508 

242 

58 

5,513,539 

42 


tion of their interests. Altogether, 44.4 per cent 
of the voters who actually cast their ballots are 
unrepresented. 


VOTES FOR ASSEMBLYMEN, NEW YORK, 1894. 


PARTY. 

REPRESENTED. 

UNREPRE¬ 

SENTED. 

VOTES. 

MEMBEBS. 

PEE 

CENT. 

VOTES. 

PEB 

CENT. 

Republican . . 
Democrat . . . 
Tammany . . . 

Socialist Labor . 
Populist . . . 
Prohibition . . 

Scattering. . . 

585,937 

40,840 

47,701 

105 

10 

13 


79,920 

352,838 

59,636 

9,575 

6,914 

21,626 

9,339 


Total . . . 

674,478 

128 

55.6 

539,848 

44.4 













































THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 77 


In the Board of Aldermen of New York City, 
in 1894, although the parties are represented in 
nearly numerical proportion, yet 52 per cent of 
the voters are actually unrepresented. 


VOTES FOR ALDERMEN, NEW YORK CITY, 1894. 


PARTY. 

REPRESENTED. 

UNREPRE¬ 

SENTED. 

VOTES. 

MEMBERS. 

PER 

CENT. 

VOTES. 

PER 

CENT. 

Republican . . . 

66,683 

14 


45,633 


Tammany . . . 

52,679 

14 


53,559 


State Democracy . 

8,702 

2 


25,198 


Socialist Labor 




5,296 


Scattering . . . 




7,861 


Total .... 

128,064 

30 

48.1 

137,547 

51.9 


These exhibits for New York State and City 
are, of course, typical for all assemblies elected by 
single districts. Nearly one-half the voters are 
without personal representation in the law-making 
bodies. The significance of this fact is not readily 
perceived. It is one phase of the conditions 
which give the local machines their hold upon 
the parties. In the strongholds the machines are 
supreme because they have no fear of independent 
movements, and where the minority is hopeless 
the machines are left in control from sheer indif¬ 
ference of the voters. The party conventions, 
therefore, which nominate general officers for city. 
State, and nation, are entirely controlled by the 
local machines. In the legislatures, however, the 

















78 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


machines from the strongholds control the situa¬ 
tion, and give character to the party as a whole. 
In either case, the rank and file of the voters have 
but little direct influence in politics. 

The significant feature of the district system is 
not only the fact that voters have a choice only 
between the candidates of the dominant political 
parties; it is also significant that a very small 
proportion of voters hold the balance of power 
between these two parties. In the congressional 
election of 1890, which substituted a Democratic 
majority of 127 for a Republican majority of 3, 
this result was brought about by a change of only 
5 per cent of the total vote,^ the Republicans losing 
that proportion, and the Democrats gaining only 
2 per cent. On the other hand, the election of 
1894, which turned a Democratic majority of 
79 into a Republican majority of 134, was the 
work of 9.1 per cent of the voters, who aban¬ 
doned the Democratic party. 

In Indiana the remarkable overthrow, in 1894, 
of a Democratic delegation of eleven members, 
and two Republicans, by a solid delegation of thir¬ 
teen Republicans, was effected by only 5.2 per 
cent of the voters who left the Democrats, while 
the Republican vote was increased by only 4.3 
per cent of the total 

In the Massachusetts Senate, elected in 1891, 
1 See pp. 56, 57. 2 See p. 62. 


THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 79 


a change of less than 5 per cent from the vote 
of those elected to the candidates in their respect¬ 
ive districts who received the next highest vote 
would have defeated every member of the senate, 
and a change of less than per cent of the vote 
in twenty-one districts would have made the State 
Senate Democratic instead of Republican^ 

Professor Giddings ^ asserts that “ the total 
possible gain or loss to a political party through 
strictly independent voting does not exceed, under 
the most favorable circumstances, 5 per cent of 
the maximum total vote of a presidential year.” 
This statement is sustained by even the unprece¬ 
dented “landslides” of the past six years. 

It is in the exaggerated weight of small factions 
holding the balance of power between the two 
parties that is to he found the secret of the cor¬ 
rupt influences already described. The great 
majority of the voters are conservative, and do 
not readily change their party. Especially in 
close districts, therefore, interested elements can 
dictate terms to both parties. This, too, gives 
the bribable vote an influence far in excess of its 
proportions. Professor J. J. McCook ^ finds in 
twenty-one towns of Connecticut that 15.9 per 

1 J. M. Berry, “ProportionalRepresentation,” Worcester, 1892. 

2 Political Science Quarterly^ vol. viii., p. 117 ff., “The Na¬ 
ture and Conduct of Political Majorities.” 

* Forum, September, 1892. “The Alarming Proportion of 
Venal Voters.” 


80 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 


cent of the voters are venal. The proportion 
ranges from 3 per cent to 50 per cent. The aver¬ 
age for the city and county is about 121 per cent. 
The proportion in other States is doubtless much 
less; but even then it is plain that the bribable 
voters themselves are adequate to hold the balance 
of power between the parties. The single-mem- 
bered district, therefore, places a magnificent pre¬ 
mium upon bribery. 

We have seen how unequally parties are rep¬ 
resented in the city. State, and nation. Our repre¬ 
sentative system was contrived to represent not 
parties, but sections. The efforts toward its im¬ 
provement have been directed not toward equality 
of party representation, but equality of district 
representation. Congressional statutes and State 
constitutions require the districts to be of “equal” 
population. But this is not enforced. South 
Carolina has a “white ” district as low as 134,369 
(Census, 1890) ; but the sole “black ” and Repub¬ 
lican district, the seventh,^ contains 216,512 popu¬ 
lation. In Texas the districts range from 102,000 
to 210,000; in Kansas from 167,000 to 278,000; 
and in Pennsylvania from 131,000 to 310,000 
(both extremes in the city of Philadelphia). In 
Illinois in 1892 the four Chicago districts had an 
average population of 297,980, while the sixteen 
country districts averaged only 164,914. 

1 See Diagram, p. 55. 


THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 81 


State and municipal representation is still more 
unequal. In New York City the State assembly 
districts are identical with the aldermanic dis¬ 
tricts. Says the Report of the New York Senate 
Committee on cities“In the common council, as 
well as in the legislature, a voting constituency 
of 7,000 has the same representation as a like 
constituency of 24,000. The principle of numer¬ 
ical equality, therefore, finds no application what¬ 
ever in the common council of New York City. 
The same may be said of the principle of locality 
representation. The interests of the first and sec¬ 
ond districts are in all things practically alike; the 
total vote of the two districts is 14,498. The 
interests of the twenty-third district are in many 
regards distinct from those of the first and second. 
The territorial area of the first and second com¬ 
bined is 634 acres, that of the twenty-third is 
1,881 acres; and yet the twenty-third, with almost 
twice the population of the first and second, and 
three times the area as well, has but one vote as 
against the two accorded to both the smaller area 
and the smaller constituency.” 

These statistics prove the excessive inequality 
and minority domination of the present system 
wherever applied. But we have not yet reached 
the end of the story. We must enter the legis¬ 
lative halls in order to see the final chapter. To 


^ P. 92. 


82 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION. 


say nothing further of the rule by the speaker 
of the House and by the legislative committees, 
through which power is taken out of the hands 
of the assembly itself, there is on all party ques¬ 
tions the imperium in imperio of the party caucus. 

If one party in a legislature has 60 representa¬ 
tives out of 100, the policy of the legislature is 
not dictated by an open conference of the 60 with 
the 40; but the majority party withdraws, and in 
secret conclave determines by a majority vote what 
shall be its united action. Thus 31 members — a 
majority of the 60, but a minority of the whole — 
may determine the policy of the legislature, and 
enact the laws of the people. This is no fanciful 
sketch. The power of the party caucus is well 
known. A man who “ bolts ” the caucus can have 
no influence whatever in legislation. He has meas¬ 
ures of his own, which he wishes to see enacted 
into laws. These may be appropriations of money 
for improvements, or for State or national institu¬ 
tions in his own district. They may be good 
measures, or they may be bad. But he knows 
that, in order to carry them, he cannot afford to 
stand against the wishes of his fellow-partisans 
on other measures. Thus every representative is 
in the power of his party caucus. He cannot stay 
out of the caucus, and when he enters he must 
abide by its decisions. To say that legislatures are"^\ 
deliberative assemblies, under such circumstances, ' 


THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 83 


is ironical. They are rather war-camps. Delib¬ 
eration involves consultation between opposing in¬ 
terests and opinions, and the development of a 
compromise policy, which will be modified more 
or less by all who have a voice. But the caucus 
rule, dominated in the interests of the party rather 
than of the people, based on an electoral system 
which usually gives a political party a clear ma¬ 
jority, begets intolerance and the overriding of 
minorities. The party emerges from its caucus 
like an army from its fortress, runs upon the 
enemy, listens to no cry for quarter or compro¬ 
mise, beheads its own deserters, and then carouses 
over its victory. 

We have now been able to follow the various 
evil phases of recent American political life di¬ 
rectly or remotely to their root in the system of 
electing single representatives from limited dis¬ 
tricts, — a system which we have inherited un¬ 
changed through six centuries of political and 
social evolution. At the present time, when 
political parties based on social questions divide 
the people and seek representation, we are using 
a system of representation based on locality. The 
political parties inevitably seize upon this machin¬ 
ery and use it for party ends. Thus violently 
distorted, it represents neither sections nor parties. 
Instead, it has divided the people in every district 


84 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

into two camps, each dictated by its own party 
machine and spoilsmen. 

These two machines are often leagued together. 
Professor Bryce has pointed out the community of 
interests which exists between them on occasion 
of independent reform movements, when they 
actually combine against the reformers.^ They 
are also in a more or less permanent coalition. 
Men who are jointly interested in corporations 
which seek legislation and franchises are osten¬ 
sibly opposed to each other as prominent managers 
of the different political organizations. Though 
differing in politics, they unite the two machines 
in the promotion of their own corporate interests. 
The perfection of this unity of interests seems to 
have been reached in various cities where, as in 
Cincinnati, the same man is reported to be the 
“ boss ” of both political organizations.^ This 
coalition extends to Federal politics. Recently a 
leading national manager has been publicly ac¬ 
cused, by a reputable member of his own party, of 
affording campaign assistance to the manager of 
the opposing party in return for congressional aid 
to a corporation client. Both machines in nation. 
State, and city are the tools of the corporations 
and speculators who plunder the public. Conse- 

1 See Bryce, “ American Commonwealth,” vol. ii., p. 111. 

2 See “Proceedings of the Cleveland Conference for Good City 
Government,” p. 318, Philadelphia, National Municipal League, 
1895. 


THE DISTRICT SYSTEM AT WORK. 85 

quently, those voters who would be independent, 
and would gladly revolt against ring rule, have no 
place. They cannot elect an independent candi¬ 
date unless they carry a majority of their petty 
ward or district. This is almost impossible in the 
face of the party organizations. They can do 
nothing but combine with one machine against 
another. Hence come hopelessness and apathy of 
the better classes of citizens. Hence also come 
those violent explosions and hysterics of reform, 
those popular uprisings, which occasionally break 
down the barriers of machine rule, but relapse 
again, like a mob in contest with troops. The 
gerrymander and inequality in the representation 
of parties are bad enough; but the deadly evil of 
the system is the expulsion of ability and public 
spirit from politics, and the consequent dictator¬ 
ship of bosses and private corporations. 


86 FEOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTER IV. 

THE GENERAL TICKET, THE LIMITED VOTE, 
THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 

Enough has been said to show the array of evils 
which spring from the single-membered district 
system. These evils have not escaped observation, 
and various attempts have been made to remedy 
them. Especially in France have interesting ex¬ 
periments been made by the substitution of “ scrw- 
tin de liste,^’ or the general ticket. Under this 
method each constituency elects several members, 
each elector has as many votes as there are mem¬ 
bers to be elected, and those candidates are de¬ 
clared successful whose votes stand at the head of 
the list. In this way the majority party gets the en¬ 
tire list and the minority is wholly unrepresented. 

There are two applications of this system which 
lead to important differences in the final results. 
The first is that adopted in several instances in 
the United States in the election of boards of 
county commissioners and boards of education, 
where the entire assembly is elected on a single 
ticket. With such a system, the question of equal 
representation plays no part whatever. The mi¬ 
nority parties are without a single representative. 
But the system usually results in the election of 


THE GENERAL TICKET. 


87 


abler men than the district system. This would 
naturally be expected from the fact that a party, 
in making nominations for a large area, cannot 
afford to nominate obscure men. For example, 
the city of Cleveland, Ohio, recently introduced, 
with the sanction of the State legislature, a far- 
reaching reform in its system of public schools, one 
feature of which is the election of a school-board of 
seven members on a general ticket. In the first elec¬ 
tion under this plan the vote stood as follows: — 


REPUBLICAN. DEMOCRAT. 


Buss . . . 

. 15,714 

Dodge . . 

. 13,661 

Boutell . . 

. 15,595 

Goulden . . 

. 13,551 

Backus . . 

. 15,385 

Pollner . . 

. 13,306 

House. . . 

. 15,860 

Ryan . . . 

. 12,851 

Daykin . . 

. 16,198 

Burke. . . 

. 12,814 

McMillan . 

. 15,690 

Hoffman. . 

. 12,777 

Ford . . . 

. 16,036 

Blent ... 

. 12,804 

Total 

110,518 

Total 

91,764 


It will be seen that the Republicans obtained 
the entire board; but had there been a change of 
only 1,000 to 2,000 votes from Republicans to 
Democrats, the Democrats would have carried 
their entire list. 

The Cook County (Illinois) commissioners are 
elected on a general ticket, with the result that 
in 1892 the Democrats, with a vote of 133,000, 
elected their entire list of 10 candidates, and the 
Republicans, with 100,000 voters, were unrepre¬ 
sented. In 1893 the Republicans, with votes 
ranging from 70,926 to 72,554, elected 9, and the 






88 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


Democrats, with votes ranging from 69,305 to 
70,980, elected one. This was the first election 
in many years when both parties had representa¬ 
tion on the board. 

The second application of the general ticket 
is a compromise between the single-membered 
district and the general ticket. Districts are 
retained, but they are enlarged, the number is 
lessened, and a solid delegation to the legislature 
of from five to twenty representatives is elected 
on a general ticket for each district, by a majority 
or plurahty vote. For example, the county of 
Cuyahoga (including the city of Cleveland) sends 
repeatedly a solid delegation of six Republican 
representatives to the Ohio State legislature, and 
not one Democrat. The county of Hamilton (in¬ 
cluding the city of Cincinnati) sends a solid dele¬ 
gation of nine Democrats. 

Representatives to Congress in the first half 
century of our constitutional history were elected 
by this system. Each State sent to Congress a 
solid delegation of one party or another, elected 
either by the State legislature or by popular vote. 
So unjust did the method prove to be that gradu¬ 
ally the single-member district was substituted by 
individual State action, and finally Congress, in 
1842, made the latter obligatory in all States. 

Presidential electors are still chosen by this 
system, though the State of Michigan made, in the 


rilE LIMITED VOTE. 


89 


election of 1892, a notable departure, by substitut¬ 
ing the district system. The legislature of 1893, 
however, controlled by an opposing party, repealed 
the law, and returned to the general ticket. 

It will, of course, be observed that a legislative 
body elected upon this basis will not wholly ex¬ 
clude a minority party. Indeed, the experience 
of France seems to show that as far as equality of 
representation is concerned, the general ticket — 
scrutin de liste — is as equitable as the single district 
ticket — scrutin d^arrondissement. In the election 
of members to the Chamber of Deputies in 1885, 
conducted according to scrutin de liste., the Repub¬ 
licans, with 4,300,000 votes, obtained 366 seats, 
whereas their numbers entitled them to only 311; 
while the Conservative-Monarchists, with 3,550,- 
000 votes, obtained 202 seats against their rightful 
proportion of 257, — a result not materially differ¬ 
ent from that of the district system in the United 
States. The general ticket was abandoned in 
1889, after the trial at this one election; and the 
French method at present is the same as that of 
other countries. 

The general ticket presents exactly the same 
fault as the single-membered district — it divides 
the voters into two camps with no representation 
of the minority, and commits the control of elec¬ 
tions to the party machines. Its only difference is 
that it makes the area of election larger. 


90 PEOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


A modification of the general ticket, intended 
to give the minority party a limited, though not 
necessarily proportional, representation, is the 
so-called Limited Vote, This was used for nine 
years in the election of aldermen in New York 
by “three-cornered” constituencies, where, with 
three to be elected, each voter had but two votes 
instead of three. The majority party therefore 
could usually elect only two candidates. In Bos¬ 
ton since 1893 there have been elected annually 
twelve aldermen at large, but each voter has only 
seven votes. The majority party therefore elects 
seven, and the minority five. Following is the 
election return for 1894. The two principal par¬ 
ties nominated but seven candidates each, while 
minor parties nominated a smaller number. The 
candidates elected are those twelve who receive 
the highest number of votes, as indicated below. 


VOTES CAST FOR ALDERMEN, BOSTON, 1894. 


BEPUBLICAIf. 


DEMOCEAT. 


INDEPENDENT 

BEPDBLICAN. 


Allen, 

31,276 

Barry, 28,592 

Fottler, 10,894 

Bryant, 

28,630 

Dever, 27,642 

Hallstrom, 12,976 

Dyar, 

24,945 

Flood, 30,718 

Folsom, 

29,534 

Lee, 26,115 


Presho, 

26,479 

Lomasney, 26,657 


Sanford, 

26,062 

McClellan, 24,069 


Witt, 

25,836 

O’Brien, 24,587 



192,762 

188,380 

23,870 


Independent Democrat, Dolan, 10,234; scattering, 19,667. 


Total vote for all parties, 434,913. Republicans elect seven; 
Democrats elect five. 




THE CUMULATIVE VOTE, 


91 


It will be seen from the above return that the 
limited vote creates an artificial representation of 
the two dominant parties, and permits no repre¬ 
sentation whatever of minor parties and indepen¬ 
dent movements. Parties are not represented in 
proportion to this popular vote, else the above 
election would have returned but six Republicans, 
one independent Republican, and five Democrats. 
The fact that the dominant parties nominate only 
seven candidates makes a nomination almost equiv¬ 
alent to an election, the voters of the majority 
party having no choice whatever, and the voters 
of the minority having only a possible choice of 
two out of the seven. 

The limited vote is an interesting example of 
the way in which the very classes against whom 
a reform movement is aimed may divert it to 
their profit. This method of election does not 
permit independence; it rather tightens the hold 
of the party organizations, and is in harmony with 
those well-known developments of municipal poli¬ 
tics where the two party machines agree to divide 
the spoils. It is paralleled by the “ bi-partisan ” 
commissions, which, instead of being non-partisan, 
are all-partisan. And it is a long step in the di¬ 
rection of that highest development of machine 
politics referred to in the preceding chapter, 
where one man is the “boss” of both political 
organizations. The limited vote in Boston has 


92 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


; not appreciably improved the type of aldermen, 
/ and cannot be said to have accomplished any 
result except a permanent alliance of the two 
machines. In New York tho law was repealed 
after a trial of nine years. 

The general ticket has been shown to be crude, 
even barbarous, in its destruction of minorities. 
The limited vote is less barbarous, but it does not 
widen the field for independence. The Cumu¬ 
lative Vote is a further modification of the gen¬ 
eral ticket in the direction, apparently, of freedom 
for the voter. According to this plan, the elector 
has as many votes as there are representatives 
to be elected, but he may dispose of them as he 
pleases. Not only may he distribute them one 
by one among the candidates of one or all parties, 
as in the general ticket or limited vote, but he 
may cumulate them upon one or more candi¬ 
dates. In this way a small minority, which would 
have no opportunity in the limited vote, may elect 
a small number of candidates by cumulating all 
its votes on one or more. For example, in the 
election of Boston aldermen, given above, if the 
Independent Republicans could have cumulated 
their 23,870 votes upon one of their candidates, 
instead of dividing them singly between two, and 
being compelled to vote presumably for five regu¬ 
lar Republicans in order to use all their lawful 


THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 


93 


number of votes, they could have elected that one 
by a vote as large as that received by any other 
candidate. 

With the cumulative vote, very much depends 
upon the size of the districts. If they are small, 
as in the election of representatives to the lower 
branch of the Illinois legislature, the result differs 
but little from the limited vote. In Illinois each 
district elects on a general ticket three members of 
the State House of Representatives; but the voter 
may cumulate or divide his votes, giving one vote 
to each candidate, or one and a half votes to each 
of two candidates, or three votes to one candidate 
(called “plumping”). This system was adopted 
in 1870, and has therefore had a trial of twenty- 
five years. Testimony as to its practical workings 
will throw light upon the problem before us. Mr. 
M. N. Forney has published answers from Illinois 
editors to inquiries which he submitted to them.^ 
From these replies and other sources, the follow¬ 
ing conclusions are drawn. 

1. It appears that representatives of third parties 
in Illinois do not, as a rule, secure election. In 
1892 the Prohibitionists in the State mustered for 
representatives 24,684 voters (not votes) ; the Peo¬ 
ple’s Party, 20,108, out of a total of 872,948. If 
these parties could have concentrated their votes, 

1 See “ Political Reform by the Representation of Minorities,” 
New York, 1894. 


94 PEOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


they would have elected four and three members 
respectively, out of a total of 153. In the elec¬ 
tion of 1894, the results were as follows: — 


ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE, 1894. 


VOTE FOR 
REPRESEN¬ 
TATIVES. 


PER CENT 
OF TOTAL. 


REPRESEN¬ 

TATIVES 

ELECTED. 


PROPOR¬ 

TIONAL. 


Republicans . . 1,332,488 
Democrats . . . 914,735 

Prohibitionists . 43,402 

People’s Party . 174,465 

Independent . . 6,323 

Ind. Democrats . 1,407 

Ind. Republicans. 8,867 

Amer. Citizen . . 2,585 

Scattering . . . 2,575 

Total . . . 2,486,847 


53.4 

92 

82 

37.2 

61 

57 

1.7 


3 

7.1 


11 

.2 



.3 



.1 



.1 



100 

153 

153 


The elections are therefore confined, as in the 
limited vote, to the candidates of the two domi¬ 
nant parties. Unlike the single-membered district 
system, however, both parties have representatives 
from every part of the State instead of from the 
strongholds only, and there are no hopeless minori¬ 
ties of the two main parties. Every citizen who 
has business before the legislature has some mem¬ 
ber of his own party to transact that business. 
The vote in the legislature is close, requiring the 
constant attendance of all members. By the elec¬ 
tion of 1892 it stood 75 to 78. 

2. Votes are wasted whenever a popular candi¬ 
date receives ‘‘ plumpers ” beyond the number 








THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 


95 


necessary to elect him. “A candidate who runs 
too far ahead, is just as dangerous to his party as 
the man who runs far behind. Under the old 
system, the man who runs ahead does so at the 
expense of his adversary, but under the cumula¬ 
tive system it is at the expense of his col- 


leagues.” ^ For example, in the election of 1894 
the vote of the forty-fifth district was as follows: — 

Callahan . . 

. Republican . . , 

, . 11,140 

Black.... 

. Democrat . . . 

. . 9,793^ 

Tiptit . . . 

. Democrat . . , 

, . 9,699^ 

Lathrop ... 

. Republican . . , 

. . 9,628 

Palmer . . . , 

. People’s Party . . 

. . 2,921i 

Smith . . . , 

. Prohibition . . . 

, . 960 


The total Republican votes were 20,768, repre¬ 
senting approximately 6,923 voters; the Demo¬ 
cratic votes were 19,493, representing 6,498 
voters. Yet the Democratic minority elected two 
representatives, and the Republican plurality only 
one, because Callahan, Republican, received at 
least 1,400 votes more than he needed; but his 
colleague, Lathrop, lacked at least 75. This re¬ 
sult occurred in one district in 1892, and in three 
districts in 1894. 

3. In order to obviate tliis waste, all the re¬ 
sources of the party managers are enlisted, and 
the party machine becomes even more indispensa¬ 
ble than under the old system. In the first place, 
the managers determine how many candidates 

1 See Fomey, above. 







96 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


shall be nominated. Only where the parties are 
close, as in the forty-fifth district above cited, do 
both parties nominate two candidates. In other 
cases, the minority nominates but one, and a nomi¬ 
nation is equivalent to an election. For example, 
the vote in the thirty-sixth district was ; — 


Kitzmiller . 

. . Republican . . 

. . 16,525 

Mounts . . 

. . Democrat . . 

. . 9,013i 

Jones . . 

. . Democrat . . 

. . 9,059 

Winters . . 

. . People’s Party . 

. . 2,360 

Kelly. . . 

. . Prohibition . . 

. . 1,117 


The Republicans, though lacking but 1,500 of the 
Democratic vote, nominated but one candidate. 
Again, in close districts, the managers must exer¬ 
cise great care in selecting good “running mates,” 
as did the Democrats in the forty-fifth and thirty- 
sixth districts. For these reasons the party or¬ 
ganization is greatly strengthened, there is a 
strong opposition to “ plumping,” and voters are 
careful not to disobey the party instructions. 

4. The quahty and ability of representatives 
are no better than under the old system. In close 
districts, where four candidates are nominated, 
there may be a slight improvement; but in other 
districts, Avhere a nomination is equivalent to elec¬ 
tion, the worst elements get control, and bid de¬ 
fiance to the people. There are frequent “ deals ” 
between parties, the minority agreeing to put up 
one man, and the “ gang ” in both parties control¬ 
ling the primaries. 







THE CUMULATIVE VOTE. 


9T 


If districts are larger, electing five to fifteen 
members, the cumulative vote gives a decided 
advantage to very small parties, both from the 
smaller quota necessary to elect a single candi¬ 
date, and from the increased waste of the larger 
parties. In England the school boards are elected 
on the cumulative plan by districts returning four 
or more members. 

A correspondent of the New York Worlds report¬ 
ing the first election held in Manchester under 
this system, wrote : ^ — 

In IManchester there were fifteen members of the school 
board to be elected, and each voter had fifteen votes at his 
disposal. Forty-four candidates went to the polls, and over 
390,000 votes were given by 26,513 voters. . . . Manchester 
is famous for two things, — first, the fervor of its Protes¬ 
tantism ; second, the number, organization, and strength of 
its working-classes. But at this election the two Roman 
Catholics were brought in at the head of the poll, one of 
them receiving nearly 20,000 more votes than any Protes¬ 
tant candidate, and no working-class candidate, of whom 
there were seven, being elected at all, the highest vote any 
of them received being 3,854, while one of them got only 
166. Here is the list of the successful candidates, with the 
votes given to each : — 


Kev. Canon Toole, Roman Catholic .... 54,560 
George Richardson, Roman Catholic .... 36,308 

Wm. Birch, “ Philanthropist ”.35,415 

Herbert Birley, Episcopalian. 34,026 

Wm. B. Callender, Episcopalian.31,824 


1 Quoted by Dutcher, “ Minority or Proportional Representa¬ 
tion,” New York, 1872, p. 72. 






98 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


Robert Gladstone, Episcopalian. 24,237 

Thos. Dale, Episcopalian. 20,688 

Joseph Lamb, Episcopalian. 22,987 

Lydia Becker, “ No Religion ”.15,249 

Richard Haworth, Wesleyan.13,137 

Rev. W. McKerrow, Presbyterian.9,919 

Robert Rumney, Presbyterian.9,510 

Dr. John Watts, Unsectarian.8,861 

John Cooper, Wesleyan.8,020 

Oliver Heywood, Secularist.7,902 


The 90,868 votes given to the Roman Catholic can¬ 
didates were polled by about 7,000 voters, who either 
“ plumped ” for the reverend gentleman wdio heads the 
list, or split their votes between him and the lawyer who 
follows him. The 133,762 votes given to the five Church 
of England candidates were polled by about 9,000 voters; 
so that it seems that in Manchester the relative strength of 
the Church of England and the Church of Rome is as nine 
to seven. It is quite clear that under the old system the 
former could have elected all the candidates, wRile the lat¬ 
ter would have been unrepresented; but it is equally clear 
that these two parties underestimated their own strength, 
and that between them they might have elected all the can¬ 
didates but one. The Catholics might have had six in¬ 
stead of two candidates, and given each of them 15,144 
votes; the Episcopalians might have had eight candidates, 
and given each of them 16,720 votes ; while all that the 
other parties could have done would have been to elect the 
remaining candidate. 

The cumulative vote, therefore, whether in 
small or large constituencies, must involve either 
waste and guesswork, or extreme dictatorship of 
party machineiy. 












PBOFOBTIONAL BEFBESENTATlON. 99 


CHAPTER V. 

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

The cumulative vote makes it possible for the 
elector, entitled to vote for a number of candi¬ 
dates, to concentrate his entire voting strength 
upon a single candidate. This is the advantage to 
minority parties which it gives, as compared with 
the general ticket. It compels all parties, there¬ 
fore, to cumulate in order to prevent a waste of 
votes. Now, suppose every elector were required 
to “plump” all of his votes on a single candidate. 
Every one would then be equally well provided 
for, if he had but one vote on a general ticket, 
instead of as many votes as there are candidates. 
Ten votes given to one candidate count no more 
than one vote given to that candidate, provided 
every other elector has but one vote. It has, in¬ 
deed, been proposed ^ that representatives should 
be elected on general ticket, but that each elector 
should be entitled to vote for but one candidate, 
the candidates who stand highest on the poll up to 
the required number being declared elected. This 
would be in effect a compulsory “plumping.” The 

1 L. C. F. Garvin, “ How to effect Municipal Reform,’’ Arena, 
September, 1894. 


LOFC. 


100 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 

same objections would apply as against the cumu¬ 
lative vote. It would waste the elector’s voting 
strength by giving surplus votes to popular candi¬ 
dates, which the electors, could they know before¬ 
hand, would wish to give to others representing 
the same views. The party organization would 
therefore decide for the electors exactly how their 
votes should be cast. 

But this dictation could be avoided and the 
voter’s freedom guaranteed, if he were permitted 
to indicate on his ballot his second and third 
choices, for whom his single vote should be 
counted, if it were not needed to elect his first 
choice, or if it were given for a candidate who 
could not be elected. This is the “single trans¬ 
ferable vote,” which, as its name would indicate, 
allows each elector to vote for but one candidate, 
instead of the entire number to be elected, but 
permits him to indicate second and third choices. 
The total number of votes cast is therefore the 
same as the number of valid ballots, which, 
divided by the number of members to be elected 
(or number of members plus one), gives the unit 
or quota of representation necessary to elect a 
single representative. Each voter marks his ballot 
with the figures, 1, 2, 3, etc., opposite the names 
of candidates in the order of his preference. In 
counting the ballots, at first only the first choices 
are counted, and as soon as a candidate has 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 101 


received a number of first choices equal to the 
quota, he is declared elected. After that no more 
votes are counted for him, but remaining ballots 
which give him first choice are counted for the 
candidates marked second choice, or if the second 
choice be declared elected, then for the third 
choice, and so on. After the ballots have been 
gone over once in this way, and it is found that 
the full number of members is not elected, as 
would usually be the case, then candidates whose 
total vote, either by way of first or secondary 
choices is less than a quota, are declared “ out ” 
in the inverse order of their vote, and their ballots 
are transferred to the successive choices indicated 
thereon, until the complete number of members 
is declared elected. 

This method of election has been exhibited by 
Miss C. H. Spence of South Australia, in some 
fifty public meetings. By massing together the 
results of these several elections, she has presented 
the following scrutiny of 3,824 votes for the elec¬ 
tion of six parliamentary representatives. There 
were twelve names of candidates on her voting- 
papers, arranged in alphabetical order.^ 

“ The instructions to voters were that they should mark 
with figures, in the order of their preference, the candidates 

1 “Report of meeting on Proportional Representation, or 
effective voting, held at River House, Chelsea, London.” John 
Bale & Sons, 1894, p. 36. 


102 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


CANDIDATES. 

First Totes. 

SUR¬ 

PLUS. 

ELIMINATED. 

ELECTED. 

1. Charlston. | 

2. Magarey. | 

1 3. Robinson, j 

1 4. Harrold. 

5. Guthrie. 

6. Fowler. 

7. Buttery. 

8. Baker. 

Angas (Capital) .... 

419 

. . 

2 

4 

10 

7 

44 

12 

139 

637 

Baker (Do.). 

2G2 

1 

. . 

1 

10 

6 

47 

15 



Birks (Single Tax) . . . 

361 

11 

2 

4 

2 

31 

17 

64 

27 

517 

Buttery (Labor) .... 

190 

2 


11 

2 

72 

11 




Charlston (Do.) .... 

682 









637 

Fowler (Capital) .... 

167 

1 

1 

1 

37 

9 





Glynn (Irish Catholic) . . 

320 

3 

.. 

6 

11 

. . 

28 

88 

127 


Guthrie (Labor) .... 

136 

18 

.. 

30 

2 

32 




615 

Harrold (Capital).... 

93 

1 

.. 

1 







Magarey (Prohibition) . . 

656 









637 

Robinson (Labor).... 

72 

4 








637 

Stirling (Wom.’s Suffrage), 

466 

4 

13 

17 

21 

22 

63 

31 


144 

Null. 




1 



6 

80 

49 



6)3,824 

45 

19 

76 

92 

187 

216 

290 

342 

3,834 


637- 

— quota. 








as far as six or fewer. This is all the voter has to do. His 
vote is to be counted for one, and that one the first on his 
list who needs his vote and can use it. If his first choice 
has already reached the quota, or has too few votes even 
with his aid to do so, the vote is transferred to his next, 
as shown by his number, and used and not wasted. 

“ The quota is found by Mr. Hare’s original method, by 
dividing the whole number of votes by the number of rep¬ 
resentatives needed, in this instance six. The votes should 
be first mixed thoroughly together, and then taken out 
one by one and numbered, and allotted according to first 
choice, as shown in the first vertical column of the table 
appended. The votes are found to be 3,824, which, divided 
by six, gives as a quotient or quota 637, leaving out the 
fraction. 






























PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION. 103 


“ This shows that only Charlston and Magarey had any 
surplus; and, after cutting the pile of votes once, like a 
pack of cards, so that there might be no arrangement of 
preferred second choices, the 45 and the 19 unneeded votes 
were taken from the top, and allotted according to second 
choice, as seen by columns two and three. 

“ Next, the returning officer declares Robinson, the lowest 
on the poll, not elected, and proceeds to distribute his 
original and transferred votes by second choice, or third, 
if second is already elected. (See column 3.) Next, Har- 
rold is declared not elected, and his votes dealt with sim¬ 
ilarly. Thus, step by step, six of the twelve candidates are 
eliminated from the contest, leaving six elected. 

“ Of these, two have quotas of first choice votes, two have 
quotas of first and transferred votes, and two have what 
Mr. Hare calls approximate quotas sufficient for returning 
them. . . . The appropriation of transferred votes may 
be followed in the horizontal lines. At the foot we see 
a line marked ‘ Null; ’ these were ineffective apparently 
more than in reality. These 144 voting papers could not 
be used because the voters had marked the names of men 
who had already obtained the full quota of 637 votes, or 
who had been eliminated as hopeless. 

“ But I believe that there were only two unrepresented; 
one who had marked one name, and that one of the unsuc¬ 
cessful candidates, while the other voter had ingeniously 
picked out the six who failed to make a quota.” 

The single transferable vote has become the 
classical form of proportional representation, 
from the great ability with which it was presented 
by its author, Mr. Thomas Hare, and advocated 
by John Stuart MillJ It was also devised inde- 

1 See Chapter X. and Appendix IV. 


104 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


pendently by the Danish statesman, M. Andrae, 
and introduced by him into the election of a 
portion of the members of the “ Rigsraad ” in 1855, 
and for the “Landsthing” in 1867. It is advo¬ 
cated by the English Proportional Representation 
Society, of which Sir John Lubbock is president. 

There is a practical difficulty, almost insur¬ 
mountable, in the application of this system to 
large constituencies, in the fact that all the votes 
of the entire constituency must be brought to¬ 
gether to the central bureau for counting. They 
cannot be counted by the various precinct officials, 
leaving only the totals to be handled by the cen¬ 
tral board. The Hare system doubtless works well 
in a constituency of a thousand voters, as in the 
Mechanics’ Institute of San Francisco, where it 
has been successfully employed in three elections, 
or in constituencies electing only three to seven 
candidates by a restricted suffrage, as in the 
Danish law of M. Andrae; but when ten thousand, 
or a hundred thousand, or a half million votes are 
to be counted, and a large number of the ballots 
must be recounted to make the proper transfers, 
the task is too heavy. 

The Hare system is advocated by those who, in 
a too doctrinaire fashion, wish to abolish political 
parties. They apparently do not realize the im¬ 
possibility of acting in politics without large 
groupings of individuals, nor do they perceive that 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 105 

the Hare system itself, though apparently a system 
of personal representation, would, nevertheless, 
result in party representation. And this from the 
fact that voters who act rationally, and wish to 
see their own views most strongly represented in 
legislation, would always transfer their secondary 
choices to candidates of the same party as the ones 
who receive their first choices. The only way in 
which the system could lessen party cohesion 
would be to require the names of candidates to 
be printed in alphabetical order, as in the present 
Massachusetts and California ballot laws, and not 
by party tickets, so that the voters would be com¬ 
pelled to search through the entire ballot for the 
candidates of their own party. This would doubt¬ 
less encourage independent voting, but would by 
no means abolish parties. A study of the scru¬ 
tiny of votes taken by Miss Spence, as given above, 
shows that the ‘‘ surplus ” votes, and votes of 
‘‘ eliminated ” candidates, have been transferred 
as far as possible within party lines. In an actual 
instead of a trial election the adherence to party 
would be closer. 

With the present organization of parties in the 
United States, and with the customary method of 
printing party tickets on the so-called Australian 
ballot, there is reason to believe that the Hare 
system would be forced into the service of par¬ 
ties. There is a general agreement among the 


106 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. 

leading advocates of proportional representation 
that a system of election is needed which will do 
as little violence as possible to existing prejudices 
and habits, — a system which will fit in with the 
methods of voting and the political traditions of 
the people, and yet will utilize these traditions 
and methods in such a way as to free the voter 
from the tyranny of the single-membered district 
system. It must also be a system in which the 
ballots can be counted at the precincts where 
they are cast. 


VOTE FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS, 
INDIANA, 1892. 



DEMOCRAT. 

REPUBLICAN. 

PEOPLE’S. 

PROHIB. 

I. 

262,270* 

255,615* 

22,208 * 

13,050 

II. 

260,661 * 

253,878* 

21,861 

12,830 

III. 

260,600 * 

253,836* 

21,883 

12,827 

IV. 

260,586 

253,815* 

21,876 

12,824 

V. 

260,580 

253,799* 

21,873 

12,823 

VI. 

260,560 

253,807 * 

21,873 

12,821 

VII. 

260,588 * 

253,793 

21,873 

12,821 

VIII. 

260,547 

253,808 * 

21,865 

12,820 

IX. 

260,575 

253,787 

21,873 

12,819 

X. 

260,600 * 

253,792 

21,873 

12,813 

XI. 

260,591 * 

253,777 

21,871 

12,820 

XII. 

260,590* 

253,767 

21,867 

12,819 

XIII. 

260,581 

253,767 

21,867 

12,815 

XIV. 

260,538 

253,770 

21,865 

12,816 

XV. 

260,533 

253,770 

21,864 

12,815 


3,910,390 

3,808,791 

328,392 

192,533 


In order to approach the solution of our prob¬ 
lem from a standpoint familiar to Americans, we 
may examine the principles involved in a vote for 






PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 107 


presidential electors, and the possible modifica¬ 
tions necessary to make such an election propor¬ 
tional. Take, for example, the vote in the State 
of Indiana in 1892, as shown on p. 106. The 
particular candidates are indicated by Roman nu¬ 
merals, in the order in which they stood on the 
respective tickets. 

Of course, under the existing system of majority 
(or rather plurality) rule, the fifteen Democratic 
nominees are declared the successful candidates, 
seeing that individually each one receives more 
votes than any Republican candidate. But with 
proportional representation, parties., rather than in¬ 
dividuals, must receive their just deserts. There¬ 
fore the following calculation is made: — 

Democrats.3,910,390 

Republicans. 3,808,791 

People’s Party. 328,392 

Prohibitionists. 192,533 

8,240,106 

8,240,106 -r 15 = 549,340 = unit of representation. 

Since there are fifteen representatives to be 
elected, it would appear that every party should 
be entitled to one representative for every fif¬ 
teenth part which it receives of the total vote 
for all parties. This quotient would be 549,340, 
which would be the unit of representation. Di¬ 
viding, now, the several party votes by the unit 
of representation, we have,— 







108 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


BEMAINDEB. ELECTING. 


Democrats, 3,910,390 -j- 549,340 = 7 + 165,010 7 

Republicans, 3,808,791 549,340 = 7 + 63,411 7 

People’s Party, 328,392 549,340 = 0 + 328,392 1 

Prohibitionists, 192,533 -J- 549,340 192,533 _0^ 

Total, 14 15 


The People’s party, having the largest remainder 
above a full quotient, would be entitled to the odd 
delegate, making the complete representation con¬ 
sist of seven Democrats, seven Republicans, and 
one Populist. 

It now remains to select the individual candi¬ 
dates on the several tickets. This is done by 
taking the seven Democrats, seven Republicans, 
and one Populist, who show the highest number 
of individual votes. I have indicated the success¬ 
ful candidates by an asterisk. 

Here we have the simplest modification possible 
of the existing general ticket with which Ameri¬ 
cans are familiar. It secures justice between^ 
parties, obviates the waste of cumulative voting, 
breaks the monopoly of the dominant parties, and 
elects the most popular and representative men in 
each party. 

But as a practical instrument for a scheme of 
proportional representation, it presents serious dif¬ 
ficulties. Like all of the plans for minority rep¬ 
resentation that have been examined, as well as 
the existing single-membered district, it is based, 
primarily, upon the theory that the voter casts 


PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 109 


his ballot for individual candidates and not for 
a political party. This is the primitive theory of 
representation, which, as we have seen, emerged 
from the primary assembly through the instru¬ 
mentality of proxies. Based, however, upon this 
earlier theory, the modern voter approaches the 
election with the idea of his political party upper¬ 
most in his mind. He votes for persons because 
they are the nominees of his party. The person¬ 
ality of the candidates is a secondary considera¬ 
tion. This is seen in an extreme case in the 
general ticket of a presidential election. Each 
political party nominates a list of candidates equal 
to the total number to be elected; and the voters 
of the majority party, by voting individually for 
each candidate on their party ticket, elect the en¬ 
tire ticket. For this reason the plan is not suited 
to proportional representation, under which the 
political parties could not hope to elect an entire 
delegation, and would naturally not wish to nomi¬ 
nate a larger number of candidates than they could 
expect to elect. 

At the same time there is a very prevalent 
modification in the method of voting the general 
ticket in the United States, which will suggest a 
way out of this difficulty. The voter is usually 
given the privilege of voting a straight ticket by 
placing a single mark opposite the title of the 
party of his choice. In this way he gives a vote 


110 PBOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

individually for each candidate on the ticket, 
although not required to check the individual 
names. Plainly, if all the votes are cast in this 
way, the final result as between parties is the 
same as though each voter cast but one vote for 
a party instead of his ten or fifteen or more votes 
for the individual candidates of that party. Con¬ 
siderations of this kind influenced Mr. Thomas 
Gilpin of Philadelphia, who in the year 1844 
published his pamphlet “ On the Representation 
of Minorities of Electors to act with the Majority 
in Elected Assemblies.” ^ This was probably the 
“earliest attempt to find a philosophical solution 
for the problem of presentation.” 2 Mr. Gilpin 
proposed that voters should have but one vote, 
which they should cast, not for a candidate, but 
for a party. The constituencies were to be en¬ 
larged, and each party committee or convention 
was to present one list of candidates. The voter 
was to hand in to the election officers his party 
ticket which might contain “ as candidates the 
whole number of representatives to be voted for 
in the district; and these should be placed in 
preferences highest on the list, in order that those 
set first on it may be chosen according as the 
number of votes given may entitle the ticket to 
one or more of its candidates.” The total number 

1 Philadelphia, John C. Clark, printer, 1844. 

2 Professor Wm. R. Ware, in American Law Review, Jan¬ 
uary, 1872. 


PBOPOUTIONAL REPRESENTATION. Ill 

of tickets voted divided by the number of persons 
to he elected, gives the electoral quota., which, in 
turn, used as a divisor, determines the number of 
candidates who are elected on each list. No pro¬ 
vision was made whereby the elector could indi¬ 
cate his preferences among the candidates on his 
party ticket, the rule being that, as already quoted 
from Gilpin, if a given list was entitled to, say, 
three quotas of votes, the first three candidates 
were to be the elected deputies. 

In 1846 M. Victor Considerant published at 
Geneva, Switzerland, a plan similar to that of 
Gilpin, but independently originated.^ He did 
not contemplate a full list of candidates on all 
party tickets, but only partial lists, as the nomi¬ 
nating agencies might choose. Each list was to 
be published before election and given an official 
number.- Each elector was to vote for a ticket by 
writing on his ballot the number, “No. 1,” “No. 
2,” etc., and then also to name the candidates of 
his own ticket whom he wished.^ 

In 1870 M. Borely of Nimes, France, proposed 
that each elector should himself indicate his pref¬ 
erences by numbering the candidates 1, 2, 3, etc. 

1 “De la Sincerite du gouvemement representatif, ou Exposi¬ 
tion de rElection Veridique.” Reprinted by Karl Biirkli, Zurich, 
1892. 

2 “ D’ecrire sur son bulletin le numero de sa section, et au-des- 
sous, la liste des noms qu’il aura choisis parmi les candidats de 
sa section,” p. 12. 


112 PEOPOBTIONAL PEPEESENTATION. 

In this form the plan was adopted in 1871 by the 
Association Reformiste of Geneva, Switzerland, 
and became known as the liste lihrcy or “free 
ticket.” 

While recognizing political parties as primarily 
entitled to representation, it was again soon per¬ 
ceived that the restriction of the elector to one 
vote for a single party did not permit him to vote 
for individual candidates on other party tickets 
whom he may have preferred; and his freedom 
of choice within his own party would not be 
great, seeing that his party managers would nom¬ 
inate no more candidates than they hoped to 
elect. In 1875 the Swiss Association, therefore, 
abandoned the double vote for party and for can¬ 
didates within the party, and advocated a combi¬ 
nation of the cumulative vote and the free ticket. 
The voter was to have as many votes as there 
were deputies to elect, and he might cumulate 
them as he saw fit. However, to avoid the 
wasted votes of the crude cumulation, the free list 
feature was added; and it was provided that the 
total number of votes given to individual candi¬ 
dates on the respective tickets were to be added 
together to determine the share of representation 
which the parties as such should have. 

Much can be said in favor of this plan, espe¬ 
cially in connection with the Australian system of 
voting, where all the party tickets appear upon 


PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 113 


the same “ blanket ballot.” It is also well adapted 
to the Massachusetts and California ballots, where 
candidates are named alphabetically, and not ac¬ 
cording to parties. By it the voters may plump 
their votes without regard to the instructions of 
the party managers, yet with the assurance that 
no votes are wasted. For example, in the election 
in the forty-fifth Illinois district, as given on page 
95, where the Republican Callahan ran so far 
ahead of his ticket that his colleague was de¬ 
feated and two Democrats were elected, the “ free 
ticket ” amendment would have given the follow¬ 
ing result: — 

REPUBLICAN. 

Callahan, 11,140 
Lathrop, 9,628 
Total, 20,768 

Republican, 20,768 
Democrat, 19,493 
People’s, 2,921i 
Prohibition, 960 

Total, 44,142^ 3 = 14,714 = rmit of representation. 

Republican, 20,768 4-14,714 = 1 + 6,054, electing 2 
Democrat, 19,493 -i-14,714 = 1 + 4,779, electing 1 
People’s, 2,921 14,714 = 0 + 2,921;!, electing 0 

Prohibition, 960 -j-14,714 = 0 + 960, electing 0 

'2 1 

In the crude cumulation, where candidates and 
not parties are considered, as in the Illinois method, 
the Republicans with a majority of the votes 


DEMOCRAT. PEOPLE’S AND 

PROHIBITION. 

Tiptit, 9,793^ 

Black, 9,699i 

19,493 ‘ 3,881i 





114 PBOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

elected only one candidate, who received 1,400 
votes more than he needed. But with the free 
ticket modification, these 1,400 wasted votes are 
counted for the party to which this leading candi¬ 
date belongs and are in effect transferred to his 
colleague. Thus that party secures its rightful 
proportion of two representatives instead of one, 
and the candidate running ahead of his ticket 
becomes a help instead of a danger. 

A bill based upon this combination was intro¬ 
duced by Hon. Tom Johnson in the Fifty-second 
Congress, and is given herewith: — 

62d Congress, 1st Session. 

H. R. 9222. 


IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. 

June 15,1892. 

Referred to the Committee on Election of President and 
Vice-President, and ordered to be printed. 

Mr. Johnson of Ohio introduced the following bill: — 

A BILL 

PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES 
BY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
That members of the House of Representatives shall be 
voted for at large in their respective States. 

Sec. 2. That any body of electors in any State may, in 
convention, nominate any number of candidates not to ex- 


PROPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 115 


ceed the number of seats to which such State is entitled in 
the House, and cause their names to be printed on its ballot. 

Sec. 3. That every elector shall be entitled on his 
ballot to one vote each for as many persons as the State 
whereof he is a resident is entitled to seats in the House, 
and he may cumulate his votes on a less number of persons 
in such manner as he may choose. 

Sec. 4. That the sum of all the votes cast for all the 
candidates in any State shall be divided by the number of 
seats to which such State is entitled, and the quotient to the 
nearest unit shall be known as the unit of representation. 

Sec. 5. That the sum of all the votes cast for all the 
candidates of each body of electors nominating candidates 
shall be severally divided by the quota of representation, 
and the units of the quotients thus obtained will show the 
number of representatives to which each such body of 
electors is entitled; and if the sum of such quotients be 
less than the number of seats to be filled, the body of elec¬ 
tors having the largest remainder after division of the sum 
of all the votes cast for all its candidates by the quota of 
representation, as herein specified, shall be entitled to the 
first vacancy, and so on until all the vacancies are filled. 

Sec. 6. That the candidates of each body of electors 
nominating candidates and found entitled to representation 
under the foregoing rules, shall receive certificates of elec¬ 
tion in the order of the vote received, the candidate receiv¬ 
ing the highest number of votes the first certificate, and so 
on; but in case of a tie, with but one vacancy to be filled, 
the matter shall be determined by lot between the candi- 
dates so tied. 

This combination of the cumulative vote and 
the ‘‘free ticket” answers in most respects the 
ideal of electoral reform. It gives to the voter 


116 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

the widest freedom of choice between all the indi¬ 
vidual candidates on all the tickets, avoids the 
waste and the consequent “machine ” supremacy 
of the simple cumulative vote, and opens the way 
for independent movements within and without 
the dominant parties. There are, however, two 
minor objections. If voters are allowed to write 
on their ballots the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., against 
individual candidates, it becomes easy to make 
those “ distinguishing marlis ” which the laws 
against bribery seek to prohibit. This objection 
would not hold against a plan by which the voter 
gives but one vote to a candidate or one to a 
ticket. Again, the cumulation involves a waste of 
votes between the groups or factions within the 
party corresponding to the waste which the sim¬ 
ple cumulation permits between parties. Voters 
of a given faction, who cumulate on their own first 
choices of their party candidates, and who fail to 
distribute their votes so as to aid the secondary 
candidates of the same faction, would be at a dis¬ 
advantage, and minor but shrewder factions would 
secure disproportionate influence in the party repre¬ 
sentation. This objection, however, is not a serious 
one, provided the several factions nominate sepa¬ 
rate tickets, as they could easily do. 

The cumulative vote, with the “free ticket” 
amendment, has been adopted by the Canton Zug 
in Switzerland, and is favored by Professor Ernest 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 117 


Naville, the leading advocate of proportional rep¬ 
resentation in that country. It is simpler than 
the plan finally agreed upon by the Swiss and 
American advocates of the reform, and would per¬ 
haps secure all the advantages of the latter. It 
could be adopted in Illinois by a slight amend¬ 
ment to the cumulative vote, though the small 
size of the constituencies would prevent the best 
results. It is the only form, too, which could 
conveniently be adopted in States like Massachu¬ 
setts and California, whose ballot laws require 
that candidates’ names be printed in alphabetical 
order, and not by party groupings. In these 
States the voter could cumulate his votes on in¬ 
dividual candidates, and it would be the duty of 
the returning officers to separate out the candi¬ 
dates by parties and add up the individual votes 
in order to find the several party votes. The 
simple rule of three would then determine the 
party representation, and the individual candi¬ 
dates who stood highest on the party lists would 
be declared elected. 

It is evident, however, that the advantages of 
cumulation will be secured to the party, though 
not to favored candidates, if voters, being allowed 
to cast but one vote for individual candidates on 
any of the party tickets, are permitted to cast all 
the unused votes to which they are entitled for a 
single party, by merely making the legal mark 


118 PEOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


against the title of the party. Thus if a voter in 
a constituency electing twenty candidates chooses 
to give single votes to five candidates on one or 
more tickets, he may, instead of cumulating the 
remaining fifteen on a single candidate, by writing 
the figures “ 15 ” against the candidate’s name, be 
permitted to “ bunch ” them directly for the party 
ticket to which his favorite candidate belongs by 
making the simple cross against the party emblem. 
His fifteen votes would go for the party thus indi¬ 
cated ; and his remaining five would count both as 
preferences for individual candidates within the 
parties, and as votes for the parties to which those 
candidates belong. 

This is the plan finally agreed upon by the 
Swiss Association, and recently incorporated into 
the electoral laws of Neuchatel and Geneva. It 
was also adopted by the American Proportional 
Representation League at Saratoga in 1895, as 
most nearly suited to American habits. A bill 
drawn up by a committee of the League ^ appointed 
for the purpose is given herewith, together with 
an introductory statement by the committee : — 

“ The accompanying bill is provided with especial refer¬ 
ence to the election of boards of aldermen in cities; but 

1 Professor J. R. Commons, Syracuse University; Mr. Stough¬ 
ton Cooley, Secretary American Proportional Representation 
League; Professor J. W. Jenks, Cornell University. This hill 
has not been officially adopted by the League. It is simply the 
recommendation of the committee. 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 119 


the same provisions may be adapted, with simple verbal 
changes, to the election of members of a legislature, or 
congressmen, or any board consisting of a number of 
representatives with equal powers. The number of candi¬ 
dates on any ticket ought ordinarily not to exceed fifteen, 
and may well be as small as five. In case of large bodies, 
therefore, the city or State can be divided into large terri¬ 
torial districts, and the proportional system applied to each. 

“ It has been presumed that the general laws of the State 
provide for the nominations by parties and by petition; 
follow the general plan of the Australian system of voting; 
provide for election inspectors, canvassers, etc.; lay down 
principles determining the validity of votes; and in gene¬ 
ral provide for the carrying out of elections, — so that this 
bill provides only the specific requirements needed for the 
proportional system.” 


BILL 

TO ESTABLISH A SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA¬ 
TION IN CITIES. 

Sec. I. The members of the board of aldermen to be 
chosen at any election shall be chosen by all the voters of 
the city on a general ticket, and not by separate districts. 

Sec. II. Any party or body of voters which polled at 
the last preceding city election one per centum of the total 
vote cast for the principal office filled at said election, or 
which shall present a nomination paper signed by voters 
equal in number to such percentage [or by the number 
specified in the law of the State concerned], may nominate 
a ticket or list of any number of candidates for said board 
of aldermen not to exceed the total number of persons to be 
elected to said board; and the names of the persons thus 
nominated shall be printed on the official ballot, but so that 


120 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


the list of candidates nominated by each party or body of 
voters shall be printed separately. 

Sec. III. A candidate may be placed upon several party 
tickets, but he may choose in favor of one of them. All 
the votes cast for him are then counted for the ticket 
chosen. In default of a choice by him, the ticket to which 
he shall be assigned is determined five days before the 
election by lot, by the proper officer, in the presence of the 
official representatives of the parties or petitioners con¬ 
cerned, if they wish to appear. 

,/ ■' A candidate’s name cannot be placed on any ticket if he 
makes objection in writing to the proper officer five days 
before the election. 

Sec. IV. Each voter shall have as many votes as there 
are persons to be elected, which he may distribute as he 
chooses among the candidatts, giving not more than one 
vote to any one candidate, votes thus specifically given to 
be known as “ individual votes ; ” and each such vote shall 
count individually for the candidate receiving the same and 
for the ticket to which the candidate belongs. In case a 
voter does not use the total number of votes to which he is 
entitled by specifying that number of candidates, the re¬ 
mainder of his votes, to be known as “ ticket votes,” shall 
be counted for any ticket as a whole, provided that he 
designate such ticket by title ; otherwise only the “ indi¬ 
vidual votes ” shall be counted. His entire ballot will be 
void if more than one ticket is designated by title. 

The voter casts his “ individual votes ” by marking in 
the space provided by law opposite the names of the sepa¬ 
rate candidates ; he casts his “ ticket votes ” by marking 
in the space provided at the head of the ticket. 

Sec. V. Judges and inspectors of election shall deter¬ 
mine for each precinct, and the central canvassing board 
for the city, the following : — 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 121 


1. The number of votes invalidated for any cause. 

2. The number of valid “ individual votes ” cast for 

each candidate. 

3. The number of valid “ individual votes ” cast for 

each party or ticket. 

4. The number of “ ticket votes ” cast for each ticket. 

5. The total number of valid votes cast for each ticket, 

including “ individual votes ” and “ ticket votes.” 

6. The total number of all valid votes cast. 

Sec. VI. In determining the results of the election, — 

1. The total number of valid votes cast for all tickets 

shall be divided by'the number of candidates to be 
elected; the quotient, ignoring fractions, to be 
known as the “ unit of representation.” 

2. The total number of valid votes cast for each ticket 

shall be severally divided by the unit of represen¬ 
tation, and each such ticket shall be entitled to 
a number of aldermen equal to the quotient thus 
obtained, ignoring fractions. 

3. Ji the sum of such quotients be less than the number 

of persons to be elected, the ticket having the 
largest remainder after the division aforesaid shall 
be entitled to an additional alderman ; thereafter, 
the ticket having the second largest remainder; 
and so on, until the whole number is chosen. 
Sec. VII. When the number of representatives to which 
each ticket is entitled shall have been determined as pro¬ 
vided in Section VL, the candidates upon such tickets who 
shall have received the highest number of votes (not exceed¬ 
ing the number of representatives to which such ticket is 
entitled) shall receive certificates of election. In case of a 
tie between tickets or candidates, the lot decides. 

Sec. VIII. If a ticket obtains more representatives than 
it has piesented candidates, the number of seats remaining 


122 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

to be filled is distributed among the other tickets in pro¬ 
portion to the votes cast for each. 

Sec. IX. When there is a vacancy in any seat, the candi¬ 
date who has received in the general election the greatest 
number of votes after the last one elected, in the party or 
group within which the vacancy has occurred, is chosen to 
fill it. 

In order to illustrate the practical operation of 
this measure if enacted into law, I give herewith 
an abstract of the report of a special commission 
to the Belgian Parliament appointed for the pur¬ 
pose of holding a trial ballot in Brussels, Nov. 19, 
1893. The report is published in full in La 
Representation Proportionelle.^ Brussels, Decem¬ 
ber, 1893. It gives a detailed and careful ex¬ 
hibit of all the steps in proportional voting. To 
Americans it is especially useful; since, although 
the Belgian bill differs in some points from the 
American, yet it is an application of the Swiss 
plan to the Australian ballot — a ballot not used 
in Switzerland. 

The Belgian parliament, having in hand the re¬ 
vision of the constitution, determined to test the 
claims of the advocates of proportional representa¬ 
tion by a trial election of the eighteen represen¬ 
tatives from Brussels in parliament; and although 
parliament finally rejected the reform, yet the 
object lesson has attracted international attention. 
The commission having the matter in charge 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 123 


placed in nomination six different tickets, — a 
larger number than would usually have been pre¬ 
sented, since the Catholics and Independents, and 
the Socialists and Progressists, would usually 
nominate fusion tickets. 

Although there were eighteen seats to be filled 
from the Brussels district, the committee did not 
place full tickets in nomination, the largest being 
that of the Socialists, containing ten names. As 
no party could hope to secure all the seats, no 
party would nominate a full list of candidates 
unless required by law to do so. Each party 
would nominate one or two more than it hoped to 
elect. On page 124 is given the form of ballot 
used in this election, with initials for the names of 
the candidates. These candidates were men who 
had retired from active politics, but whose polit¬ 
ical reputation made them well known in the city. 

The instructions given to voters were as fol¬ 
lows:— 


INSTRUCTIONS FOR ELECTORS. 

A. The elector may stamp the white spot in the square 
placed at the head of a list of candidates. By voting in 
this way he gives eighteen votes to the ticket, no matter how 
many candidates there are upon it. (“ Ticket votes.”) 

B. He can, after having stamped the square at the 
head of the ticket, also stamp the white spot in one or 
more squares placed at the right of the names of those can¬ 
didates who Jigure on the same ticket. By doing this he 


BALLOT VOTED AT BRUSSELS TRIAL ELECTION. 


124 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 



Stamped to indicate the vote of a Liberal Progressist who gives eighteen votes to his party and 
preferences to DEM. and LAB. 



































































PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 125 


gives eighteen votes to that ticket and one vote of prefer¬ 
ence (“ individual votes ”) to each of the candidates whom 
he has thus designated. 

C. The elector who has not voted at the head of any ticket 
can stamp the white spot of one or more squares placed at 
the right of the names of candidates on whatever ticket the 
candidate may appear. In this way he gives for each 
square stamped one vote of preference to the candidate des¬ 
ignated, and one vote to the ticket to which this candidate 
belongs. (Mixed ballots.) (This differs from the American 
bill and from the Swiss laws, in which the elector gives 
“ individual votes ” on as many tickets as he pleases, and 
then gives the remainder of the number to which he is 
entitled to any ticket, even though his “ individual votes ” 
are on both tickets.) 

D. The following ballots are void : — 

1. Ballots having more than one vote at the head of 
tickets. 

2. Ballots upon which the elector has stamped the white 
spot placed at the head of a ticket, and has voted at the 
same time for candidates on the other tickets. (Not void 
in American bill and Swiss laws.) 

3. Ballots in which the elector has voted for more than 
eighteen candidates.” 

The people of Brussels took a lively interest in 
the experiment. Meetings were held in various 
parts of the city, and the method of voting was 
explained. About 12,000 electors cast their bal¬ 
lots. The voting-booths were open from 9 a.m. 
to 4 P. M. The counting of ballots was begun at 
once, and completed in all the precincts in three- 
quarters of an hour to four hours’ time for from 


126 proportional representation. 


300 to 1,940 ballots each. This work was found 
to be not at all complicated, and was done as 
easily and rapidly as in the ordinary elections. 

The work of the central bureau began at 5.30 
p.M. ; and the returns from the several precincts 
were added up as rapidly as they came in. The 
first results were as follows: — 

Number of votes.12,192 

Blank or void ballots. 333 

Valid ballots.11,859 

A large number of the void ballots had been 
purposely annulled by the voters, who had cov¬ 
ered them with fantastic inscriptions. The party 
votes were the following: — 


PARTY. 

TICKET 

TICKET 

MIXED 

TOTAL 


BALLOTS. 

VOTES. 

VOTES. 

VOTES. 

Moderates 

646 X 18 = 

9,828 4- 

1,865 = 

11,693 

Progressists 

2,013X18 = 

36,234 + 

3,278 = 

39,512 

Socialists 

6,748 X 18 = 

103,464 + 

3,217 = 

106,681 

Flemish 

Democrats 

1,127 X 18 = 

20,286 + 

1,427 = 

21,713 

Independents 

411 X 18 = 

7,398 + 

1,027 = 

8,425 

Catholics 

972 X 18^ 

17,496 + 

1,909 = 

19,405 

Total 

10,817 X 18 = 

194,706 + 

12,723 = 

207,429 


A very small number of the ballots contained 
“ mixed votes,” — only 1,042 out of 11,859, — the 
great majority, 10,817, being cast for “tickets.” 
With the American law there would doubtless be 
a larger proportion of mixed or scattering votes, 
since the voter who has marked the head of his 








PBOPOETIONAL REPBESENTATION. 127 

ticket is not prohibited from scattering a portion 
of his votes for candidates on other tickets. In 
the Belgian law, of course, each “ ticket vote ” 
counts eighteen votes for the party; in the Amer¬ 
ican bill it counts only the surplus remaining after 
the “ individual votes ” have been counted for 
those several tickets in which the individually 
designated candidates appear. 

The 1,042 mixed ballots contained 12,723 votes, 
an average of twelve to the ballot, whereas the 
voter was entitled to eighteen. This may be ex¬ 
plained. The elector who scatters his votes is 
embarrassed in finding eighteen individuals who 
satisfy him, and on the average, therefore, loses 
one-third of his party-voting strength. He finds 
it easier to vote for tickets than for candidates. 
The modified “ ticket vote ” of the American bill, 
therefore, again assists those who wish to vote 
mixed tickets, and in so far promotes the inde¬ 
pendence of the voter. It allows him to use all 
the votes to which he is entitled after he has scat¬ 
tered his individual votes among various tickets 
by merely “ bunching ” the remaining votes on a 
single ticket. 

For the distribution of seats among the political 
parties the Belgian reformers have indorsed a plan 
drawn up by Professor D’Hondt, and explained in 
Appendix I. to this book. It is a complicated 
plan, and does not secure better results than the 


128 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 

simple rule of three adopted in Geneva and Neu- 
chatel and by the American League. Accord¬ 
ing to this latter simple division, the distribution 
would be the following: The total number of 
votes, 207,429, divided by eighteen, gives 11,523 
as the unit of representation. Dividing the party 
votes by this unit provides for fifteen representa¬ 
tives; the remaining three are assigned to the 
parties having the largest remainders. 


PARTY. 

rOTAL UNIT OF 

VOTE. REPRESENTATION. 

SEATS. 

Moderates . . . . 

11,693 ^ 

11,523 = 1 -}- 

170 = 

1 

Progressists . . . 

39,512 

ll,523=3+ 

4,943 = 

3 

Socialists . . . . 

106,681 -i- 

11,523 = 9 + 

2,974 = 

9 

Flemish Democrats 

21,713-i- 

11,523 = 1 + 

10,190 = 

2 

Independents . . 

8,425 ^ 

11,523 = 0 + 

8,425 = 

1 

Catholics . . . . 

, 19,405 -f 

11,523 = 1 + 

7,882 = 

2 

Total . . . 


. . . 15 . 


18 


It is impossible under any plan yet devised to 
to find an exactly proportionate representation.^ 
Representatives are living units, and cannot be 
parcelled into fractions for the accommodation of 
unfortunate remainders. But taking the above 
distribution, we find that the 

Moderates get one representative for 11,693 votes. 

Progressists get one representative for 13,170 votes. 

Socialists get one representative for 11,853 votes. 

Flemish Democrats get one representative for 10,856 votes. 

Independents get one representative for 8,425 votes. 

Catholics get one representative for 9,702 votes. 

1 In Appendix I. will be found a comparison of different plans 
proposed for the distribution of seats. 



PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 129 


After determining the number of representatives 
to which each party is entitled, the next step is 
to designate the individual candidates actually 
elected. The vote for candidates on the Progress¬ 
ist ticket is here given, the others being similar. 
This ticket is entitled to three seats, and the indi¬ 
viduals chosen are those having the three highest 
votes, as indicated below. 

INDIVIDUAL VOTES ON PROGRESSIST TICKET. 


VOTES OF PREF- VOTES OF PREF- 

EREKCE ON ERENCE ON TOTAL. 

TICKET BALLOTS. MIXED BALLOTS. 


DA . 

.... 738 

459 

1,197* 

DEM . 

.... 1,012 

495 

1,507* 

GEN . 

.... 394 

442 

836 

LAB . 

.... 228 

349 

577 

LAV . 

.... 282 

365 

647 

SCA . 

.... 616 

428 

1,044* 

SP . . 

.... 388 

367 

755 

CA . 

.... 393 

373 

766 


The report of the commission states that the 
most important men of each party lead the tickets 
in the number of their votes. In this connection 
should be noted the small number of preferences 
given on ticket ballots. Of the 10,817 ticket bal¬ 
lots only 6,317 indicated preferences for candi¬ 
dates, the remaining 4,500 voting straight tickets 
with only the single mark against the title. The 
6,317 “ticket votes,” which contained also indi¬ 
vidual votes of preference on the same ticket, in¬ 
dicated only 21,105 such preferences, an average 







130 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


slightly exceeding three, as against the average of 
twelve individual votes on the 1,042 mixed bal¬ 
lots. It would seem, therefore, that the mixed 
ballots, which do not throw their entire weight 
for one party against others, and so have little 
influence upon the share of party representation, 
have, nevertheless, a disproportionately large in¬ 
fluence in designating the candidates upon each 
ticket who shall be elected. This might occur; 
but in the above election, as a matter of fact, the 
candidates who received the largest number of 
votes of preference on ticket ballots generally re¬ 
ceived a similar advantage on the mixed ballots. 

In this connection the objection is made against 
the Swiss system that a strong party with surplus 
votes might defeat the leader of another party by 
giving preference votes to a weak candidate on 
the ticket of the latter. That this objection has 
but little weight can be seen by examining the 
above table of individual votes on the Progressist 
ticket. Not often would a party be so strong as 
willingly to transfer votes to an opposing party 
which would be liable to swell the latter’s repre¬ 
sentation at the expense of its own. It could 
jeopardize only one of the candidates on the lat¬ 
ter’s ticket, and this would not affect the leader 
unless the party were so small as to be entitled to 
only one representative. In the Progressist ticket, 
it will be seen, 209 votes would have been needed 


PBOPORTIONAL PEPBESENTATION. 131 


to displace S.C.A., the lowest successful candidate 
on the ticket, by G. E. N., the next in order, while 
the leader of the party, D. E. M., exceeds S. C. A. 
by nearly 500 votes. The principal leader of a 
party may always he expected to run considerably 
ahead of his ticket. As between the larger par¬ 
ties, therefore, which are entitled to more than 
one representative, the objection has no weight, 
while with a party barely entitled to hut one 
representative it assumes an improbable waste of 
votes by the larger parties. It might be added, 
however, that in the cumulative variety of the 
free ticket as proposed in the Johnson bill and 
adopted in Canton Zug, the principal leaders of a 
party would be further removed from such risk 
than in the single-vote variety. 


132 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


CHAPTEE VI. 

APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 

In stating the advantages of proportional repre¬ 
sentation there are two lines of discussion, a theo¬ 
retical and a practical. The theoretical principle 
involves the goal towards which electoral reform 
should be directed. But to reach this goal a plan 
of action must be devised. In the latter case the 
discussion is practical, dealing with the various 
methods which have been proposed. 

In a Democratic form of government, unlike an 
absolute monarchy, methods are as important as 
measures. If a practicable and effective method 
of proportional representation cannot be discov¬ 
ered, the theoretical principle is a mere dream. 
We shall therefore best perceive the general prin¬ 
ciple and the practical method by examining them 
together. 

In the first place, proportional representation 
recognizes the nature of modern political parties 
as based, not altogether on sectional divisions, but 
on social and economic problems of national scope. 
There is in various quarters a disposition to decry 
and resist any recognition of parties. It is pointed 
out, for example, that the very essence of civil 


APPLICATION OF THE BEMEDY. 


133 


service reform lies in taking the offices “out of 
politics,” and that the evils of municipal govern¬ 
ment proceed from political parties. 

The contention is mainly one of definition. 
Possibly a new definition is needed of “party,” 
as well as “politics.” The latter has come to 
mean a base, underhanded manipulation and diplo¬ 
macy. But there is also an honorable and neces¬ 
sary politics. All action by government, whether 
city. State, or nation, is political action. And all 
action by individuals towards incorporating their 
views in laws and public policy must be through 
associations or groupings of individuals under 
their chosen leadership. These groups are politi¬ 
cal parties, and this action is the genuine, 
educational, vital function of parties in popular 
government. 

But where there is freedom and intelligence, 
such groupings are not rigidly permanent. They 
turn on political questions, and as questions 
change there come new alignments of individuals. 
If the electoral machinery prevents this, and forti¬ 
fies the dominant parties against inroads, compel¬ 
ling alignment on new questions the same as on 
old, and forcing the same alignment on municipal 
and State questions which exists on national ques¬ 
tions, the party becomes a machine, sustained by 
spoils and plunder, and there is no freedom for 
the voter. If, however, the electoral machinery 


134 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 

be modified so as to permit the representation of 
new elements within the old parties, or to facili¬ 
tate the representation of new parties, then we 
should have, not rigidity and corruption, but 
natural and wholesome political growth, whether 
in city. State, or nation. 

Proportional representation, therefore, is based 
upon a frank recognition of parties as indispensable 
in free government. This very recognition, in¬ 
stead of making partisan government all-powerful, 
is the necessary condition for subordinating parties 
to the public good. To control social forces, as 
well as physical forces, we must acknowledge their 
existence and strength, must understand them, 
and then must shape our machinery in accordance 
with their laws. We conquer nature by obeying 
her. 

At the same time, though recognizing political 
parties based on social questions, yet, in a nation 
of such vast territory as the United States, sec¬ 
tional differences also demand recognition. These 
are amply provided for in our Federal Constitution. 
The Senate of the United States represents the 
States, without regard to population or parties. 
It is not proposed to criticise this practice. It 
is an important feature of our Federal system. 
Yet it does not seem that the Senate should have 
the same weight in legislation as the House of 
Representatives. It ought to sink to the level 


APPLICATION OF THE EEMEDT. 


135 


of a revisory board like the House of Lords, or the 
upper chambers of the Canadian and Provincial 
parliaments. Such would become its status, if the 
House truly represented the people, and furnished 
a lifelong arena for their political leaders. As 
it is, the Senate shines, not by ability, but by 
comparison. 

The House is supposed to represent the people. 
A combination of sectional and party representa¬ 
tion would be secured in this branch by elect¬ 
ing State delegations on the proportional basis. 
Congress has power to provide without Constitu¬ 
tional amendment for this plan of election. The 
gerrymander has destroyed whatever unity of local 
representation the present system may retain in 
theory. Districts are frequently changed; agri¬ 
cultural, manufacturing, mining areas are thrown 
together. The State, however, is a truly organic 
unit, accustomed to act as such; and State election 
of national representatives would harmonize with 
this unity, and would permit the free play of sec¬ 
tional as well as national interests. 

In State legislatures a similar distinction might 
be made. In the lower house the county, or a 
small group of counties, electing ten or twelve 
representatives, could be made the unit. In a 
House of one hundred members, there would be 
eight or ten districts, each sending its delegation 
elected on the proportional basis. 


136 PROPOETIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 

The State senate should be elected on a general 
ticket for the State at large, one-half perhaps at 
each election. It is difficult to describe the prin¬ 
ciple upon which senates at present are chosen. 
Their membership is small, ranging from thirty- 
five to fifty. Hence senators cannot stand for 
counties. Only nine of the fifty-two Indiana 
senators represent single counties, and two of 
these are from one county. The others represent 
the most arbitrary combinations of two, three, and 
four counties each, arranged only for partisan pur¬ 
poses. May not the senate be given a distinctive 
place and character, elected on the broad basis of 
the State, representing the whole people, thereby 
attracting to its halls the recognized leaders of 
thought and action throughout the common¬ 
wealth ? 

At the same time local interests would have 
their influence. A political party with only 
meagre sagacity would distribute its nominees 
either for Congress or for a State senate as widely 
as possible over the State. Only in this way 
could it appeal to the voters of all classes and in¬ 
terests. Even now we see this distribution in the 
nomination of tickets of State candidates, from 
the governor to the chief of statistics. If sec¬ 
tional differences are decisive, political parties 
may be trusted to provide for them. 

The canton of Geneva, with a single legislative 


APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 137 


assembly of one hundred members, elects them 
on the proportional plan, in three nearly equal 
groups; one group of thirty-four from the city of 
Geneva, one group from the right and another 
from the left bank of the river. 

In municipal elections the unity of the cit^ 
would be recognized by abolishing the wards alto¬ 
gether, and by electing only one legislative assem¬ 
bly instead of two. With a single chamber also, 
as in foreign cities, responsibility will be central¬ 
ized, and the honor of the position enhanced. 
The board of aldermen or common council might 
consist of thirty members, ten of them to he 
elected each year. There might, indeed, be cities 
of extensive area, or with sections of opposing 
interests, where two or three general tickets could 
be elected. But as a rule this would not be neces¬ 
sary, for the parties would be careful to distribute 
candidates among the sections. 

The significance of proportional representation, 
as far as it affects popular elections, consists in 
the fact that it prohibits the exaggerated influ¬ 
ence of small factions holding the balance of 
power between two parties. For this reason it 
will remove the incentives to bribery and extrava¬ 
gant use of money in elections. The secret bal¬ 
lot has made bribery difficult and dangerous, but 
it has not touched the inducements to bribery. 


138 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

The number of close districts is so large that ma¬ 
jorities in the legislatures and Congress, as well 
as popular majorities for executive and judicial 
officers, turn on narrow margins. The bribable 
vote is as large as, or even larger than, the shifting 
vote,^ and is therefore adequate to decide elec¬ 
tions, and to turn the control of legislative bodies 
with large majorities from one party to the other. 
But with proportional representation there is no 
faction or group which holds the balance of power. 
A change of the entire venal vote, should it equal 
the Connecticut average of 12^ per cent, would 
affect only 12^ per cent of the result. But as 
the changes of this kind are more or less offset 
by both parties, they could not disturb more than 
one per cent to three per cent of the total vote. It 
can therefore be seen how diminutive would be 
the briber’s influence. Successful bribery would 
endanger only one candidate out of a party’s 
representation. And this, unless the legislature 
were minutely close, would not be worth the 
briber’s expense. A legislature elected by bribery 
could be of no service unless it contained a ma¬ 
jority for the bribers. The only cases in which 
bribery might be expected to give a political party 
such a clear majority, would be in those States 
where the party vote is very close, as in New 
York and Indiana, where the two parties often 
1 See pp. 79, 80. 


APPLICATION OF THE BEMEDY. 139 


differ by less than 1 per cent of the total vote. 
But even in such cases, it must be remembered, 
there are third and fourth parties, which, if repre¬ 
sented, would hold the balance, and would prevent 
a clear majority for either of the great parties. 
The same is true of the Federal Congress. In 
other States, where one party has a heavy major¬ 
ity, the bribable vote is not large enough to over¬ 
come it. The secret ballot makes bribery difficult; 
proportional representation makes it fruitless. 

Proportional representation based upon political 
opinions, rather than territorial areas, is a “ specif¬ 
ic ” for the gerrymander. As already shown, the 
gerrymander is an inevitable result of the district 
system. It is merely a phase of the attempt to 
outline the districts or the wards. If there are 
no districts, there can be no gerrymander. Other 
remedies must fail. The courts in various States 
have recently taken upon themselves the right to 
overrule certain redistricting acts contrived for the 
election of State legislators. This policy is dan¬ 
gerous to the integrity of the courts, as well as 
fruitless. The courts are not empowered to sub¬ 
stitute an apportionment of their own creation; 
and therefore, by declaring an existing gerry¬ 
mander unconstitutional, they merely call back a 
previous one of another party, usually their own, 
and equally vicious with the one condemned. But 


140 PBOPORTIONAL EEPBESENTATION. 


proportional representation, by abolishing districts 
altogether, wipes out the very substance of the 
gerrymander. It relieves the courts and the le¬ 
gislatures of an onerous burden and a dangerous 
power. So inevitable and self-evident is this 
remedy for the troublesome gerrymander that to 
add more words in explanation of it could only 
weaken the force of the simple statement. 

Not only are parties primarily represented, they 
are represented with mathematical accuracy in 
proportion to their strength. Justice and equal¬ 
ity become realities. Instead of the flagrantly 
distorted assemblies, which by way of rhetoric we 
call representative, we should have a true reflec¬ 
tion of the people. And this equal representation 
is elastic. It conforms to all the movements of 
population. 'If cities increase in size, their repre¬ 
sentation increases in legislatures and Congress. 

Even more significant than unequal representa¬ 
tion as between pa.rties, is the large number of 
voters who under the district system are wholly 
unrepresented. The tables given in Chapter III.i 
show for certain elections of congressmen, of mem¬ 
bers of the New York Assembly, and of aldermen 
of New York City, the number of electors who 
voted for successful candidates, and are therefore 
represented by men of their choice, and the num- 
1 See pp. 74-77. 


application of the remedy. 141 


ber who voted for unsuccessful candidates, and 
are therefore unrepresented. By reference to 
those tables it will be seen that, by the congres¬ 
sional election of 1894, 44.5 per cent of the voters 
are unrepresented in Congress by men of their 
own choosing. That this is the usual proportion 
is shown by the fact that for the Fortieth, Forty- 
first, and Forty-second Congresses, elected more 
than twenty years earlier, the proportion of unrep¬ 
resented voters was 42 per cent. In the New 
York Assembly elected in 1894, 44.4 per cent of 
the voters are unrepresented; and in the Board of 
Aldermen of New York City 51.9 per cent are 
unrepresented. 

The theory by which it is sought to justify the 
present system in its denial of representation to 
nearly half the voters, is based on the assertion 
that a minority party in one district will be a 
majority party in another; and that, therefore, the 
minority voters whose particular candidates are 
not ^ccessful will, nevertheless, be represented, 
because legislators in other districts will be 
elected by voters of the same political faith. 

That such an argument should be generally ac¬ 
cepted as adequate is striking evidence of the hold 
which political parties as corporate entities have 
gained upon the popular imagination. So unques¬ 
tioned is the notion of the solidarity and the com¬ 
munity of interests of men of the same party, no 


142 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


matter how far apart they may live in different 
sections of the nation, the State, or the city, that 
one-half the people are willing to forego the right 
of personal representation, and to permit distant 
and often antagonistic interests to choose for them 
their own representatives. It is assumed that the 
Negroes and Republicans of the Southern States 
are represented by Republicans chosen in the 
North, and that Northern Democrats can find their 
spokesmen in the Democrats from the South. In 
the present New York Assembly, 13 of the 23 
Democratic assemblymen were elected by 47,700 
Tammany voters of New York City. Can it be 
said that the 350,000 Democrats of the remainder 
of the State will find their views expressed by 
these Tammany assemblymen from the city ? 
Are the Republican merchants of the city repre¬ 
sented by the farmers from the country? These 
voters for defeated candidates have no voice in the 
selection of the standard-bearers of their own party. 
In this important sense they are unrepresented. 
Unable to affect elections within their own party, 
they leave the machine in control. The present 
influence of Tammany Hall would be much lessened 
in State and Federal politics, did not the district 
system make its leaders spokesmen, not only for its 
own following, but also for the unrepresented 
Democracy of the State at large. Proportional 
representation would increase the representation 


APPLICATION OF THE BEMEDY. 143 


of the latter while reducing the representation of 
Tammany, and so lessen its autocratic power. 
Candidates, too, are not nominated on one issue 
alone, hut on several. It is this tempering and 
modulation of the representative body so as to 
correspond with all phases of opinion and policy 
throughout the country or the State that propor¬ 
tional representation guarantees. 

It is to he noted that, in this discussion, we are 
not concerned directly with the basis of suffrage. 
We are not inquiring whether it shall be wide or 
limited, plural or singular, male or female, old or 
young, white or black, intimidated or free. We 
take the suffrage for granted, and inquire only 
whether, such as it is, it is effective; whether, with 
the show of representation, there is essential dis¬ 
franchisement, and what are the remedies therefor. 

Proportional representation promises, above all, 
the independence of the voter, and freedom from 
the rule of the party machine. It will not abolish 
parties, it recognizes them. But it permits new 
alignments and groupings of individuals within 
and without existing parties at the expense of the 
iron-bound classification imposed by the modern 
highly developed party machine. 

The secret of machine rule lies in the control 
of nominations, and the rigid alignment of voters 
in two camps. Freedom from the machine, then, 


144 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, 


means, first, power on the part of the voters to con¬ 
trol the nominations of their party; and second, 
power to defeat obnoxious candidates without en¬ 
dangering the success of the party. Both of these 
advantages are provided for in the proposed bill. 

First, as to influencing nominations. In many 
of the cities of this country, where representative 
institutions have most signally failed, the public 
alarm is showing itself in spirited independent 
movements of the best classes of citizens from all 
political parties. But these municipal leagues and 
civic federations can act only indirectly upon the 
city authorities. They have very little influence 
upon the nominations of the two parties for mu¬ 
nicipal officers. They do not attempt independent 
political action, their only resource being to enter 
into combination with one of the machines in order 
to defeat the other. But suppose, in such a situa¬ 
tion, proportional representation were adopted. 
The Municipal League could then nominate an 
independent ticket by petition signed by one per 
cent of the voters at the last general election. 
Let this ticket be nominated in advance of the 
nominations by the dominant parties. Let it con¬ 
tain names of the best citizens of both parties, men 
whose ability, public spirit, and integrity are every¬ 
where acknowledged. The two dominant parties 
would be almost forced to indorse these candi¬ 
dates. In that case the candidates would select 


APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 145 


the party for which their individual votes should 
be counted. If it should happen that the entire 
ticket of the Municipal League were indorsed by 
the various parties, the League’s ticket would 
wholly disappear; but the members and friends of 
the League would scatter their votes among the 
other tickets, voting individually for their own 
original candidates. The following will illustrate 
the process. 

Suppose there are ten aldermen to elect, and 
that the League can muster 300 voters, the Re¬ 
publicans 500, the Democrats 400, and the Labor 
party 100. Each voter being entitled to ten 
votes, there would be 13,000 votes in all, requir¬ 
ing 1,300 to elect a single candidate. Suppose 
the League to place in nomination the following 
ticket, consisting of three Republicans, three Dem¬ 
ocrats, and one Labor candidate. 

TICKET OF MUNICIPAL LEAGUE. 

( ^. 

Republicans < B. 

(c. 

. 

Democrats < E. 

(f. 

Labor | G. 

If, now, the character of their nominees is so 
distinguished that the existing parties would be 
constrained to indorse them all, and, being thus 









146 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


indorsed, the candidates should indicate the ex¬ 
isting parties as the beneficiaries of their votes (in 
accordance with section 3 of the bill), the tickets 
to be voted at the election would be as follows: — 


MUKICIPAL 

LEAGUE. 

REPUBLICANS. 

DEMOCRATS. 

LABOR. 

A 

*A 


*G 

B 


♦E 

N 

C 

*C 

*F 

O 

D 

H 

L 


E 

I 

M 


F 

K 



G 





Each party, unless required by law, would nom¬ 
inate, not a complete list, but only about as many 
as each expected to elect. If, now, the 300 voters 
of the League should distribute their votes indi¬ 
vidually for the seven League candidates, as indi¬ 
cated above, while all others should vote straight 
tickets for their respective parties, the result 
would be: — 

Republicans, 6,000 + 900 = 5,900 votes, electing 5 aldermen. 

Democrats, 4,000 + 900 = 4,900 votes, electing 4 aldermen. 

Labor, 1,000 4- 300 = 1,300 votes, electing 1 alderman. 

Total, 12,100 10 

In this extreme case the League has seen its 
own ticket disappear, but has dictated the nomina¬ 
tions of the other parties, and, by adding its votes 
to theirs, has elected its own nominees. The five 
Republicans elected would include A, B, C, who 



APPLICATION OF THE PEMEDY. 147 


receive 800 individual votes each, against 500 
each for H, I, and K. The four Democrats would 
include D, E, F, who receive 700 individual votes 
each, against 400 each for L and M. The Labor 
candidate, G, receives 400, against 100 for N and 
O. Of course it is not expected that in actual 
practice the 500 Republicans, for example, would 
all vote straight tickets. Many of them might give 
preferences for H, I, and K, but many more would 
give their preferences for A, B, and C, while the 
entire weight of the League would be thrown for 
A, B, and C. And so for the other parties. 

What reason have we to suppose that other 
parties would swallow the League ticket, as above 
indicated? Simply the fact that their voters are 
perfectly free to abandon their party nominees, 
and to vote for the League candidates of their 
own political stripe, yet not nominated by their 
own machine. For example, if the other parties 
declined to indorse the League candidates, the 
tickets now to be voted would be: — 

MUNICIPAL LEAGUE. REPUBLICANS.X DEMOCRATS. LABOR. 



H 

I 

K 

p 

Q 

u 


L 

M 

R 

S 

T 


N 

O 


Labor \ G 


148 PBOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


I have indicated the vote of a supposed Repub¬ 
lican who gives one vote each to the Republicans 
on the League ticket, and his other seven votes to 
his own ticket straight. Supposing all the Repub¬ 
licans, Democrats, and Laborites to do the same (of 
course an extreme case), we should have the fol- 


lowing result: — 




MUNICIPAL LEAGUE. 

REPUBLICANS. 

DEMOCRATS. 

LABOR. 

3,000 Straight 

5,000 

4,000 

1,000 

1,500 Repub. 

1,200 Demo. 

— 1,500 

— 1,200 

— 100 

100 Labor 




5,800 

3,500 

2,800 

900 

Electing 4 

3 

2 

1 

The extent to 

which the 

Municipal League 


could go in electing its candidates would, of course, 
depend upon the ripeness of voters for revolt from 
their parties. In a case like that above, where the 
parties declined to indorse any of the League can¬ 
didates, we might expect a much larger disaffec¬ 
tion than above supposed, and the election of a 
larger number of League candidates. It will be 
noticed that the Republicans, by “ bolting ” their 
party, have succeeded in electing six Republicans 
instead of the five to which their proportions origi¬ 
nally entitled them. But three of these six are 
nominees of the League, A, B, and C, who get 
800 votes each (300 from the League and 500 
from the Republicans). One of the League Dem¬ 
ocrats is elected with 700 votes. 




APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 


149 


I have given two extreme variations out of the 
several combinations possible. Many others might 
be suggested and worked out. I will conclude 
with one more. 

Suppose the Republicans and Democrats each 
nominate one of the League candidates. The tick¬ 
ets would be: — 

MUNICIPAL LEAGUE.X 

A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 

I have indicated the vote of a Leaguer who 
gives one vote to each of his nominees on the 
Republican and Democratic tickets, and eight to 
his League ticket. Supposing the others to vote 
likewise, and the other parties to vote straight, we 
should have: — 

League, 2,400 votes, electing 2 aldermen. 

Republicans, 5,300 votes, electing 4 aldermen. 

Democrats, 4,300 votes, electing 3 aldermen. 

Labor, 1,000 votes, electing 1 alderman. 

13,000 votes, electing 10 aldermen. 

In this case the League has elected two men on 
its own ticket, and two of its own nominees on 
other tickets. 

So much for the influence of voters upon the 


REPUBLICANS. 

DEMOCRATS. 

LABOR. 

Ax 

Dx 

N 

H 

L 

0 

I 

M 


K 

R 


P 

S 


Q 

T 




150 PBOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


nominations of candidates. The second element 
of strength in proportional representation is the 
power it gives to voters to defeat obnoxious can¬ 
didates of their own party without endangering 
the success of the party as a whole. This may be 
illustrated by another example, such as may often 
be found in a State at large, where there is no in¬ 
dependent organization like the Municipal League, 
ready to anticipate the party nominations. Sup¬ 
pose in such a case that the parties with the rela¬ 
tive strength of 500 Republicans, 400 Democrats, 


100 Laborites, place 
nomination: — 

the following 

tickets in 

EEPUBLICANS. 

DEMOCEATS. 

LABOE. 

A 

D 

N 

B 

E 

O 

C 

F 


H 

L 


I 

M 


K 

R 



If the voting were as usual, the Republicans 
would have 5,000 votes, electing five candidates; 
the Democrats 4,000, electing four; and the La- 
borites 1,000 votes, electing one. But suppose 
the party organization of the Republicans has fla¬ 
grantly disregarded the wishes of 200 Republicans, 
and nominated no candidate representing them. 
Under the present system of plurality election, 
these 200 Republicans know that to put up an in- 


APPLICATION OF THE BEMEDY. 151 


dependent ticket means both their own defeat and 
that of the Republican party as a whole, with the 
election of the Democrat. But with proportional 
representation they could safely nominate an inde¬ 
pendent ticket. The tickets would be as fol¬ 
lows : — 


REPUBLICANS. 

DEMOCRATS. 

LABOR. 

INDEPENDENT 

REPUBLICANS. 

A 

D 

N 

AA 

B 

E 

O 

BB 

C 

P 


CC 

H 

L 



I 

M 



K 

R 



The result of the election would be : — 


Independent Repub., 2,000 votes, electing 2 representatives. 

Republicans, 3,000 votes, electing 3 representatives. 

Democrats, 4,000 votes, electing 4 representatives. 

Labor, 1,000 votes, electing 1 representative. 


We see here a striking advantage of proportional 
representation. An independent movement takes 
place in the ranks of a plurality party, and does 
not in the least endanger the success of the party 
as a whole. The Republicans elect as many repre¬ 
sentatives as before the division, so that on party 
questions they retain their original strength in the 
legislature; but the individuals elected are by no 
means the same. Two of the five are wholly inde¬ 
pendent of the machine organization. Of course, 
if the independent movement increased, as it could 


152 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


readily do, if the candidates of the regular organiza¬ 
tion were objectionable, the number of independent 
representatives would be increased proportionally 
at the expense of the regular nominees. 

It is easily seen that this increased power to 
reject the nominees of a party must react strongly 
upon the character of the nominees. The latter 
are nominated to be elected. Under the present 
system very inferior men may be elected, because 
the voters have no other choice. Let them have, 
however, the wide freedom of choice which pro¬ 
portional representation gives, and the party mana¬ 
gers will be forced to place before them a much 
higher grade of candidates, who will be suited to 
their wishes. Thus proportional representation 
gives the voters power against the influence of 
the machine to control nominations, not only di¬ 
rectly, by nominating early their own candidates 
for a later indorsement by the regular organiza¬ 
tion, but also indirectly, by their increased power 
to “bolt,” and defeat obnoxious candidates who 
have been “regularly” nominated. 

The secret of these combinations and recombi¬ 
nations, of this unparalleled freedom of the voter, 
springs from two facts: first, instead of requiring 
a majority or plurality to elect a candidate, a much 
smaller fraction can do so; and second, a wide 
territorial area is given for combinations of voters 
of the same opinions. Instead of a ward we have 


APPLICATION OF THE EEMEDT. 153 


a city; instead of a district we have a State. 
Under the present system, independent voters who 
actually place a ticket in the field are usually in 
the minority. If, however, we count those who 
stay at home, as we should do to a large extent, 
the number of independents is very great. But 
they have only a choice between two machines. 
They are penned up in narrow districts under 
the whip of the party bosses. But proportional 
representation breaks down the fences, and en¬ 
ables them to combine throughout the city or 
State. And, furthermore, it allows them to com¬ 
bine within their own party organization without 
promoting the success of the opposing party’s 
machine. 

That this feature of proportional representation 
strikes at the radical evil of present-day pohtics, is 
shown abundantly by current literature. We may 
notice absenteeism and the primaries. 

Surely it is an alarming condition when the in¬ 
telligent and business classes everywhere leave the 
primaries and the elections to the “heelers,” the 
loafers, and the ignorant. The extent of this evil 
is in recent years well understood, but its causes 
are unexplained. Says a writer in an article favor¬ 
ing compulsory voting“In the State of New 
York 300,375 persons who voted in 1888 remained 

1 F. W. Holls, in Annals of American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, April, 1891, pp. 589, 590. 


154 PBOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


away from the polls in 1889; and 286,278 did so 
in 1890. In the last mayoralty election in New 
York City (1890), over 35,000 men who had even 
registered abstained from voting, with the result 
that the city was once more turned over to an 
organized band of plunderers. A more deliberate 
and extensive betrayal of trust would be difficult 
to find. In Massachusetts the total vote of 328,- 
588 in 1888 fell to 260,798 in 1890, a difference 
of 67,790. In Chicago the figures are even more 
startling. In the spring election of 1887 less than 
72,000 out of a possible 138,000 were cast,— 
66,000 citizens failing in their duty, — while in 
June of the same year, at the judiciary election 
for the choice of judges for a city of almost a mil¬ 
lion of souls, the total vote was 44,074, less than 
one-third of the number of qualified voters.” Pro¬ 
fessor A. B. Hart^ affirms that the voting popula¬ 
tion is one-fourth of the total population, and that 
in the presidential elections five-sixths of this vote 
is cast. In New York, in 1880, the vote was 
1,104,605, being 23 per cent of the population, and 
95 per cent of the legal voters; but in 1891 it was 
only 259,425. In New York City in 1888, the 
vote was 18 per cent of the population; in 1890 it 
was 11 per cent, and in 1891 it was 13^ per cent. 
In Massachusetts the census of 1885 showed 

1 “Practical Essays on American Government,” pp. 24, 30. 
New York, 1893. 


APPLICATION OF THE UEMEBY. 155 


442,616 voters; but the vote for governor in that 
year was only 209,668, and in 1894 it was 13 per 
cent of the population. For president in 1888 in 
that State it was 344,243. In Boston, says Mr. 
S. B. Capen, President of the Municipal League, 
the assessed polls in January, 1895, were 143,435. 
Of these but 88,214 were registered, and only 
70,191 — less than one-half of the eligibles — took 
the trouble to vote. Ward 11, the home of the 
rich, shows the lowest proportion of actual votes, 
as compared with registered citizens. The full 
figures are: assessed polls, 7,809; registered, 
4,807; votes cast, 3,533. Ward 9, the Beacon 
Hill ward, shows assessed polls, 3,838; registered, 
2,260; votes cast, 1,687. And at a party primary 
held in Ward 11, there were but 81 votes cast in 
four precincts out of 800 entitled to vote. 

Up to the present time the greater part of the 
agitation for better government consists in bitterly 
criticising the intelligent voters who stay at home, 
and beseeching them to meet their political duties. 
It is assumed that their only reasons are bad 
weather, dirty politics, business engagements, and 
lack of public spirit. Indeed, such reasons come 
to the surface; but even when these classes are 
aroused, as at the present time, and ready to do 
their share of work, no one can fail to see that 
they are cowed and silenced by their utter help¬ 
lessness and the hopelessness of their cause. Sep- 


156 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


arated by arbitrary ward lines in narrow districts, 
they cannot get together throughout the city. If 
they have a record of independence, the party pri¬ 
mary excludes them; and, if admitted, they are 
not a match against the party organization. Poli¬ 
tics is a business. It requires time and strength. 
The politician does the least of his work in the 
primary. The real work is done beforehand, and 
the primary registers the “ cut-and-dried ” decrees. 
America has no leisured citizens who can afford 
to give themselves to this work. They must 
leave it to the professionals. 

With proportional representation the party pri¬ 
mary loses much of its significance. Nominations 
can be made by petition. Municipal leagues, 
civic federations, business men’s associations, 
chambers of commerce, labor unions, have their 
completed organizations. These can nominate 
their tickets by petition, or can indorse those 
already nominated. As in English cities, where 
it requires but eight signatures to nominate a 
candidate for the municipal council, the matter 
would adjust itself, and there would be no danger 
from a multiplicity of candidates and tickets. 
With such facility in the nomination of indepen¬ 
dent tickets, and with independent parties holding 
the balance of power, the party primaries would 
fall into disuse. Politicians would not struggle to 
control them, seeing that even if suecessful, yet their 


APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 157 


party could not elect a majority of the assembly, 
and so make it worth while for them to control the 
primaries. They would learn also to nominate by 
petition, as is the practice in other countries. 

At the same time the primaries and conventions 
must be recognized at present as the sources of 
power. The most serious evil connected with 
them, and the one which gives the machine its 
control, is the practice of exclusive majority rule. 
Committees and delegates are elected by a major¬ 
ity vote on the principle of the general ticket, or 
else the chairman is authorized to appoint them, 
and he is the product of a majority vote. The 
true purpose of a primary or convention, as repre¬ 
senting all sections of a party, is defeated. It is 
proper that the majority should elect the chairman, 
or nominate single candidates ; hut why should the 
majority be alone represented on committees, dele¬ 
gations, and general tickets ? Plainly, here is need 
for a further application of the proportional rule. 

Mr. D. S. Remsen of the New York bar, in 
his essay on “Primary Elections,” has made a 
careful study of the rules governing party organ¬ 
izations, and the management of primaries and 
conventions in the United States. He advocates 
a plan of primary election similar to Mr. Hare’s 
single transferable vote already described in these 
pages. It is probable that the complexity in¬ 
volved in counting the votes according to that 


158 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

plan would cause it to break down in the confu¬ 
sion of a mass-meeting and in the hands of 
tellers who are inexpert. A plan is required 
which will be simple and quickly worked. Such 
a one has been proposed by Dr. L. B. Tucker- 
man of Cleveland, Ohio, and is described by its 
author under the title, “Election by Preponder¬ 
ance of Choice.” 1 

“1. Each voter writes on his ballot as many 
names as there are persons to be chosen, writing 
the names in the order of his choice, first choice 
first, second choice second, and so on. When 
nominations are made before balloting, it is more 
convenient to write them on a board where all can 
read them. 

“2. In tallying the vote, the tellers read the last 
name on each ballot first, crediting the name with 
one tally; the name next to the last, second, 
crediting the same with two tallies; and so on, 
always crediting the name written first on each 
ballot with as many tallies as there are names 
written on that ballot. Thus a ballot written :— 


SMITH 

BBOWH 

JONES 

FETZER 

COLEMAN 


1 Proportional Representation Review, September, 1893. 



APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 159 


would be read, Coleman 1, Fetzer 2, Jones 3, 
Brown 4, Smith 5. 

“3. The person receiving the highest number 
of tallies is first declared elected; the person re¬ 
ceiving the next highest, next; and so on, until all 
the vacancies are filled. In case of a tie with but 
one vacancy to be filled, the incumbent is deter¬ 
mined by lot. 

“ The practical working of this rule is that 
every element in the electing body large enough 
to have a quota, finds itself proportionately repre¬ 
sented, and by its own first choice or choices. 
Suppose, for instance, a caucus in a ward contain¬ 
ing one hundred voters. They are to choose 
delegates to a convention. Suppose there are 
two factions, one counting on fifty-five voters, 
the other on forty-five, and the contest so lively 
that a full vote is polled. Suppose, further, that 
the first faction decides to support A, B, C, D, 
and E, in the order named, and the second F, 
G, H, I, and K, the resulting ballot will tally as 
follows:— 


A 65 X 5 = 275 
B 55 X 4 = 220 
C 55 X 3 = 165 
D 55 X 2 = 110 
E 55 X 1 = 55 


F 45 X 5 = 225 
G 45 X 4 = 180 
H 45 X 3 = 135 
I 45 X 2 = 90 
K 45 X 1 = 45 


“ The five highest are A, F, B, G, and C, three 
of the majority faction and two of the minority — 


160 PItOPOBTIONAL PEPBESENTATION. 


the first choices, the representative men of both 
parties. The advantage of this method in a 
caucus or convention is that it reaches the result 
certainly, directly, and quickly; there is no count¬ 
ing the number of ballots cast, and dividing by 
the number of persons to be chosen, to find what 
the quota is.” 

This plan, while simple enough, is open to ob¬ 
jections similar to those described in the case of 
the limited vote and the cumulative vote. It 
would be a mistake to adopt it by legislation, 
though it is convenient for the use of voluntary 
assemblies. With the legalized primaries and the 
direct nomination of candidates by the voters, 
exactly the same system should be used as the one 
that is adopted for the general elections. This 
would be either the Belgian or the Swiss sys¬ 
tem, with such modifications as are adapted to 
the American party-column ballot and American 
habits of voting. 

With a rule of this kind governing primaries 
and conventions, we should accomplish within 
party lines results similar to those to be ac¬ 
complished by the proposed bill between parties. 
All classes within a party would be represented, 
“ packed ” conventions would be unknown, the 
party machine would be shorn of much of its 
undeserved power, tickets would be nominated 
with candidates acceptable to all ranks of the 


APPLICATION OF THE REMEDY. 161 


party, the necessity for independent tickets would 
be largely obviated, and citizens would be more 
inclined to attend their party primaries, knowing 
that their wishes would find expression. 

When finally we come to the elections, propor¬ 
tional representation would go far towards bring¬ 
ing out a full vote. There would be none of the 
present hopelessness. “ It is only the fear of 
wasting their votes on good men who have no 
chance of winning which deters the people from 
voting against the bad candidates who are forced 
upon them by the regular machine.” ^ 

So crude a measure as compulsory voting could 
not change the results of the present system. In 
two recent elections in the Swiss canton of Zu¬ 
rich, with a compulsory voting law applying to 
two communes, 21 per cent to 24 per cent of the 
ballots were blanks, while in the communes with¬ 
out the compulsory law, 17 per cent and 20 per 
cent were blanks Compulsory voting does not 
furnish an outlet for independence. It would 
rather tighten the control of the party managers.® 
We have seen that the margin of mobile voters 
who change from one party to another is seldom 
more than 5 per cent of the maximum total vote 
in a presidential year. Compulsory voting might 

1 Chas. Richardson in Annals of American Academy of Politi¬ 
cal and Social Science, March, 1892, p. 80. 

2 See Direct Legislation Record, September, 1894, p. 63. 

3 See Hart, “ Practical Essays,” p. 51. 


162 PBOPORTIONAL REPBESENTA TION. 


possibly change this proportion slightly, but it 
could do no more than substitute one machine for 
another. The real problem is not how to compel 
unwilling electors to vote, but how to give effect 
to the votes of those who are willing. 


PARTY responsibility:^ 


163 


CHAPTEE VII. 

“ PARTY RESPONSIBILITY.” 

The ideal of democratic government in the 
United States has centred about the principle of 
rule by the majority of the people. Its aim is 
Bentham’s aphorism, “the greatest good of the 
greatest number.” The means whereby in practi¬ 
cal politics this greatest good is to be secured is to 
divide the people into two political parties based 
on numbers alone, and to give to one of these 
parties entire control of government in at least its 
legislative and executive departments. If the 
people happen not to be divided in such a way as 
to gather a majority into a single party, then a 
plurality is to be permitted to choose the govern¬ 
ing officials. By this process it is maintained 
that the rule of the majority is secured through 
the device of what is known as “party respon¬ 
sibility.” 

It must be noticed that the word “party” in 
this connection has a double meaning. The argu¬ 
ment begins with the conception of a popular 
party composed of a mass of voters; it ends with 
a party of office-holders and law-makers who are 
elected by the voters. These officials are commis- 


164 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

sioned as a kind of extra-legal corporation to con¬ 
duct the government, and are required to appeal 
often to the voters for continuance in power. 

One thing overlooked in tliis form of govern¬ 
ment is the quality of the individual men who 
constitute the governing corporation. Individual 
statesmen do not stand out as leaders of the party 
or the people. They all are merged in a corporate 
mediocrity. The bosses who actually control the 
corporation by no means represent the popular 
party, much less can they command a majority of 
the popular vote. They are irresponsible. A 
party and not a man becomes responsible. 

Proportional representation is advocated as a 
means for supplementing party responsibility with 
the individual responsibility of law-makers to the 
people. It will do this, first, by bringing into 
legislative assemblies able and experienced men, 
the true leaders of their parties and the people. 

The assertion is often made that our public of¬ 
ficers and representatives are as good as the people 
who elect them; that they are representative in 
the sense of possessing the average ability, intelli¬ 
gence, and integrity, of the community; and there¬ 
fore the failures of our governments are to be 
found, not in the machinery, but in the voters. 

It is questionable whether this assertion is true. 
Very often the legislative body is below the aver¬ 
age citizenship of the community. But the ques- 


PARTY responsibility: 


165 


tion comes, Do we want only average men to 
govern us and make our laws? We do not select 
average physicians to save our lives, average law¬ 
yers to protect our rights, average ministers to 
interpret the gospel, nor average tailors, bakers, 
and carpenters to clothe, feed, and shelter us. 
We select men of exceptional native ahihty, who 
through training have become experts and profes¬ 
sionals, men versed in their callings. So in this 
most important of our delegated services, this re¬ 
vising and framing our laws which regulate the 
very structure of society, and make our lives, our 
rights, our religion, and our enjoyments possible, in 
this supreme service, why should we not select men 
far above the average ? Should they not be men 
who are grounded in jurisprudence, sociology, politi¬ 
cal economy, comparative legislation, besides pos¬ 
sessing that infinite tact known as statesmanship ? 

Indeed, the American people do desire such 
men. They have long been dissatisfied with their 
law-making bodies. They have been persistently 
depriving them of power because they are both 
unrepresentative and inefficient. The people sin¬ 
cerely wish to have capable legislators, but have 
not been able to enforce their wishes. The reason 
is that social and legal institutions of themselves 
possess a certain capacity of natural selection. 
They are the framework, the environment, within 
which individuals and classes co-operate. As in 


166 PEOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION. 


the biological world, those individuals survive and 
prosper who are best able to utilize the passions, 
customs, and legal regulations of their fellow-men. 

But society, unlike the animals, can change 
its customs and laws within certain limits, and 
thereby can change the environment of individ¬ 
uals. New and different qualities are now neces¬ 
sary for survival and power. Such a change 
is the secret ballot, which handicaps bribery; or 
civil service reform, which evicts spoilsmen; or 
hundreds of those political devices whereby gov¬ 
ernment has been for centuries slowly perfected. 
The same will hold for legislatures. If the people 
wish to bring to their legislatures intelligence, ex¬ 
perience, ability, probity, and sympathy with pop¬ 
ular aims, they should first develop those forms of 
government and that political machinery which 
will insure adequate security, support, and dignity 
to such qualities. 

Proportional representation would be an im¬ 
provement of this kind. In the first place, it 
would secure all the advantages of the English 
and Canadian practice of non-residency. Five- 
sixths of the members of parliament do not live in 
the districts they represent. This enables a polit¬ 
ical party to keep its leaders always in power, by 
selecting for them a sure district in which to make 
their canvass. With proportional representation, 
as with a general ticket, representatives could be 


PARTY responsibility: 


167 


selected from an entire State or city without refer¬ 
ence to their residence in a limited district or ward. 
The area of choice is widened. A party leader, 
like McKinley or Morrison, need no longer be ex¬ 
cluded from Congress because he happens to live 
in a district where his party is a minority. Gerry¬ 
manders could not be constructed to exclude him. 
All the money and influence of a wealthy opposing 
party could effect nothing. His party might be 
a minority in the State, yet, if it could poll only 
a single quota of the votes, he would be sure of 
election. Nothing could exclude him except the 
disaffection of his own followers. 

Neither could factions and interests holding the 
balance of power dictate nominations, and thus put 
unknown and opinionless men before the voters. 
Every faction, every party, every interest, could 
place its own strongest men in the legislature; and 
compromise candidates, “ dark horses,” would be 
unknown. 

Mr. Albert Stickney has found in frequent elec¬ 
tions and short terms the root of corrupt politics 
and machine rule.^ There is truth in his conten¬ 
tion. A representative must indeed give his time 
to carrying elections. He must placate and har¬ 
monize factions. He must properly distribute the 
spoils, and must not break with the machine. Little 
time is left to study legislation. 

1 See “ A True Republic,” New York, 1879. 


168 PEOPOBTIONAL BEPEESENTATION. 


But with proportional representation, frequent 
elections would be combined with life-long service, 
provided the representative retained the confidence 
of a single quota of the voters. The manipulation 
of elections would not engross him. His only- 
thought would be to know that in his legislative 
duties he truly represented his quota of supporters. 
Frequent elections, on the other hand, would give 
the people power quietly to drop him if he ceased 
to represent them. They would simply give their 
preferences to others on their party ticket, or would 
nominate a new ticket which would draw from him. 
Frequent elections under the district system are 
dangerous to both the good and the bad. Under 
proportional representation they would endanger 
only the bad. 

The representatives therefore will not only be 
capable; they will be responsible directly to the 
people. The objection against proportional repre¬ 
sentation on the ground that it abandons what is 
called “party responsibility,” proceeds from the 
assertion that it gives no party a clear majority 
in the legislature ; that ours is a government by 
political parties, and parties must therefore be 
permitted to make a record in the legislature or 
Congress, upon which they can go before the people 
for approval or rejection. 

This objection will be considered later when 
speaking of minority parties. In this place let 


PARTY RESPONSIBILITY.'^ 


169 


US notice the nature of “party responsibility.” 
It is multiple and corporate. The people can 
select no individual upon whom to centre respon¬ 
sibility. A party, like a corporation, can be held 
accountable only through its individual agents. 
For this reason, cities in the United States are 
transferring legislative and administrative func¬ 
tions from boards and councils to the mayor. 
Thus responsibility is fixed. But when a national 
party of four hundred representatives and sena¬ 
tors, besides hundreds of State and local officers, 
is defeated at the polls, both the good and the bad 
are defeated together. Why should a representa¬ 
tive rise above party expediency when he knows 
that the deeds of his colleagues will drag him 
down with them? 

There are two features of proportional repre¬ 
sentation which permit the voters to hold individual 
representatives, instead of parties, responsible. The 
first is the fact that parties, if defeated, would lose 
but a small proportion of their representatives. No 
matter how close the votes of parties in any State, 
a popular rebuke would usually lessen its vote 
not more than five per cent, except in cases where 
disaffection within the party has brought out an 
independent ticket. A party having eight repre¬ 
sentatives in a delegation of fifteen would thereby 
lose not more than one. Under the district system, 
as has been shown, a reversal of five per cent is 


170 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


catastrophic ; and an entire party, good and bad, go 
down together. Thus the idea is unduly promi¬ 
nent that the people reject the party as a whole, 
and the fiction is fostered of “ party responsibility.” 
But with proportional representation only a very 
few of the party candidates would be defeated. 

Now, if the voters have the power to select 
those candidates who are to be defeated, and to 
continue the others, shall we not have the essence 
of individual responsibility? The second feature 
of proportional representation gives them this 
power. Not only may electors vote for “ tick¬ 
ets,” they may also indicate their preferences for 
individual candidates upon their party ticket. 
Thus, in the case of a party expecting to elect 
eight representatives, and therefore nominating 
nine, but in the final count electing only seven, 
the voters by their preferences will have dropped 
at least two who have not met their responsibility. 
And, again, in the provisions for nominating inde¬ 
pendent tickets, and thus drawing off from a polit¬ 
ical party all those voters who are dissatisfied with 
the candidates it has nominated, and in the pro¬ 
visions for scattering individual votes among can¬ 
didates of several tickets, the electors have the 
widest freedom for distinguishing between can¬ 
didates, and holding each one personally respon¬ 
sible. Consequently, bad candidates cannot ride 
into power on a wave of party prosperity, nor can 


PARTY responsibility: 


171 


good candidates be swamped in the ebb of party 
adversity. Each candidate stands upon his own 
merits and record, and by these is he judged, 
apart from the judgment upon his party as a 
whole. 

With all parties fairly represented by their 
ablest leaders, legislatures would become delibera¬ 
tive assemblies, instead of arenas for party strife. 
The objection against proportional representation 
has just been cited, that it would nullify party 
responsibility. It is said that it would do this 
by giving a small minority the balance of power 
and enabling it to dictate legislation. This would 
weaken the government and prevent a consistent 
policy. We have frequently noticed the very 
close popular vote as between the two great par¬ 
ties, neither of them receiving a majority. Third 
and fourth parties, therefore, if given their propor¬ 
tionate weight in legislation, would often hold the 
balance. Of course, with the existing system they 
already often have this advantage, but with pro¬ 
portional representation the same would more 
frequently happen. 

The weight of this objection, the most serious 
yet presented against proportional representation, 
varies in different grades of government. Polit¬ 
ical parties are divided on national questions. 
City and State politics do not (or should not) 
follow the same alignment. Leaving the consid- 


172 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


eration of city politics to another chapter, we may 
at this point examine the objection as applied to 
Congress (and incidentally to the State legisla¬ 
tures), w'here it has its greatest force, and where 
pre-eminently party responsibility may be ex¬ 
pected to be decisive. 

In the first place, the objection overlooks the 
principle of equality and justice in representation. 
It may prove here, as elsewhere, that justice is 
the wisest expediency. It is a curious anomaly, 
showing confusion of thought regarding democ¬ 
racy, that a people who insist on universal suf¬ 
frage, and who go to ludicrous limits in granting 
it, should deny the right of representation to those 
minor political parties whose existence is the nat¬ 
ural fruit of this suffrage. The argument against 
proportional representation is made that it would 
enable the degraded and corrupt elements of the 
community to keep a bad man in the legislature 
against the wishes of all the honest and patriotic 
classes; that it would give saloon-keepers and 
gamblers representation; that it would give too 
great influence to the socialists and other “dan¬ 
gerous ” elements. 

Possibly universal suffrage is unwise, and the 
franchise should be restricted; but, having granted 
it, the dangerous elements become more danger¬ 
ous if they are denied that hearing which the 
suffrage promises. Vice and corruption thrive by 


PARTY RESPONSIBILITY. 


173 


secrecy. Nothing is so mortal to them as expo¬ 
sure. It is suicidal to come out in the open, and 
defend themselves in their nakedness. The seri¬ 
ous fault with the present system is its rich oppor¬ 
tunities for under-handed work on the part of the 
corrupt classes. They alone have no political 
principles, and can therefore take sharp advantage 
of the party divisions of the people. By their 
very corruption they have far more than their pro¬ 
portionate representation. It is a serious evil of 
the existing system that the two industries most 
largely represented in municipal councils are those 
of the saloon-keepers and the gamblers. Far bet¬ 
ter would be a system which reduces their rep¬ 
resentation to the same proportions which their 
numbers bear to the whole community. The 
corrupt and dangerous classes are a very small 
minority of the people, but by their well-chosen 
methods they get majorities in our legislative 
bodies. Proportional representation would give 
them a hearing, for they are entitled to it, but it 
would deny them supremacy. 

The argument, however, of those who fear that 
third parties will hold the balance of power is not 
based solely on a dread of the corrupt classes, but 
rather of the idealists, the reformers, “faddists” 
and “ cranks ” so-called. They would retain ex¬ 
clusive majority rule and party responsibility in 
order to prevent the disproportionate influence of 


174 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. 


these petty groups. They overlook, of course, 
the weight of the argument already made, that 
individual responsibility is more important for the 
people than the corporate responsibility of parties. 
They overlook also other considerations. 

A significant fact in American national politics 
is the actual break-down of this presumed party 
responsibility. In our system of co-ordinate pow¬ 
ers, there can be no party responsibility for legis¬ 
lation unless the Senate, the House, and the Pres¬ 
ident agree in politics. Yet since the election 
of 1876 there have been but six years of such 
agreement, namely, in the Forty-seventh, Fifty- 
first, and Fifty-third Congresses. And in the 
Forty-seventh Congress the Senate was tied, and 
in the Fifty-third the Senate, with a Democratic 
majority, was constantly opposed to the Demo¬ 
cratic House and President. For less than one- 
third of the time, therefore, can we be said to 
enjoy party responsibility. Only where a single 
party for a long series of years has possession of 
government, as was the case during and follow¬ 
ing the Civil War, is it likely to get control of 
all branches, so that party responsibility can be 
located. And even in such a period internal dis¬ 
sensions between the President and Congress con¬ 
fuse the public. 

Again, a strong government, so-called, is needed 
mainly in the administration of foreign affairs. 


175 


PARTY responsibility:^ 

In the American and German systems, as distin¬ 
guished from the English and French, in which 
the executive is independent of the legislature, 
such a government is secured regardless of party 
revolutions. If this were not so, the deadlocks of 
the past twenty years would have rendered our 
system intolerable. At the same time there is no 
public question which so thoroughly extinguishes 
party lines as a serious foreign complication. 

But there are deeper reasons than these for 
believing that a just representation of the people 
by their recognized leaders would guarantee an 
efficient and stable government, freed from the 
dictation of extremists who hold the balance of 
power. 

There are but two classes of questions in 
American politics which are characteristically 
party questions, — these are questions of the suf¬ 
frage, such as force bills and gerrymanders, which 
threaten to deprive one party of its votes; and 
questions of legislative election or civil service 
appointment to office. It must be admitted that 
on these two classes of questions a clear party 
majority is necessary. But other questions can 
be compromised. The legislature of Nebraska 
of 1893 adjourned with probably the best record 
achieved by any State legislature in several years. 
Yet it was composed of three parties about equally 
divided, The legislature spent six weeks out of 


176 PUOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


the legal twelve in a deadlock over the election 
of United States senator. Such a matter cannot 
be compromised except by electing an unknown 
man. This the legislature did, and then pro¬ 
ceeded to law-making. It enacted good laws on 
important matters, such as railways and indebted¬ 
ness, which were exciting popular feeling at the 
time; but these laws were neither confiscatory nor 
reactionary. They were just to all concerned. 
There were no deadlocks. Every measure was a 
fair compromise. 

Proportional representation could not exist with 
a spoils system, and probably not with the elec¬ 
tion of United States senators by legislatures. It 
would end in deadlocks and incapacity. But this 
surely cannot be a serious objection to the reform. 
On other grounds the country would gain if merit 
were substituted for spoils, and senators elected 
by the people. 

With these two occasions of difference removed 
from legislative halls, the possibilities of compro¬ 
mise would soon appear. They proceed from the 
fact that the majority of the people are not ex¬ 
tremists. They will not consent to radical depar¬ 
tures from existing institutions. The points of 
agreement between political parties on principles 
and measures are therefore far more numerous 
than those of divergence. Parties differ only on 
the fringe of policies. Their battles are usually 


PARTY responsibility: 


177 


mock battles inspired by spoils instead of policies. 
When the outs come m, they do not radically re¬ 
verse the policy of their predecessors. Even the 
tariff, on which they fight their battles, resolves 
iself into a matter of a very high tariff, or one not 
quite so high. The country will not permit a 
return to no-tariff. Other questions, such as free 
silver and anti-options, are settled by divisions 
which run across party lines. Upon pensions both 
parties bring out emulous majorities. River and 
harbor bills are bargained through by individual 
“ log-rolling,” and exchange of favors. On so 
many of the vital questions do representatives in 
Congress disregard party lines, that one is led to 
suspect that the tariff is merely a “ war scare ” 
to keep the voters in line. 

The fundamental nature of legislation is not 
party victory, but compromise. Compromise is 
expediency. Expediency is nothing more nor less 
than ideal principles and institutions in process 
of realization. Compromise rests on the fact of 
growth. Society is developing out of a primitive 
barbaric state, where human rights were unknown, 
towards an era when the ideal rights of man shall 
be recognized and obtained for every individual. 
One by one the burdens of the past are being 
discarded in the march towards the goal. And 
this is expediency — compromise. Enthusiasts 
appeal to the higher law, and demand that all 


178 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

obstructions be overthrown at once. This is im¬ 
possible. These obstructions are not mere coats of 
mail and trunks and luggage. They are human 
beliefs, habits, passions, prejudices^ necessities. 
They exist in the very souls of men. It requires 
time and death to remove them. No more can 
the physical body separate itself suddenly from 
immature childhood, and, omitting the period 
of youth, suddenly leap into ripened manhood, 
than can the social body abruptly break from its 
past. 

But the social body grows through modifi¬ 
cations of social institutions. The family, the 
church, the State, private property, are all being 
changed in the direction of social ideals. These 
changes are made unconsciously, as in primitive 
times, also consciously, as in modern times by 
legislation. Here arise the two primary divisions 
of society, which, shifting slightly, according to 
the issues in hand, appear in general as the con¬ 
servative and liberal parties, the former holding 
to the things already achieved, the latter urging 
change. 

These different classes and interests come to¬ 
gether in the legislative halls. The circumstances 
of the time compel change. The radicals demand 
extreme measures. The conservatives resist. If, 
now, the system of representation is such that 
neither has a majority in the legislature, but the 


PARTY responsibility: 


179 


overwhelming majority of the people who hold 
moderate views is adequately represented and holds 
the balance of power, compromises will result. 
Measures will be examined, debated, amended, 
until they reach the shape which will command a 
majority of the votes. 

There is no measure in politics which cannot 
be thus modified. Even the question of slavery 
could have been compounded. There are a hun¬ 
dred intermediate positions between immediate 
emancipation and permanent slavery. Had a law 
been enacted in the ’40’s or ’50’s providing for 
gradual emancipation, even upon the basis pro¬ 
posed by Abraham Lincoln, of a hundred years, 
the Civil War might have been averted. But the 
district system had excluded from Congress Demo¬ 
crats from the North, and Whigs from the South, 
men who occupied a middle ground, and the antag¬ 
onism between the sections was thereby exagger¬ 
ated. Especially was it affirmed by a committee 
of the United States Senate in 1869, and it is well 
known to students of history that the South was 
not fairly represented in Congress. A large mi¬ 
nority of the whites were in favor of the Union, 
and doubtless they could have been brought to 
gradual emancipation. But they were excluded 
from the State legislatures and from the halls of 
Congress. The slave-holding oligarchy precipi¬ 
tated the South into rebellion; and when the 


180 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


die was cast, the people were forced to follow.^ 
Would not compromise have been better than war? 
Would not the Negroes to-day be in a better con¬ 
dition ? 

Compromise seems to compound with evil. “No 
question is settled until it is settled right.” True 
indeed. There is a base compromise born of pusil¬ 
lanimity. It fortifies and strengthens the evil. 
But true expediency plans for the ultimate extinc¬ 
tion of hoary wrong. It recognizes, however, that 
right is not all on one side. Historical conditions, 
inherited privileges, legal enactments, of them¬ 
selves create rights. Slave-owners should have 
been compensated, as in the West Indies, or else 
been granted time to prepare for emancipation, as 
in Brazil. The district system prevents this kind 
of compromise. It keeps new parties out of rep¬ 
resentation. Their leaders have no influence on 
legislation, whereby they might force a compro¬ 
mise looking to the future. Thus the anti-slavery 
movement had no strength in Congress commen¬ 
surate with its strength among the people. It was 
choked and suppressed until it became irrepres¬ 
sible. It ended in civil war, immediate emancipa¬ 
tion, and no compensation. 

It must not be supposed, therefore, that pro- 

1 See Keport of the Select Committee of the United States 
Senate, on Representative Reform, Senate Document Fortieth 
Congress, Third Session, No. 271, March, 1869. 


PARTY RESPONSIBILITY. 


181 


portional representation, by increasing compromise, 
would prevent reform. Indeed, it would bring for¬ 
ward the day of genuine reform. And this not by 
erratic jumps or civil war, but like the steady pro¬ 
cesses of nature. Reform movements would have 
a hearing in their beginnings. Legislation would 
prepare for them. The minds of men would ripen 
for them. Only in this way could they prevent 
reactions. Those anti-slavery agitators who saw 
in Lincoln’s proclamation the final triumph of their 
work, and those extremists who gave the new- 
fledged freeman the ballot, may well to-day look 
back with chagrin on those exultant measures. 
The slave is not yet free. He was not ready for 
the ballot. He has even been openly disfran¬ 
chised. And the South is a land of smothered 
anarchy. Surely gradual emancipation and pro¬ 
gressive enfranchisement would not have been 
slower in final results than were those uncom¬ 
promising reforms. 

So it is with present-day reforms. By means 
of proportional representation they would show 
themselves inside party organizations. At present 
our parties are grown over with a crust of tradi¬ 
tion. They do not respond to the growing body 
within. There is a false feeling of security on 
the part of managers. New movements being un¬ 
represented, the leaders run to extremes. These 
have not the advantages of responsibility, of con- 


182 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


fereiice and friction with the representatives of 
existing conditions. Hence they become visiona¬ 
ries instead of practical reformers, and the public 
learns to distrust them. 

Mr. Wm. Dudley Foulke, president of the Pro¬ 
portional Representation League, has said : ^ — 

“ The result of nearly all political action is compromise. 
In the present system this compromise is made when the 
great parties are organized. It is made amid the excite¬ 
ment of a political convention. When proportional repre¬ 
sentation is adopted those compromises will be made in the 
legislative body, where all can see more clearly the strong 
and the weak points of every claim. Suppose you are in 
favor of some particular reform — civil service reform, for 
instance—will you have a better chance of success when 
you urge your claims upon one of the two great parties in 
the turmoil of a political contest, or where these claims can 
be freely presented by your own representatives in the 
legislative body ? Let us suppose, for instance, that we 
have a number of prohibitionists in a legislative body, suf¬ 
ficient perhaps to control the balance of power, what will 
be the probable result of legislation ? A prohibitory law 
will hardly be adopted — for this would be in opposition to 
the great majority; but stronger temperance legislation 
will be enacted — local option, for instance, or more strin¬ 
gent excise laws. It is by such compromises as these that 
civilization makes its safest and most effective strides. 
Small factions which control the balance of power may 
occasionally get more than they are entitled to, but this 
will only be the case where there is some greater issue 
between the larger parties which compels the relinquish- 


1 Proportional Representation Review, December, 1895. 


183 


“ PABTY BESPONSIBILITT." 

ment of something for the sake of obtaining something of 
greater importance. Compromise is of the essence of pop¬ 
ular government, and the fairest compromises are most 
likely to be made when all phases of popular thought are 
proportionally represented.” 

The first effects of every innovation are always 
viewed with alarm. So accustomed are we to 
the workings of existing institutions, that, though 
we acknowledge their imperfections and injustice, 
we rather cling to them than risk the imagined 
incidental results that may flow from the triumph 
of justice and fairness. Our principal difficulty 
is our failure to perceive that a far-reaching re¬ 
form, which strikes at the root of existing evils, 
brings with it a series of changes which harmonize 
with it. We assume that under the new system 
all conditions, except the mere mechanical im¬ 
provement, will remain the same as they are 
before. At first, indeed, the people might not 
fully understand the innovation, and shrewd 
schemers might take advantage of their ignorance; 
but soon they will comprehend it, and will adjust 
their actions to it. It does not follow that, with 
proportional representation, third parties, composed 
of so-called “ cranks,” “ faddists,” impracticables, 
“ anti-vaccinationists,” repudiationists, or what 
not, would increase in size, and continuously hold 
the balance of power. A few able men of noble 
humanitarian, though “visionary,” ideas, in every 


184 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION. 


assembly, would be an actual gain. But if their 
views are truly impracticable and unjust, nothing 
will so demonstrate the fact to them and their 
followers as the responsibility for practicable legis¬ 
lation, and the hard contact with other views 
upheld by men of ability in legislative halls. 
Idealist reformers would send their ablest spokes¬ 
men. Other parties in self-defence would be 
compelled to do the same. The representative 
assembly would become the great forum of the 
people. Its debates would command attention. 
It would educate the nation. Reformers would 
see that their cause is strengthened, not by send¬ 
ing eccentrics to Congress, but by sending ca¬ 
pable, all-round men. At present, having no 
representation whatever, only their extremists can 
attract attention. The very nature of reform 
movements would change. There are many sen¬ 
sible citizens who to-day would gladly see politi¬ 
cal and industrial conditions improved, but who 
find no place in the dominant party organizations, 
and are distrustful of the extreme reform organ¬ 
izations, and are therefore enrolled in that army 
of often nearly half the voters who stay at home. 
These men would take an active interest in poli¬ 
tics, and would modify by their new-found influ¬ 
ence the personnel of both the new parties and 
the old. In these ways the balance of power 
would be held, not by “faddists,” but by the 


“ PABTY BESPONSIBILITY.^ 185 

solid, patriotic, disinterested citizenship of the 
country. 

Proportional representation was advocated thirty 
years ago in the interests of the minority. It was 
thought to be a promising corrective of the newly 
widened suffrage. The franchise in England was 
extended in 1867 to the artisans, and in 1884 to 
the agricultural laborers. In the United States it 
was granted in 1869 to the Negroes. Conserva¬ 
tives thought minority representation was neces¬ 
sary to protect the rich against the confiscation of 
these mobs. This was partly the thought of John 
Stuart Mill, in his classical work, “ On Represen¬ 
tative Government.” But to-day it is advocated 
in the interests of the masses. John Stuart Mill 
knew nothing of the power of the lobby as against 
an extended franchise. One man of wealth has 
the influence of a thousand farmers, storekeepers, 
and laborers. But the lobby is a dangerous ma¬ 
chine in legislation. It protects the unscrupulous 
for a while, but stirs those vindictive passions 
which finally lead to indiscriminate spoliation. 
Far better for one and all would be fair and open 
compromise ! If legislatures were deliberative 
assemblies, bringing together the leaders of all 
classes and interests, this would be secured; and 
the progress of enduring social and industrial 
reform would be quickened. 

These considerations have a bearing upon the 


186 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


arguments for the so-called “ Direct Legislation ” 
by the people. Direct legislation exists at present 
in various forms in every canton of Switzerland. 
Three of them have no legislature, retaining the 
primitive primary assembly of all the voters. Di¬ 
rect legislation applies to cantonal and municipal 
questions, and has been extended to federal legis¬ 
lation. It exists in two principal forms, the Initi¬ 
ative and Referendum. 

The Referendum is the right of the people to 
vote upon a law which originates in the legisla¬ 
ture. This exists in two forms, the optional and 
the obligatory. In the optional referendum the 
proposed law is referred to the people only when 
a certain proportion of the citizens, usually one- 
sixth to one-fourth, demand it by formal petition. 
It exists in eight cantons, and in the federal legis¬ 
lature. The obligatory referendum permits no 
law to be passed, or expenditures beyond a stip¬ 
ulated sum to be made, by the legislature, without 
a vote of the people. It exists in eight cantons, 
including the two most populous — Zurich and 
Berne. The tendency in Switzerland has been to 
pass to the initiative and the obligatory referen¬ 
dum as the complete and only satisfactory form of 
“ legislation by the people.” 

As applied in America, the referendum prom¬ 
ises decided advantages over delegated legislation. 
It would take important questions out of party 


PABTY responsibility: 


187 


politics. Legislatures already use it for this pur¬ 
pose, especially in liquor and local-option legis¬ 
lation. It would educate the people on public 
questions. The press in Switzerland to-day “ has 
a rdle more preponderant than formerly.” But 
its principal advantage is as a check upon corrupt, 
incapable, and unrepresentative legislatures. It 
utterly deprives them of power. It has banished 
the lobby from Swiss legislation. Representatives 
cannot sell out, simply because they cannot ‘‘ de¬ 
liver the goods.” The people alone decide. The 
referendum is a club of Hercules in the hands of 
the people. But it does not create; it destroys. 

This is shown in various ways. The people can 
vote only on certain, large, simple, well-defined 
measures, such as loans, public improvements, 
saloon license, etc. The details of legislation in 
these days are far more important than ever be¬ 
fore. This gives abundant opportunity in the 
legislatures to introduce “ambiguous phraseology 
or provisions which would neutralize the purpose 
of the bill, or make it unconstitutional or obnox¬ 
ious.” ^ Consequently the people are better able 
to vote for men than for measures. This is shown 
by the following examples: — 

In New York, in 1894, the vote on the revised 
Constitution was only 57 per cent of the vote cast 
for governor at the same election; the vote on 
1 Alfred Cridge, in “ Hope and Home.” 


188 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


apportionment (gerrymander) was 59 per cent; and 
the vote on canal improvement was 60 per cent. 

In California, in 1892, the vote on five amend¬ 
ments to the Constitution and four propositions 
ranged from 53 per cent to 80 per cent of the 
votes cast at the same election for members of the 
assembly. (Popular election of senators 80 per 
cent; educational voting qualification 77 percent.) 

In Ohio a Constitutional amendment to tax fran¬ 
chises of corporations was lost three times, although 
the majorities in its favor were large, simply be¬ 
cause the total vote on the question was less than 
7.^ per cent of the total vote cast at the same 
elections for state officers, as required by the Con¬ 
stitution. 

j' In Switzerland, of the twenty federal referenda 
dturing 1879-1891, the average vote was 58.5 per 
pent of the total number of voters, ranging from 
;40 per cent to 67 per cent. Upon the “Right 
to Employment” it was 56 per cent.^ 

In Zurich a larger percentage of votes is cast, 
owing to the compulsory voting law; the average 
on 133 cantonal propositions of all kinds being 
74 per cent of the eligible voters. 26 per cent of 
the votes were blanks, while in two recent elec¬ 
tions of candidates 21 per cent and 24 per cent 
were blanks.^ 

1 A. B. Hart, “The Referendum in Switzerland,” in The 
Nation, September 14, 1894. 

2 J. "W. Sullivan, Direct Legislation Record, September, 1894. 


PARTY responsibility: 


189 


In Switzerland it turns out that many bills are 
approved or rejected in the referendum not on 
their merits, but on the questions “ Confidence ” 
or “No Confidence” in the legislature which sub¬ 
mitted them. In federal legislation, twenty-seven 
laws and constitutional amendments were sub¬ 
mitted to the referendum (optional) during the 
years 1874 to 1894; and of these fifteen were re¬ 
jected and twelve approved. In Zurich, with the 
compulsory referendum, there were 128 legislative 
acts voted upon between 1869 and 1893. The 
people ratified ninety-seven, and rejected thirty- 
one.^ A few laws at first rejected by the people 
were later adopted; and although Zurich is en¬ 
gaged in manufacturing and has a large working- 
class vote, it has rejected laws reducing the period 
of work in factories to twelve hours a day, pro¬ 
tecting female operatives, making employers liable 
for accidents to employees, increasing the amount 
of education in the public schools, and providing 
free text-books These votes do not mean always 
that the people are more conservative than their 
representatives, but that the particular form in 
which the legislature drew up the measures and 
the personnel of the legislature itself were not 
satisfactory to the people. These adverse votes 

1 See A. Lawrence Lowell, “The Referendum and Initia¬ 
tive,” International Journal of Ethics^ October, 1895. 

2 See Lowell as above. 


190 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


on advanced measures should be compared with 
the votes when the referendum was first estab¬ 
lished in 1869. Says Herr Burkli, “The Father 
of the Referendum: ” ^ “ The plutocratic govern¬ 
ment and the Grand Council of Zurich, which had 
connived with the private banks and railroads, 
were pulled down in one great voting swoop. The 
people had grown tired of being beheaded by the 
office-holders after every election.” 

The unrepresentative character of the legisla¬ 
tures has led to the Initiative, whereby the people 
purpose to draw up their own measures, and have 
them voted upon without the interference of the 
legislature. A petition signed by six to eight per 
cent of the voting constituency submits the bill 
to the legislature, which must in turn promptly 
submit it unchanged to the people, though it may 
express an opinion or submit also an alternative 
proposition, if it wishes. The cantonal initiative 
exists in fourteen of the twenty-two cantons, and 
was introduced into federal legislation in 1891. 

But the initiative is almost valueless as a means 
of legislation. It, indeed, educates the people and 
shows the weakness of extremists, as when the in¬ 
itiative federal bill, guaranteeing “right of em¬ 
ployment ” to every citizen, was rejected by a vote 
of four to one; but it does not enact good laws. 
In Zurich, from 1869 to 1893, nineteen initiatives 

1 Quoted by Sullivan, “Direct Legislation,” New York, 1893. 


PARTY RESPONSIBILITY. 


191 


were voted upon. “ Four of them the legislature 
advised the people to adopt, and of these two were 
ratified at the popular vote, and two were rejected; 
but of the other fifteen proposals which were dis¬ 
approved by the legislature, only three were en¬ 
acted by the people. One of these set up houses 
of correction for tramps, a measure the wisdom of 
which was much doubted; a second re-established 
the death penalty, but this came to nothing, for 
the people rejected, at the referendum, the law 
which was prepared to carry it into effect; the 
third abolished compulsory vaccination.”^ 

The initiative is weak for the reasons already 
given as to the true nature of legislation. It pre¬ 
vents compromise and mutual concession. Meas¬ 
ures are drawn up, not by a body representing all 
interests, which would therefore be fair to all, but 
by a faction or group of extremists. It by no 
means embodies the joint wisdom and sense of jus¬ 
tice of the community. It therefore cannot often 
command a majority of the votes; and if it does, 
the animus is likely to be not a generous spirit 
of tolerance, but a petty hatred of a small minor¬ 
ity. This is shown by the recent federal refer¬ 
endum forbidding the slaughter of animals by 
bleeding, which was adopted mainly to persecute 
the Jews. 

The referendum, on the other hand, exhibits 
1 See Lowell, as above. 


192 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. 


strikingly the unrepresentative character of the 
legislatures. The people reject both measures 
patently vicious and others whose details they sus¬ 
pect, merely on the question of confidence in the 
legislature. 

Unquestionably direct legislation in the form 
of the referendum would serve an important pur¬ 
pose in the present condition of American politics. 
It would promptly bring all legislative assemblies 
to a standstill. But, as in Switzerland, it would 
make them no more attractive than now to the 
ability and statesmanship of the country. They 
would be simply advisory committees on legisla¬ 
tion, with no responsibility, attracting neither the 
political leaders, nor enlisting the popular vote at 
elections. But the political atmosphere would be 
cleared. The people would have relief from the 
surfeit of partisansliip and corrupt influences. 
They could calmly contemplate the obstacles to 
popular government. In Switzerland, direct legis¬ 
lation is being followed by proportional represen¬ 
tation. Five cantons have adopted it since 1891, 
through the referendum. Four have rejected it 
by referendum, in some cases because it was con¬ 
fused by partisan legislatures with other issues.^ 
But in two cases an initiative is demanding a new 
vote. The opinion is expressed that “ in less than 

1 See Bulletin des Schweiz. Wahlreform-Vereins fur Proper- 
tionale Volksvertretung, No. 8 and 9, Mai, 1894. 


PARTY responsibility:' 


193 


ten years the whole of Switzerland will have pro¬ 
portional representation carried out peaceably, with¬ 
out revolution and bloodshed.” ^ Thus direct 
legislation proves to be an efficient instrument, 
not so much for legislation, as for reforming the 
legislatures. If the arguments presented in the 
foregoing pages are valid, and proportional repre¬ 
sentation brings into the legislatures the political 
leaders of the people, transforming them from par¬ 
tisan organs into deliberative bodies accurately 
representing the public, we may expect that the 
referendum and the initiative in Switzerland will 
be gradually discontinued, but not until they have 
made possible a genuinely representative democ¬ 
racy. 

The preceding discussion is concerned only with 
the legislative department of government. How¬ 
ever the executive may be chosen, he is properly 
only the agent of the legislature. As such he is 
not called upon to exercise discretion, which is 
the prerogative of legislators, but to execute laws 
exactly as their framers contemplated. He is 
therefore, strictly speaking, not a party official, 
but a non-partisan agent. As a matter of effi¬ 
ciency, he should be in sympathy with the ruling 
policy of the legislature. There is therefore no 
reason why minority representation should be 

1 Charles Burkli, in Proportional Representation Review, Sep¬ 
tember, 1895. 


194 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

introduced in the executive department. Where 
it has been attempted, as in the executive boards 
of Switzerland, the results are unsatisfactory. 
Practical efficiency also requires that the execu¬ 
tive head be a single officer, and this excludes 
the principle of minority representation. 

The case is somewhat different with the judi¬ 
ciary. This branch of government interprets the 
laws, and applies them to particular cases. To a 
considerable extent it creates new laws through 
its application of recognized principles to new 
conditions. In the United States it has also an 
important political function through its control 
over the legislature. Whether, therefore, judges 
should be appointed or elected is a debatable 
question. Undoubtedly, if the courts further 
extend their powers over legislation, they must, 
like the legislatures, be made elective. Any other 
policy would be destructive to democratic ten¬ 
dencies. But if the courts are to come under 
the control of machine politics through popular 
elections on party tickets, they, too, must sooner 
or later become degraded. Already supreme court 
and inferior judges in various States are known 
to be nominated and eleeted by saloon and cor¬ 
porate interests with a view to their action on the 
constitutionality of important statutes. 

Possibly proportional representation will solve 
the enigma of an elective judiciary. Police magis- 


PARTY responsibility:^ 


195 


trates in Philadelphia and supreme court judges 
in Pennsylvania are elected by the “ limited vote,” 
a form of minority representation, which, as al¬ 
ready explained, makes them directly the agents 
of party politics. The principle, however, might 
be employed with a better form of proportional 
representation, which would tend to remove the 
bench from partisan control. 

The problems of the executive and judiciary 
are subsidiary ones. They have appeared im¬ 
portant only because the failure of legislatures 
has imposed heavy obligations on the co-ordinate 
branches of government. The legislatures have 
been unrepresentative in character because the 
theory of party responsibility has prevented re¬ 
form of electoral machinery. More important 
than party responsibility is such a perfection of 
methods as will maintain individual responsibility 
of all officials directly to the people. By propor¬ 
tional representation this would be secured, and 
with it would appear in legislative assemblies the 
leading men of the city. State, and nation — men 
who would possess that spirit and capacity of 
just compromise which proceed only from wide 
experience, distinguished ability, and patriotism. 
With such men in power it would no longer be 
necessary to hold a majority of the legislature 
together by the party machine, but new majori¬ 
ties could be trusted to be formed on every ques- 


196 PEOPOBTIONAL PEPBESENTATIOlf. 

tion in harmony with the wishes and interests 
of all the people. And instead of idealizing the 
rule of a mere numerical majority on the plea of 
the greatest good of the greatest number, we 
should promote mutual concession for the sake 
of a broader ideal, the greatest good of all the 
people. 


CITY GOVERNMENT, 


197 


CHAPTER VIII. 

CITY GOVERNMENT. 

It is admitted that a portion of the arguments 
in the preceding chapter is in advance of what 
the public is ready to accept. Jeremy Bentham 
is quoted as saying that a reform may be so en¬ 
tirely just that all classes will forthwith join 
together to defeat it. Not only must it be just, 
it must be practicable; and it must not run 
counter to public prejudice. We as a people are 
not yet ready to abandon the notion that party 
responsibility in Federal affairs is essential for 
safety; and even in our State governments the 
election of senators by State legislatures, and the 
congressional gerrymanders, force us to decide 
State questions by Federal parties. 

But in city affairs it is different. The think¬ 
ing and practical public is consenting, even in¬ 
sisting, that city politics must be separated from 
State and Federal politics; that a man’s views on 
the tariff have nothing to do with his views on 
special assessments, health administration, fran¬ 
chise-stealing, or police. It is also agreed that 
third parties in cities are not composed of vision¬ 
aries and irresponsibles, but of the intelligent and 


198 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


well-to-do classes. Consequently, reformers are 
appealing to citizens to abandon their political 
parties in city elections, and to vote for the best 
man on business principles. Independence in city 
politics is coming to be dignified and respected. 
Public prejudice may soon permit the necessary 
political machinery for promoting this indepen¬ 
dence. But up to the present time what has been 
done ? 

The city is looked upon as a business corpora¬ 
tion, instead of a political corporation, to be man¬ 
aged in a business manner. It must therefore 
have its general manager, who shall appoint all 
heads of departments, and become clearly responsi¬ 
ble for its administration. Power must be taken 
from the council and from boards, and be concen¬ 
trated in the mayor. The mayor must be elected 
by popular vote. 

Mr. James Bryce calls this a “cure or kill” 
method of government.^ It places tremendous 
interests at stake in every election upon the turn 
of a few votes. When the people are thoroughly 
aroused they may elect a good mayor. But how ? 
Usually, as recently in New York City, one of the 
two political party machines must be recognized 
in the nomination. A compromise candidate must 
be agreed upon, and the other elective officials 
must be properly distributed so that this machine, 

1 “American Commonwealth,” vol. i., p. 617. 


CITY GOVERNMENT. 


199 


usually in the minority, may get a share of the 
spoils. But in case such a patchwork ticket can¬ 
not be arranged, the independents are forced to 
nominate a ticket of their own. Here the result 
is familiar. Three candidates are in the field for 
one office. The great majority of the voters ad¬ 
here to their party. The independents cannot 
elect their man; they can only draw from one 
machine to the success of the other. And it is 
usually found that the two machines have an 
agreement both to keep the field as a lesson to the 
reformers, and afterwards to share the offices. 

Thus the one-man system compels the very 
thing which the reformers deprecate, the intro¬ 
duction of Federal politics. It does not permit 
the introduction of a third element wholly disen¬ 
tangled from any alliances with the two dominant 
parties. To ascribe the failure of mayoralty des¬ 
potism to the indifference of the intelligent and 
business classes is to overlook the fact that the 
system of majority election, all the way from 
primaries and conventions up to the mayor, 
rigidly excludes those classes. They may be 
aroused for a time, may abandon their Federal 
politics, and may join in a popular uprising. In 
that case the independent movement may show 
considerable strength, and in isolated cases may 
control the election. But popular uprising is not 
the normal condition. It is rebellion, it requires 


200 PBOPOETIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 

unusual exertions and great expenditures of time 
and money by the few who take the lead. It 
depends upon impromptu organization, and soon 
exhausts itself. One or two mayors may be 
elected through its influence; but the politicians 
know that, by quietly waiting, their turn will 
come again. This explains why the advocates of 
one-man power, in looking about for the failure of 
their remedy, are beginning to ascribe it to the 
short term of the mayor, which prevents him from 
developing a “ policy.” 

This last explanation of failure shows us a fault 
not only in the practice, but also in the theory, of 
one-man rule. The city is not merely a voluntary 
business corporation organized to economize the 
taxes of the stockholders; it is a compulsory 
corporation, into which men are born. It is a 
branch of the State, and exercises the sovereign 
functions of eminent domain, taxation, ordinance¬ 
making, based on compulsion rather than on free 
contract. In a private corporation the interests 
of the stockholders are all in one direction — the 
increase of dividends. In a political corporation 
different classes of citizens have often different 
interests. Therefore all interests and classes 
should be represented in its administration. In 
what direction its sovereign powers shall be em¬ 
ployed is a political question, involving justice 
and expediency as well as business. Shall taxes 


CITY GOVERNMENT. 


201 


be levied to protect health, to extend free schools, 
to cleanse the slums, to buy water-works or street¬ 
car lines ? — these are a few of the political ques¬ 
tions which cities must consider. Upon these 
questions there is room for an alignment of politi¬ 
cal parties, of conservatives, and progressists, as 
much as in Federal politics, but not corresponding 
to the Federal alignment. The mayor represents 
only the majority. If he has a “policy,” it should 
affect nothing more nor less than the execution of 
the laws and ordinances; and these a representa¬ 
tive body must determine—if not the municipal 
council, then the State legislature. They are not 
matters of free contract to be agreed upon by pri¬ 
vate individuals; they are coercive enactments to 
be executed by the mayor and the police. They 
cannot be determined except to a limited extent 
by the initiative and referendum, for reasons 
already given; and if municipal home rule is to be 
extended or even retained, they must be deter¬ 
mined by local legislation. 

But “ the council,” says Mr. Seth Low, “ is the 
great unsolved organic problem in connection with 
city government in the United States.” Origi¬ 
nally given complete control of city affairs, it has 
been forced to share its power with other branches. 
To its incapacity and gradual subsidence are to be 
ascribed the miserable plight of our cities. 

German and English cities retain the council as 


202 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

the all-important and only elective body of city 
officials. But it is doubtful whether American 
cities can learn from them. European cities do 
not have a heterogeneous population of foreigners 
and foreign extraction furnishing one-half the 
votes or more. Neither do they have universal 
suffrage. In New York one person in six is a 
voter; in Glasgow, one in nine; in Berlin, one in 
eleven. In Berlin the voting age is twenty-five; 
and non-taxpayers, numbering 10 to 15 per cent 
of the men of voting age, have no vote whatever. 
The council is elected by an ingenious “three- 
class ” system, in such a way that 10 to 15 per 
cent of those who vote — including only the very 
wealthiest citizens, numbering not more than 7 
or 8 per cent of the total male population above 
twenty-one years — elect two-thirds of the coun- 
cil.i In Glasgow, 25,000 adult males — equal to 
one-fourth of the population—are disfranchised; 
while the infiuence of property is still further 
emphasized by the provisions that women may 
vote provided they are taxpayers, and also sub¬ 
urban merchants and property owners who live 
within seven miles of the city. 

The restrictions in all British cities on regis¬ 
tration, the requirements of two years’ residence 
in the same precinct, and the exclusion of those 

1 See Albert Shaw, “ Municipal Government in Continental 
Europe,” p. 307, ff. 


CITY GOYEBNMENT. 


203 


who receive public relief, disfranchises many 
thousands of the poorest classes who freely vote 
in America^ 

France, with a wider municipal suffrage than 
Germany or England, nevertheless disfranchises 
habitual drunkards, recipients of public poor relief, 
and those convicted of crime. It is significant 
that France, with her comparatively wide muni¬ 
cipal suffrage, elects municipal councilmen below 
the ability of those in England and Germany, and 
that city government in that country has been 
centralized in the hands of the mayor who appoints 
all subordinates. He is elected by the council, 
but can be removed by the prefect of the depart¬ 
ment. In Paris there is almost no home rule; 
the two prefects who govern the city being ap¬ 
pointed by the president of the Republic.^ 

It is generally agreed that the government of 
English and German cities is superior to that of 
American cities. Public officials are renowned 
for their honesty, efficiency, and the economy of 
their administration. The municipal councils in¬ 
clude the best and most intelligent citizens, who 
serve without salary. And yet they who thus 
represent the wealth of the community have pro¬ 
moted much further than American cities many 
public services for the wants of the unrepresented 

1 See Albert Shaw, “ Municipal Government in Great Britain.” 

2 Ibid., p. 23 ff. 


204 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

masses, such as parks, baths, gas and water supply, 
cheap car-fares, and many others. The reason for 
this is probably to be found in the very purity 
and efficiency of their administration, which en¬ 
courages the citizens to intrust to their munici¬ 
palities many functions which the corruption of 
American cities forces them to remand to private 
corporations. In German cities, also, the com¬ 
pulsory enlistment of private citizens of wealth 
and influence in unpaid co-operation with city 
authorities in the details of administration, ac¬ 
quaints them thoroughly with the needs of the 
people and stimulates a public spirit. In Berlin 
10,000 taxpayers are thus enrolled, nearly 2,500 
being in the department of charities. That a 
restricted suffrage would bring similar results in 
American cities is not to be expected. In the 
words of Mr. Seth Low, “ In a country where 
wealth has no hereditary sense of obligation to its 
neighbors, it is hard to conceive what would be 
the condition of society if universal suffrage did 
not compel every one having property to con¬ 
sider, to some extent at least, the well-being of 
the whole community.” 

Yet it must be acknowledged that the failure 
of American cities is in some way connected with 
universal suffrage. The fault, however, lies, not 
with the extension of the suffrage, but with an 
obsolete system of election devised for aristo- 


CITY GOVERNMENT. 


205 


cratic and capitalistic representation. The wealthy 
classes of Berlin, who elect two-thirds of the coun¬ 
cil, are more amenable to business considerations 
than are the masses of the voters. Just as little 
as railway stockholders would consider the Fed¬ 
eral politics or the religious belief or any other 
quality of their directors, attorneys, and managers, 
except their business capacity, so little would a 
capitalistic suffrage allow these qualities to in¬ 
fluence the selection of councilmen. Were the 
suffrage restricted to any other single class in the 
community, little difficulty would be met by such 
class in selecting its ablest and typical represen¬ 
tatives for important positions. School-teachers 
and professors, if they alone held the franchise, 
would select the leading men of their calling. 
Ministers of the gospel would select the leading 
minister, physicians the leading physician, mer¬ 
chants the most successful merchant, manufac¬ 
turers the best organizer of industry, and so on. 
But when the suffrage is extended to all these 
classes, and they are thrown together in a mis¬ 
cellaneous grouping, and instructed to elect a sin¬ 
gle representative who stands for them all, they 
cannot do it. The typical physician does not 
represent the merchants, nor the most successful 
merchant the ministers. Compromise candidates 
must be selected who do not stand out typically 
as the leaders of any class. Far more difficult is 


206 PBOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


the problem when the manual working classes, 
with new and opposing interests, receive the fran¬ 
chise. Not only are the business classes them¬ 
selves, under such conditions, unable to elect their 
own typical representatives and councilmen, but 
the propertyless laborers and the small home-own¬ 
ers are likewise handicapped. The ward lines 
separate them all into artificial groupings, and pre¬ 
vent those natural combinations based on business 
and social interests which they would readily adopt 
could they join together throughout the city, ir¬ 
respective of residence. Neighborhood, though 
more compacted, is less united in the city than 
in the country. Friendship, business alliances, 
religious co-operation, social enjoyments, bind to¬ 
gether people of different wards instead of those 
of the same ward. The ward system, separating 
politically those whom interest would join, and so 
preventing their natural representation, ends in¬ 
evitably in the party machine, with its military 
and fraternal organization of the voters who are 
otherwise separated. It is useful, therefore, only 
to the astute schemer and wire-puller, the repre¬ 
sentative and “ boss ” of the machine, who bal¬ 
ances skilfully interest against interest, faction 
against faction, party against party. He repre¬ 
sents nothing but his own shrewd manipulation of 
the separated fragments of the body politic. His 
success is that of Napoleon, “divide and conquer.” 


CITY GOVEENMENT. 


207 


It is admitted that government by the mayor in 
American cities is better than government by the 
common council elected by wards. It centralizes 
the administration in one head, which is more easily 
decapitated by a popular uprising than the hydra¬ 
headed council. But its limitations and dangerous 
tendencies have been indicated. The council, how¬ 
ever, elected upon the proportional basis, promises 
more for municipal reform than the mayor. In 
the first place it would soon remove the govern¬ 
ment from Federal politics, simply because it would 
introduce representation of business interests, good 
citizenship interests, labor interests, and various 
interests other than partisan, which would hold 
the balance of power, and prevent every partisan 
action. 

The appeal to voters to abandon their Federal 
politics in city elections must in the long run be 
fruitless under a system of majority or plurality 
rule, where one party by the election of a mayor 
can capture the entire city government. The 
prize is too great to be neglected by partisan inter¬ 
ests. Party machinery must be constantly active, 
or else be weakened. To exert influence on na¬ 
tional issues, the local organization must find co¬ 
hesion in local issues. Local victory strengthens 
its hold on the State and national organizations. 
The only way to prevent national parties from 
struggling to control city politics is to introduce a 


208 PE OP OR TIONAL BEPRESENTA TION. 

system which prevents any one party from securing 
majority control of the city government. If third 
or fourth parties hold the balance of power, they 
can check the domination of either national party 
in city affairs, and so reduce them both to a mini¬ 
mum. And here again, since the public looks on 
third parties in city affairs with a favor which it 
does not vouchsafe to third parties in Federal affairs, 
the time is ripe for a system of city government 
with proportional representation which will frankly 
give these third parties the balance of power, and, 
indeed, encourage them to increase in numbers, 
variety, and vigor. At the same time, by electing 
a council of, say, thirty, in annual groups of ten, 
the quota of representation would be large enough 
to exclude petty and factious interests, but small 
enough to represent all interests of municipal sig¬ 
nificance. 

Proportional representation would bring able 
and public-spirited men into the service of the city. 
As a legislative body meeting once a week or 
fortnight, and supervising through their commit¬ 
tees, but not administering the city departments, 
the councilmen would receive no salaries, as in 
German and English cities ; but they would be 
glad to serve. It is a mistake to assume that the 
best business men are so engrossed with their pri¬ 
vate affairs that they would not act as councilmen. 
Such men already give their unpaid services as 


CITY GOVERNMENT. 


209 


trustees of institutions, as members of State boards 
of charities, as school, park, and sinking-fund com¬ 
missioners, and in many public positions where 
they are not compelled to seek appointment by 
questionable means. So would they serve in the 
city council if chosen on the proportional plan in 
such a way as to be free from humiliating bar¬ 
gains. “ Elected in this way,” says Charles Fran¬ 
cis Adams,^ “ who could refuse to serve ? Consider 
the prestige, the weight of authority and influence, 
with which any man could walk into a council 
chamber, who entered it at the head of the poll 
under such a system as this. No citizen, whether 
in New York or Boston, so elected, could or would 
refuse to obey the mandate of his fellow-citizens. 
And so it would be in the power of any consider¬ 
able body of voters to lay a hand on the shoulder 
of any man, no matter how eminent or how busy 
he might be, and call upon him to perform his 
tour of municipal duty.” 

Such citizens, too, would be elected from the 
different sections of the city. Proportional repre¬ 
sentation in cities would not abolish local repre¬ 
sentation. In some cases where a river or a 
railway system divides the city into two widely 
different sections, it might be well to provide for 
two tickets, one for each section. But even with¬ 
out such provision, the parties nominating candi- 

1 “ Proportional Representation Review,” March, 1894. 


210 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 

dates could bring out a full vote for their tickets 
only on condition that they distributed the candi¬ 
dates among the sections. And if the voters as a 
matter of fact attach weight to sectional repre¬ 
sentation, they can readily cast that weight in their 
ballots by voting for such candidates as repre¬ 
sent their sections. Thus sectional interest must 
come forward under such a system in its true 
proportions along with other interests, though 
it is prevented from becoming the exclusive in¬ 
terest. 

With a reformed city council removed from 
Federal politics, the city administration would as¬ 
sume a new efficiency. The council is not only a 
legislative body; if it truly represents the people, 
it must be also an administrative body. Therein 
it differs from the State and Federal legislatures 
in that the latter are sovereign in every regard 
over their respective fields. But the city govern¬ 
ment is only a branch of the State government, its 
powers are delegated, and it possesses only those 
granted by the legislature or the Constitution of 
the State. Matters of general legislation, such as 
health, administration of justice, property, and 
personal rights, in all their manifold forms, are 
withheld from it. The council, representing the 
delegated sovereignty of the city, has but limited 
legislative duties, even under the most generous 
grant of home rule. It remains, therefore, to in- 


CITY GOVERNMENT. 


211 


quire how far it should be intrusted with adminis¬ 
trative duties. 

At the present time, civil service reform in the 
United States has advanced no farther than the 
control of subordinate positions. It is not even 
proposed by the ardent advocates of this reform 
that either in city, State, or nation, it should in¬ 
clude the heads of departments. The conse¬ 
quence is that, in the cities where civil service 
rules apply, there is a double head to each depart¬ 
ment ; a political head, appointed by the mayor for 
his own term of office, and a professional or expert 
head, holding under civil service rules during 
efficiency. The latter has the entire administra¬ 
tion of the details of the service, and the super¬ 
vision of subordinates ; he is an expert who has 
usually come up from the ranks, and is thoroughly 
acquainted with every feature of his department. 
The political head comes and goes with the mayor, 
and is supposed to represent his “policy.” The 
actual administration, however, he is compelled 
from very inefficiency to leave to the expert head. 
Now, civil service reform comes in as a mechan¬ 
ical arrangement to prevent the political heads of 
departments from applying to subordinates the 
same rules of appointment and removal as those 
which are applied to themselves. So far it has 
best accomplished its aim when administered by a 
commission appointed independently of the city 


212 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


authorities, as in Massachusetts by the governor. 
This commission, after competitive and non-com¬ 
petitive examinations, can alone “ certify ” candi¬ 
dates for subordinate appointments to the heads 
of departments, upon requisitions from the latter. 
Usually, when one appointment is to be made, the 
three candidates who stand highest on examina¬ 
tion are certified, and the head of the department 
must select one of these. Promotions, too, must 
be made according to fixed rules of precedence. 
The object here is to restrict the freedom of the 
political heads of departments, so that they will 
not dismiss subordinates in order to appoint their 
own political adherents. 

Undoubtedly, with the existing methods of se¬ 
lecting heads, these rules are indispensable. They 
give employees security of tenure, they promote 
efficiency and economy, but above all they prevent 
the demoralization of the voters, a surprisingly 
large number of whom are controlled by the hope 
of office for themselves or their friends. 

But civil service reform as thus administered is 
strikingly inadequate in municipal government. 
The general testimony is that it succeeds well 
when the heads of departments are in sympathy 
with it; but if they are not, they can defeat its 
aims. On the other hand, if the heads are perma¬ 
nent expert officials, as is often the case in the fire 
department, they do not need the services of an 


CITY GOVERNMENT. 


21 ^ 


outside commission, and are awkwardly hampered 
by it. The appointment and promotion of subor¬ 
dinates is not a mere mechanical matter of ex¬ 
aminations, measurements and averages, which 
can be done by a commission having no profes¬ 
sional and expert knowledge of the services re¬ 
quired. Rather is it a work of tact and insight 
into character, a work requiring that sound judg¬ 
ment, that thorough experience in the service, and 
that full knowledge of those subtle qualities which 
bring success in the particular duties required, 
— a judgment, an experience, and a knowledge 
which can be found only in the resourceful head 
of a department, who has served in subordinate 
positions, and who has at heart the success and 
honor of his department. The weakness of civil 
service reform is that it does not reach the foun¬ 
tain and source of efficient civil service, the heads 
of departments. 

A thorough reform of the civil service in city 
affairs cannot be expected until the political heads 
of departments are abolished altogether, and the 
entire administration intrusted to the expert pro¬ 
fessional heads. In German and English cities 
the civil service commission as an independent 
organization is unknown. Heads of departments 
are selected by the council, sometimes from the 
subordinates by promotion, but usually from the 
lists of those who have achieved success and 


214 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

reputation as heads in smaller cities, having be¬ 
gun their careers as subordinates in both large 
and small ones. Upon these heads is laid the 
complete responsibility for the administration of 
their departments, and, as an indispensable con¬ 
dition of such responsibility, the unrestricted ap¬ 
pointment and removal of all subordinates.^ The 
council, of course, legally and formally ratifies 
the action of its heads of departments through its 
own committees, though not interfering in the 
election of subordinates. 

In the United States an essential feature of 
government by the mayor, both as practised and 
advocated, is his unchecked freedom in appoint¬ 
ing his so-called “cabinet,” the heads of depart¬ 
ments. They are his personal representatives in 
the city administration. But the mayor, as al¬ 
ready shown, must necessarily be elected, except 
in sporadic cases, on the basis of Federal politics. 
His personal representatives, therefore, must re- 
fiect his political complexion. They must come 
and go with him. They are appointed and 
removed, not on account of their intimate knowl¬ 
edge of the departments and their eminently suc¬ 
cessful administration therein, but solely for those 
political reasons which may, for the time being, 

1 Illustrations of this and other statements regarding foreign 
cities are found in Albert Shaw’s “ Municipal Government in 
Great Britain ” and “ Municipal Government in Continental 
Europe,” New York, 1895. 


CITY GOVERNMENT. 


215 


strengthen the popular hold of the mayor. As 
long as the mayor, elected by popular vote, ap¬ 
points them, such must be their character. They 
are at the best a useless encumbrance, and in all 
cases a serious danger to the administration of 
city affairs. 

On the other hand, if a reformed and strictly 
non-partisan council of the foremost citizens, 
wherein no single political party held the major¬ 
ity, should appoint the heads of departments, 
these would not be chosen for political reasons, 
but simply to carry out the wishes of the council. 
The latter would determine its own “ policy,” as 
far as the city government is empowered to do 
so; and the heads of departments would he its 
professional, expert administrators for developing 
that policy. The civil service commission could 
he abolished as a wasteful obstruction; and the 
department chiefs, whose only claim to perma¬ 
nency would be the efficiency of their administra¬ 
tion, could be intrusted with entire responsibility 
in all the details of appointments, promotions, 
and removals. 

Thus it will be seen that proportional represen¬ 
tation in American cities will achieve its marked 
success not merely in the legislative field, but in 
the more important administrative field. There 
is, in fact, no half-way position between rule by 
mayor and rule by council. If Americans accept 


216 PBOPOBTIONAL PEPEESENTATION. 

the present tendency, they cannot stop short of 
the abolition of the council. Following that must 
come longer terms for the mayor; next, removal 
from office by the governor, not only for mal¬ 
feasance, but for political reasons, as in France. 
Home rule, democratic self-government, civic 
pride, municipal patriotism, must gradually dis¬ 
appear in the face of advancing centralization. 

On the other hand, a council elected from the 
best citizens by the free choice of the voters, as 
guaranteed by proportional representation, would 
gradually absorb into its hands the control of city 
administration. Beginning with the control of 
taxation, the legislature would remove from it 
those restrictions against granting franchises and 
making loans, and those financial limitations im¬ 
posed by independent boards of estimate and 
apportionment, which now render even the legis¬ 
lative functions of the council in our large cities 
a mere formality. Then the council would be 
able to control the mayor, and to state the terms 
of financial support. And finally, proceeding 
from one success to another, the mayor would 
again be reduced to the position of chairman 
and dignitary, while the grand committee of the 
people, representing them wholly and in part, 
freed from machines, bosses, and spoilsmen, would 
restore to our cities a genuine representative 
democracy. 


CITY GOVERNMENT, 


217 


Practical illustrations of the line of reasoning 
pursued in the foregoing pages might be found 
in any American city. I will select the campaign 
of 1895 for the election of mayor and council- 
men in the city of Syracuse. The Republican or¬ 
ganization had been in control of the city for 
several years. After both the Republican and 
Democratic parties had made their nominations 
for mayor, there was considerable dissatisfaction. 
A Citizens’ Reform party was organized, com¬ 
posed mainly of Republicans. This party offered 
the mayoralty nomination successively to three 
well-known and capable citizens, two of whom 
declined, and the third accepted. Thus three 
candidates were in the field. As a result, the 
Democrats elected their nominee on the follow¬ 
ing vote: Democrats, 9,184; Citizens, 6,018; 
Republicans, 5,831. At the same election 19 
councilmen were elected by wards. Had the 
councilmanic election been based on proportional 
representation, according to the vote for mayor, 
the council would have stood, 8 Democrats, 6 
Citizens, 5 Republicans. Neither party would 
have secured a majority. At the same time the 
Citizens’ party would have met no difficulty in 
finding eminent candidates. The two men who 
refused to run for mayor would willingly have 
accepted a place on a proportional ticket, be¬ 
cause a nomination would have been equivalent 


218 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION, 

to an election. They would not have been 
forced to undergo the bitter personal attacks 
which spring from the supreme importance of a 
single candidate, upon whom depend all the ap¬ 
pointments and the distribution of patronage. 
There would have been no fight whatever over 
the four or five principal candidates nominated 
by the Citizens’ party. Then, when elected, such 
men would not have been compelled to drop their 
private business, at great loss to themselves, their 
partners, and their families, only to return to it 
after two years of harassing struggle with spoils¬ 
men. Serving without salaries, meeting once a 
week, supervising through committees the heads 
of departments, to whom the actual administration 
is intrusted, they would have time for their pri¬ 
vate affairs. Under such conditions, there is no 
reason why the best men of American cities, as of 
European cities, should not find the honor and 
opportunities of an aldermanic seat greatly to be 
desired. When once elected, and their records 
made, they would be returned again and again 
to the council, with no effort, no political wire¬ 
pulling, simply through nomination by petition 
and the untrammelled suffrage of their fellow- 
citizens. In the council they would hold the 
balance of power between the two dominant 
parties. They would prevent all partisan legis¬ 
lation and appointments, would be the spokes- 


CITY GOVERNMENT. 


219 


men for the public opinion of the community, and 
a rallying-point against corruption in the city 
affairs. 

Here the objection naturally arises, granting 
that the Citizens’ Keform party would be able 
to guarantee election to its principal candidates, 
would not the same be true for the regular parties 
and their nominees ? Therefore, would not the 
proportional plan strengthen instead of weaken 
the hold of the machines ? Could they not elect 
the very worst candidates whom they might 
choose? And when elected, could not these rep¬ 
resentatives of both party organizations combine 
to defeat the Citizens’ party and then divide the 
appointments and share the corruption funds be¬ 
tween themselves ? After all, does not muni¬ 
cipal reform depend solely upon the renewed 
interest and independence of citizens in municipal 
affairs rather than in any mere revision of political 
machinery ? 

Unquestionably, the first requisite of any reform 
is the public spirit, intelligence, and independence 
of the voters. A corrupt and ignorant electorate 
can never produce good government. At the same 
time, the history of the secret ballot legislation 
in the United States the past five years demon¬ 
strates beyond doubt the importance of reform 
in political machinery. The ballot laws did not 
create patriotism, public spirit, intelligence, inde- 


220 PBOPOJRTIOJVAL PPPBPSPJSTTATIOJV. 

pendence; but they have given these qualities an 
advantage which they never before possessed in 
the electoral contest with bribers. Proportional 
representation goes farther in the same direction. 
It offers to would-be independent voters the guar¬ 
anty that they will not throw their votes away if 
they cast them for third-party candidates. In the 
Syracuse election hundreds of voters were influ¬ 
enced by this consideration. A bolt from the 
Republican ticket to the Citizens’ ticket on the 
mayoralty election was quite generally understood 
to be simply a vote for the Democratic candidate. 
But with proportional representation every 1,100 
votes turned over to the Citizens’ ticket carries 
the assurance of electing one candidate on that 
ticket; whereas in the election of mayor it would 
have required nearly 10,000 votes. So easy and 
safe is the bolting from the regular nominees 
under the proportional plan that the political or¬ 
ganizations would see the necessity of nominating 
at least prominent men instead of mere tools and 
figure-heads. Otherwise the Citizens’ ticket could 
easily increase its share of representation from a 
third to a half or more of the aldermen. In either 
case there would be a decided gain. If only the 
men who engineer the political machines, but 
who usually hold no offices, could be placed 
in the municipal council, they would be in a 
position where the people could condemn them. 


CITY GOVERNMENT. 


221 


And succeeding elections, with the habit of in¬ 
dependence encouraged among the voters, would 
gradually weed out even the least corrupt of 
aldermen. The voters in American cities are 
already independent enough to bring about these 
results. Our cities are not now in need of 
greater independence among the citizens, but 
of better machinery for expressing their actual 
independence. 

City government in the United States is at once 
the direst failure and the brightest hope of our 
politics. It is based upon the ward, — the pettiest 
extreme of the district system of representation, — 
and ward politics is recognized as the worst pol¬ 
itics. This is the hopeful feature, that the people 
acknowledge the failure, and are looking for rem¬ 
edies. What these remedies shall be is not yet 
clear nor agreed. A great many must be tried 
and tested, and their defects noted, and finally 
by experimental selection the fittest will survive. 
With three thousand cities and villages, America 
has the widest variety of municipal experiments 
in the world. Small governments can be reformed 
more readily than large ones. To experiment 
upon Congress jeopardizes the nation; to exper¬ 
iment upon cities risks but a fraction. And no 
experiment scarcely can aggravate the actual sit¬ 
uation. From one city to another the successful 
reform will extend, and finally, like other reforms 


222 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


in America, proceed to State and national adop¬ 
tion. If proportional representation can be fairly 
introduced and tested, it is believed that the fore¬ 
going pages have indicated the hope of its uni¬ 
versal success. 


SOCIAL BEFOBM. 


223 


CHAPTER IX. 

SOCIAL REFORM. 

The motive of political reform is not a mere 
academic delight in symmetrical and clean govern¬ 
ment. It goes much farther. Political reform is 
only the preliminary to social reform. The most 
serious objections urged against the interference 
of the State or the city in promoting social welfare 
are grounded on the incapacity of administrative 
officials. The experience of foreign cities has 
demonstrated the value of municipal ownership 
and operation of all public services, such as water, 
gas, electric lighting, and street railways. The 
efficient municipal governments of Europe have 
done much more. They have erected municipal 
dwellings with the best equipments, to be leased 
at moderate rentals to working people. They 
have conducted municipal farms, slaughter-houses, 
savings banks, pawnshops, baths, laundries, ball- 
grounds, technical schools, with the purpose to 
improve the condition of the poorest working pop¬ 
ulation, and to elevate the life of every class. 
In American cities it would seem absurd to in¬ 
trust such important enterprises to the authorities 
as at present constituted. Generally, where water- 


224 PEOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION, 


works, gas, or electric lighting is taken up by a 
municipality, it is placed in the hands, not of the 
council, but of a board or commission newly cre¬ 
ated for the purpose, and elected by the people or 
appointed by the mayor. This does not bring 
satisfactory results. It unnecessarily splits the 
government, divides responsibility, involves waste¬ 
ful administration. Yet, where the council cannot 
be trusted, it is the only practicable plan. At the 
same time, it is so objectionable that it affords 
little encouragement to those who desire the exten¬ 
sion of municipal functions. With a reformed 
council, however, the way would be open to a 
business-like administration of all new enterprises 
which the public might wish the municipality to 
undertake. The reform of the government of 
London, through the County Government Act of 
1888, which created a council of able and repre¬ 
sentative citizens, was followed immediately by 
energetic work in the direction of municipal dwell¬ 
ings, street and dock improvements, abolition of 
contract work, and purchase of street-railway lines. 
The latter, throughout the whole area of London, 
will be owned and operated by the council, and 
consolidated into a single system within fifteen 
years. 

The people who suffer most from inefficient and 
corrupt government in the United States are the 
wage-earning classes. Their streets are ill kept; 


SOCIAL BEFOBM. 


225 


sanitary and building regulations are unenforced; 
heavy charges are imposed for car-fares and gas; 
parks, playgrounds, and schools are inadequate. 
So little does the city do for the classes who have 
no property, that they lose their interest in muni¬ 
cipal government, and readily follow the politician 
who appeals to their prejudices. This becomes a 
serious matter as these classes grow in self-con¬ 
sciousness, as they begin to learn their political 
power, and to feel that the motive of municipal 
government is not to promote their welfare, but to 
restrict their liberty. They have a majority of the 
votes, and they tend to combine under machine 
leadership for what they consider their class inter¬ 
ests. Municipal reform must consider the welfare 
of the masses of the working classes. But it is a 
mistake to suppose that their welfare will be pro¬ 
moted by giving them exclusive majority rule, as 
with the present system. Tammany Hall secures 
their votes, but neglects their homes and schools. 
A corrupt government, with weak officials, managed 
by private bosses, can never introduce social re¬ 
forms. It must first have a share of the business 
integrity and leadership of the community. There 
are many men of this type in every city who would 
gladly enter upon reforms for the people could 
they be placed in power. If the working classes 
were free to vote as they pleased, they would soon 
learn to stand by such men and to keep them in 


226 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. 


the municipal council against all the influences of 
machines and corporations. At present these men 
are excluded by the very qualities which would 
make them of service. Proportional representa¬ 
tion is the only political reform yet proposed 
which will guarantee them continued election, and 
thereby bring about that interest of the working 
classes in good city government and that harmony 
of all classes which is becoming indispensable. 

Thoughtful persons who contemplate the social 
conditions of to-day are oppressed by anxiety. So 
suddenly have a multitude of strange evils sprung 
into sight that the observer is bewildered, — on 
one side, an unprecedented concentration of wealth 
in the control of a few syndicates; on the other, a 
growing restlessness and frantic attempts at organ¬ 
ization on the part of the wage-earning classes. As 
phases of these changes, there are also the rapid 
rise of cities where capital and labor meet face to 
face in secret and open battle; the mobilization 
of the army near these cities, and the equipment 
of armories; the increase of the unemployed, of 
crime, intemperance, and vice ; the purchase of 
legislation and the degradation of politics. But 
more serious than all is the cynical recognition of 
these facts in the club-room, the bitter emphasis 
of them in the back alley and the tenement and 
among the small farmers, and the hopelessness of 


SOCIAL REFOBM, 


227 


millions of workers. Forty years ago the farmer 
and his sons worked early and late, opening up the 
wilderness, but they went and came with songs. 
To-day they cannot endure it; sons abandon the 
farms for the cities, work is irksome and a curse; 
they hurry through it to reach the saloon. Have 
the people become individually and severally de¬ 
generate, or are they distorted by social condi¬ 
tions ? 

Whatever the causes, the problems are here. 
And the array of solutions is more bewildering 
than the multitude of problems. Here are iso¬ 
lated groups of visionaries and enthusiasts, ready 
to sacrifice themselves for their several panaceas. 
Here are timid souls anxious to smooth the ele¬ 
ments by charity, and beseeching competitors to 
show brotherly kindness. Here are hard intellects, 
demanding the police. 

The situation cannot remain. It rests on a pro¬ 
found contradiction. On one side is a religion 
quoted and invoked at school, in the pulpit, by 
the press, by socialists, even by atheists, which ex¬ 
alts an ideal of human brotherhood and equality; 
on the other side, an industrial condition fast so¬ 
lidifying class distinctions, and a political philoso¬ 
phy teaching the infallibility of the majority. 

The conviction is growing that in some way the 
government, as city. State, or nation, is to have an 
important place in solving these contradictions. It 


228 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

is seen that the church has lost its hold — in the 
Middle Ages it might have sufficed. Education 
is not enough — it, with religion, intensifies the 
unrest. Public opinion grows and accomplishes 
much, but it is limited. Feelings of brotherhood 
and a spirit of concession soften antagonism in 
individual cases, but they are not comprehensive. 
The state alone includes all the other elements; 
it alone is coterminous with society. Without it 
education is not universal. Religion and brother¬ 
hood do not reach criminals, degenerates, nor 
tyrants, but the state lays its hand upon them. 
Society acts through the state — it is society’s 
organ. Public opinion, as modified by religion, 
education, and brotherhood, effects its main pur¬ 
poses through legislation. 

But the state is too much considered as merely 
coercive. It is primarily co-operative. Coercion 
is needed only for anti-social individuals and emer¬ 
gencies. The state seems to be coercive because it 
does not represent all the people; it is not yet a 
perfect organ for expressing their wishes. Many 
who are not truly anti-social are crushed by it. 
Were its laws and administration accurately just to 
all classes, and did it promote the general rather 
than influential private welfare, public opinion 
would exact such close obedience that coercion 
would almost disappear. 


SOCIAL BEFORM. 


229 


No social doctrine can long be held by a consid¬ 
erable body of people if it does not include a side 
of truth. It may not be intelligently held, nor be 
intelligible to others, and may be grounded mainly 
on feelings; but it is the expression of feelings 
which are themselves products of social conditions, 
and so has a place in social organization. Such 
are the profound conservative instincts which sus¬ 
tain private property, the family, political parties, 
and the state. Less so, and modified more or less 
by intelligence, are the instincts which demand 
change, such as abolition of slavery and the sa¬ 
loon, or which seek socialism, anarchism, single 
tax, co-operation, or other innovations. Out of 
the proper and just balancing of all these interests 
and doctrines, and their proportionate realization 
in social structure, proceeds that ‘‘ moving equilib¬ 
rium ” which is the life of society. 

It is the province of the science of sociology to 
discover what is this just balancing of social forces 
which will harmonize antagonisms and make for 
progress. Science should indicate those lines of 
development and social experiment which will 
economize the life of society, and secure the good 
of every individual. 

But science alone is inadequate. It is merely 
academic and preliminary. Its honor is that it 
leads to invention, and invention in society is 
legislation. Legislation, comprehending the en- 


230 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

tire range of human social existence, lays the 
foundation for individual development and pri¬ 
vate co-operation. Law-makers, then, are socio¬ 
logical inventors, and require the aid of sociology 
as electricians require the aid of physics.^ 

Social invention, however, differs from mechan¬ 
ical invention in one most important character. 
Society is not dead matter to be ruthlessly ad¬ 
justed. It is a vital, historical growth, composed 
of human lives, feelings, and interests. These 
interests must be consulted. Monarchy was abol¬ 
ished because royal inventors did not consult 
social classes. Likewise every system of govern¬ 
ment which is partial and unrepresentative will be 
left behind, whether it be conducted by aristoc¬ 
racy, plutocracy, or political machines. 

But if a system of government can be perfected 
where all classes and interests shall be represented 
by their leading spokesmen, social invention will 
proceed, not by the coercive arm of the state, but 
by mutual concession. Labor and capital to-day 
have no recognized common ground or meeting- 
place, neither in shop, factory, church, college, nor 
state. It is left for demagogues, the representa¬ 
tives of neither, to bring them together. But a 
city council, having the responsibility of the city 
in its hands, and containing in its membership the 
acknowledged leaders of capital and labor, would 

1 See Ward, “ Dynamic Sociology,” 2 vols. New York, 1886. 


SOCIAL BEFORM 


231 


be, within its jurisdiction, the most efficient in¬ 
strument yet discovered for harmonizing the two. 
It would be a perpetual board of arbitration, pos¬ 
sessing many powers of sovereignty, but not com¬ 
pelled to use them. Strikes and boycotts would 
be settled by mutual agreement between author¬ 
ized negotiators. And for the wider interests of 
States and nation the legislatures and Congress 
would fill the same office. 

Such a representative assembly would be com¬ 
posed of moderate, sensible, earnest men, because 
the people are moderate and earnest. There 
would be extremists and idealists, but their vis¬ 
ions would be controlled by hard contact with the 
practical difficulties of ideal legislation and with 
the overwhelming majority of moderates. And 
the latter, too, would be forced to s^e that ideal 
conditions must have consideration as well as the 
rude facts of the present. 

From such assemblies of leaders in all the cities 
and States and the Congress of the Union would 
proceed such well-considered, straightforward, and 
simple laws, without the coercion of partisan ma¬ 
jorities or the injustice of partial representation, 
that the people would learn to respect their gov¬ 
ernment, and to fall in line heartily with its laws 
and ordinances. Such assemblies, instead of shoot¬ 
ing back and forth between revolution and re¬ 
action, would march steadily forward in the line 


232 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

of social reform. They would call science and 
comparative legislation and history to their aid. 
They would establish by mutual concession the 
essential conditions for the brotherhood of capital 
and labor, and with these conditions would lay 
the foundations for the gradual solution of the 
main problems of social organization. And the 
state, instead of being a coercive policeman to 
force degenerates into line, would become the 
honored instrument of social co-operation. 

It might then be expected that the legislature 
would resume its rightful place as the sovereign 
branch of government. Unquestionably, its posi¬ 
tion is such that, no matter how degraded its 
character, unless restricted by the Constitution, it 
gradually absorbs supreme control of the other 
departments. It alone can grant and withhold 
financial support; and sooner or later this power 
subordinates the executive, the judicial, and the 
administrative branches. The national Congress, 
notwithstanding presidential vetoes and popular 
distrust, has drawn to itself the management of the 
details of administration. State legislatures and 
municipal councils would have done the same but 
for the increasing constitutional restrictions which 
have subordinated their financial powers to the 
judiciary and the executive. Could the Federal 
Constitution be readily amended, doubtless similar 
restrictions would be imposed upon Congress. 


SOXJIAL BEFORM. 


233 


If government is to be an agent for social re¬ 
form, it must have first the confidence of the peo¬ 
ple. This can come only as it commands the best 
ability of the community, and is representative 
in character. The executives and judges do not 
answer these requisites. They cannot represent 
all the people. They are single officers elected 
by a majority, or appointed by the agent of the 
majority, and they do not inspire universal confi¬ 
dence. Generally, indeed, they do not represent 
even a majority of the people, but only a plu¬ 
rality ; and even in that plurality a small faction 
of astute politicians and influential capitalists in¬ 
terested in legislation or contracts and franchises, 
has dictated the nominations and the appoinh- 
ments. It cannot be expected that the people, 
who are only awaiting a new election to bring in 
a new executive hostile to the incumbent one, 
will trust such a government with the delicate 
and portentous problems of social reform. In the 
legislature, however, elected upon the propor¬ 
tional basis, by the free choice of all classes of 
voters, and uncontrolled by a partisan majority, 
the people would find that ability, that extended 
experience, that representative character, and that 
continuous policy, which would command their 
confidence. 

With the confidence of the people assured, the 
legislature must become solely responsible for the 


234 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

policy and administration of government. It is 
becoming plain that, in times of urgency, the 
American idea of “ checks and balances ” is falla¬ 
cious. A government in which departments are 
pitted against each other cannot be consistent and 
harmonious, much less efficient. The idea is al¬ 
ready nearly abandoned in municipal government, 
where the mayor is made alone responsible for the 
administration. There must, indeed, be checks 
and balances in government, else one class will 
override the others. But these checks should not 
be founded upon the antagonism of independent 
departments; rather should they be provided for 
within a single sovereign department. By a pro¬ 
portional election of law-makers this is secured. 
Within the legislative body itself, controlling all 
other departments, would be found such a bal¬ 
ancing of interests and classes that, on the one 
hand, the despotism which our constitution-makers 
feared would be obviated, and, on the other, the 
indispensable harmony and unity of government 
would be guaranteed. 

The legislature could then safely be made the 
sovereign organ of the government and the promo¬ 
ter of social reform. The executive would sink to 
its true position, that of an agent for carrying out 
the policy of legislation; and the judiciary, instead 
of annulling the laws, would simply apply them to 
concrete cases. 


SOCIAL REFORM. 


235 


All this, of course, involves a change in the 
character of our representative assemblies difficult 
for the American citizen to comprehend. It im¬ 
plies not merely a constitutional supremacy of the 
law-making body over the other departments, hut 
primarily a popular supremacy in the hearts of the 
people. Proportional representation is not ad¬ 
vocated only to give the minority a hearing, but 
mainly to give all the people confidence in their 
rulers and in one another. And unless the rising 
demand for social reform now urging forward all 
classes can bring them all together into harmoni¬ 
ous, progressive, and just legal relations through 
the law-making agencies, the outlook for these 
movements is indeed ominous. 


236 PEOPORTIONAL EEPBESENTA TION. 


CHAPTER X. 

THE PROGRESS OP PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA¬ 
TION. 

In its English and colonial origins, representa¬ 
tive government was an almost unconscious 
growth. No’ philosophical dissertations preceded 
it. The masses of the people, with slavery and 
serfdom their lot, were ignorant and without voice 
in the government. Representation at that time 
was an instrument in the contest between mon¬ 
archy on the one hand, and aristocracy and wealth 
on the other. The first outcome was the success 
of representation and the limitation of monarchy. 
The problems of government which attracted at¬ 
tention down to the middle of the nineteenth cen¬ 
tury turned upon the relative weight of the 
monarchical as against the representative principle. 
Consequently, the philosophical works of the 
eighteenth century, and the written constitutions 
from 1787 to 1848, were concerned with the dis¬ 
tribution of powers, and the balancing of execu¬ 
tive, legislative, and judicial branches. In all of 
these discussions, the unpropertied classes had no 
immediate interest, and were not consulted. The 
final result of this constitution-making has been 
the destruction or the constitutional limitation of 


ITS PROGRESS. 


237 


monarchy and aristocracy based on birth, and the 
increased influence of plutocracy based upon prop¬ 
erty. 

In the third and fourth decades of the present 
century, a remarkable wave of democracy culmi¬ 
nated in our Western civilization. In the United 
States, property and educational qualifications 
were very generally removed from the suffrage. 
In France, and more especially in Switzerland, the 
franchise was made nearly universal. In England 
and Germany, while the suffrage was not extended 
to the wage-receiving classes, yet the spirit of 
the times liberalized the constitutions through the 
Reform Bills of 1832 and 1854 in England, and 
the representative parliaments of 1848 in Ger¬ 
many. 

The modern political parties date from those 
decades. Popular suffrage introduced a radical 
change in the nature of the representative system. 
Politicians began to bid for the labor vote. A 
few pioneering minds saw the inevitable outcome, 
and set about a philosophical study of the founda¬ 
tions of representation. It was not accidental 
that the years 1844 in America and 1846 in 
Switzerland mark the first attempts of individual 
minds to inquire into the true basis of representa¬ 
tion. Mr. Thomas Gilpin published at Philadel¬ 
phia, in the former year, his prophetic work, 
of which little notice was then taken, “On the 


238 PROPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

Representation of Minorities of Electors to act 
with the Majority in Elected Assemblies.” In 
1846 Victor Considerant, the distinguished leader 
of the socialist school of Fourier, addressed an 
open letter to the Grand Council of Geneva, en¬ 
titled, “ De la Sincerite du Gouvernement Re- 
presentatif, ou Exposition de I’Election Yeridique.” 
In this brochure M. Considerant proposed inde¬ 
pendently a plan of election almost identical with 
that of Thomas Gilpin. Each voter was to cast 
one vote for a party, and then to indicate the 
names of the candidates of his party whom he 
preferred. The proportion of representatives to 
which each party should be entitled was to be 
determined by the rule of three, and the success¬ 
ful candidates by the order of their preferences. 
Something akin to this plan had been suggested 
some twelve years before by Considerant’s master, 
Charles Fourier; and its publication in 1846 pre¬ 
ceded by one year the wide extension of the suf¬ 
frage in Geneva. There was as yet no feeling of 
serious need for it, and it therefore lay dormant 
for fifteen years. In 1861 it was revived by M. 
Antoin Morin in two pamphlets.^ 

In 1864, at the August election, the city of Gen¬ 
eva was the scene of violent outbreaks and blood¬ 
shed, resulting from the political strife of the 

1 Un Nouvean Systfeme ilSlectoral. Geneve, 1861. De la Repre¬ 
sentation des Minorites. Geneve, 1862. 


ITS PMOGRESS. 


239 


Conservative and Radical parties. The following 
September, Professor Ernest Naville published his 
first brochure 1 addressed to the federal council 
and the Swiss people, showing that the violence 
of the elections which threatened the stability of 
Swiss institutions, and inspired throughout Europe 
a dread of the new democracy of 1848, was but 
the natural outcome of the general ticket and ex¬ 
clusive majority rule. Professor Naville from that 
date has been the recognized leader of the re¬ 
form in Switzerland; and his numerous publica¬ 
tions, besides presenting cogent arguments, afford 
a complete history of proportional representation 
to the present time. 

In 1867 was formed 1’Association reformiste de 
Geneve, composed of Professor Naville and six 
associates. But the time was not yet ripe for a 
popular appreciation of the principles of propor¬ 
tional representation; nor, indeed, had a plan been 
perfected which would appeal to the public. The 
movement for the referendum and initiative as a 
decidedly practical and thorough-going deadlock 
upon their unrepresentative assemblies absorbed 
the thought of the people. Another twenty-five 
years passed without appreciable advance in popu¬ 
lar approval. A small group of students contin¬ 
ued at work improving the plan of reform which 

1 Les Elections de Geneve, Memoire presente au Conseil federal 
et au Peuple Suisse, par Ernest Naville; Lausanne et Geneve, 
1864, p. 59, 


240 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

they would present to the people. In the year 
1876 the national Association Suisse pour la Re¬ 
presentation Proportionelle was organized, with 
branches at Berne and Geneva. Hearings were 
obtained from time to time before legislative and 
constitutional assemblies. But it required a crisis 
to force public attention upon the reform. 

The crisis came in 1890 in the Italian canton of 
Ticino. The Conservative party in 1889, with 
12,653 votes, elected 77 of the 112 members of 
the Grand Cpuncil, while the Liberals, with 12,008 
(a handful less), elected only 35. Out of a total 
vote of 24,671, it was calculated that 9,157 were 
unrepresented.^ Finally, in 1890, an insurrec¬ 
tion broke out. The Liberals seized upon the arse¬ 
nal, and overthrew the Conservative government. 
Federal troops were despatched to put down the 
revolt. Then it was that the federal government 
recommended to the canton the adoption of pro¬ 
portional representation. The suggestion was 
acted upon, a commission was created, and in 1891 
the Free List was adopted in the form approved 
by the Swiss Association. Says Professor Louis 
Wuarin of the University of Geneva — 

“ Had not the system of proportional representation been 
carefully worked out by men who, believing in the correct- 

1 W. D. McCracken, Proportional Representation Review, 
September, 1893, p. 12. 

2 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, November, 1895. 


ITS PEOGBESS 


241 


ness of the principle, were desirous of changing the basis 
of the electoral law, the great achievement in the cause of 
justice and peace we now rejoice at, in Switzerland, would 
not have been effected. Is not this an eloquent encourage¬ 
ment to every man to look for the truth and prepare its 
advent, no matter if the feeling of the people should even 
be strongly adverse or sceptical at the beginning? The 
reformers, a small handful of workers, met with but little 
encouragement at first; they were opposed by almost aU 
the men playing some part in politics, and who enjoyed the 
reputation of being practical. But an hour came when 
the stone intended to be put at the corner of the edifice of 
democracy was found useful, and was used. In the organ¬ 
ization of free government, there is something which is 
left to the brain and the spirit of research. The power of 
thought is a living force, and no department of the world 
can prosper where it is stagnant.” 

From Ticino the reform has spread rapidly to 
other cantons. The initiative and referendum have 
helped it very much. The French Protestant can¬ 
ton Neuchatel adopted it in 1891; the large canton 
of Geneva in 1892; the Catholic Fribourg, for mu¬ 
nicipal elections, in 1894; the German Catholic Zug 
in 1894, which combined the “free ticket” with 
cumulative voting; finally the German Catholic 
Soluthurn in March, 1895, the first to introduce 
the Droop quota (the votes divided by the number 
of representatives increased hy one'). In a few 
cantons and cities the reform has been rejected by 
referendum. The city of Basle rejected it a few 
years ago, but the people are now demanding it 


242 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


anew by initiative. The German Catholic Lucerne 
and St. Gall rejected it, though large minorities 
were for it. It is expected that “ they will soon 
follow, and take it up like Basle; so that in less 
than ten years the whole of Switzerland will have 
proportional representation carried out without 
revolution and bloodshed.” ^ 

In a small decentralized country, like Switzer¬ 
land, a political reform is more readily accomplished 
than in a large one. England and America, how¬ 
ever, have actually preceded Switzerland by twenty 
to twenty-five years in the adoption of certain 
forms of minority representation. Doubtless the 
crudity and comparative failure of those primitive 
forms were important factors in blocking their pro¬ 
gress and prejudicing the public against mere doc¬ 
trinaire tinkering without a practicable basis. 
Similar conditions, however, and similar problems, 
suggest similar solutions. In 1854, in the discus¬ 
sion of the second Reform Bill, Lord John Russell 
moved in Parliament, on the suggestion of Profes¬ 
sor Fawcett, that, in the newly created electoral 
districts returning three members, no elector should 
vote for more than two candidates. He said : — 

“Now it appears to me that many advantages would 
attend the enabling the minority to have a part in these re¬ 
turns. In the first place, there is apt to be a feeling of sore- 

1 See article by Charles Burkli, “Free List vs. the Hare Sys¬ 
tem,” in Proportional Representation Review, September, 1895. 


JTS PROGBESS. 


243 


ness when a considerable number of electors, such as I have 
mentioned, are completely shut out from a share in the 
representation of one place. . . . But, in the next place, I 
think that the more you have your representation confined to 
large populations, the more ought you to take care that there 
should be some kind of balance, and that the large places 
sending members to this House should send those who rep¬ 
resent the community at large. But when there is a very 
large body excluded, it cannot be said that the conimunity 
is fairly represented.” ^ 

In 1854 Mr. James Garth Marshall published 
at London his “ Majorities and Minorities; Their 
Relative Rights,” wherein he proposed for the first 
time the cumulative vote which has been so popu¬ 
lar in English and American reforms. The limited 
vote of Lord Russell, however, did not find legis¬ 
lative enactment until twenty-three years after its 
first proposal; and the cumulative vote was first 
employed in 1870. Two events prepared the way 
for this adoption. The first was the discussion 
inaugurated by Mr. Thomas Hare in 1859, when 
he published his volume entitled “ The Election 
of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal,” 
which was followed in 1862 by John Stuart Mill’s 
profoundly philosophical “ Considerations on Rep¬ 
resentative Government.” Mr. Mill speaks of 
Thomas Hare as “ a man of great capacity, fitted 
alike for large general views and for the contri- 

1 Quoted by Salem Butcher, “ Minority or Proportional Rep¬ 
resentation,” New York, 1872, p. 38. 


244 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. 


vance of practical details; ” and of his plan as 
“ among the very greatest improvements yet made 
in the theory and practice of government.” ^ 

Certainly no discussions have equalled these 
treatises of Mill and Hare in placing before the 
thinking people of all countries the true nature of 
representation under universal suffrage and politi¬ 
cal parties. The very extreme to which Mr. Hare 
carried his plan, proposing as he did to abolish all 
districts, and to make one great constituency, en¬ 
abled him and Mr. Mill to develop fully the philo¬ 
sophical principles underlying personal rather than 
party or sectional representation. The unit of 
representation was to be determined by dividing 
the whole number of votes in the entire kingdom 
by the number of seats in the House. Every can¬ 
didate who obtained a quota would be returned, 
from however great a number of local constitu¬ 
encies his votes might be gathered. The elector 
would indicate his first and second choices, and so 
on; so that his single vote might be transferred 
from elected or defeated candidates to some one 
whom it might assist in electing.^ The mechanical 
details for counting, calculating the quota, and 

1 “Considerations on Representative Government," American 
edition, New York, 1875, pp. 153,156. 

2 The plan is substantially the same as that described on pp. 
100-105. It is approved by British, Canadian, and Australian 
advocates, but is not adapted to the American party system. 


ITS PBOGBESS. 


245 


transferring the votes, are given by Mr. Hare in 
great detail. So complicated did the plan appear 
when presented on a national scale, yet so power¬ 
ful were the considerations urged in favor of its 
underlying principle, that for ten years in England 
and America the simpler forms of the limited and 
the cumulative votes received earnest attention 
and occasional enactment into law. 

At the same time the suffrage was again being 
widely extended in both countries. In 1867, when 
the Reform Bill which granted the ballot to the 
artisans in towns was being adopted by Parliament, 
Mr. Mill, as member for Westminster, moved an 
amendment embodying the essential features of 
Mr. Hare’s scheme. The motion did not prevail; 
but at a later session the limited vote of Lord John 
Russell was adopted for all parliamentary constitu¬ 
encies returning three members, known as “ three- 
cornered constituencies.” It will not be surprising 
to the reader who has followed the description of 
the limited and cumulative votes in the foregoing 
pages to learn that it was the manipulation of this 
limited vote which first introduced into England 
the American political machine. Mr. Joseph 
Chamberlain and the Liberals of Birmingham pro¬ 
ceeded to organize thoroughly their following, in 
order to secure not merely two but the three can¬ 
didates of their constituency. 

In 1870, when the English government began 


246 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 

its wide extension of free schools, the cumulative 
vote was introduced in the election of the new 
local boards of education. This was by way of 
concession to the supporters of private and secta¬ 
rian schools, who wished to retain their hold in 
the distribution of public funds, and in the admin¬ 
istration of their schools. 

With this Act the progress of proportional 
representation in England ceased. When the 
suffrage was extended in 1884 to agricultural 
laborers, an attempt was again made to introduce 
the reform, but after considerable discussion the 
amendment was defeated. The next year was 
organized the English Proportional Representa¬ 
tion Society, of which Sir John Lubbock is presi¬ 
dent, and several of the members of Parliament 
are members. The society advocates the Hare 
system in constituencies electing five to fifteen 
representatives. 

In the United States, the work of Thomas Gil¬ 
pin followed close upon the Act of Congress of 
1842, which for the first time took the control 
of elections for congressmen from the several 
States, and provided, among other things, that 
the single-membered district should be universal. 
This was an attempt to give representation in 
Congress to the minority, who were practically dis¬ 
franchised by the laws of certain States wherein 
congressmen were elected on a general ticket. 


ITS PROGBESS. 


247 


Giipins essay grew out of the discussion upon 
this measure 

Not until the period following the Civil War 
was public opinion ready to discuss the principles 
of representation, nor, indeed, was there any press¬ 
ing occasion. The writings of Mr. Hare and 
Mr. Mill were widely read in the United States; 
and the pending reconstruction of the States lately 
in rebellion, and the agitation for the enfranchise¬ 
ment of the freedmen, brought the problems of rep¬ 
resentation suddenly to a focus. There were only 
two plans which reached practical adoption, the 
limited vote and the cumulative vote. The legis¬ 
lature of New York, in 1867, in providing for a 
constitutional convention, required that thirty-two 
of the delegates to be chosen should be from the 
State at large; no voter to vote for more than six¬ 
teen candidates. In this way, though the political 
bias of the delegates elected to the convention 
from single districts stood 81 Republicans to 47 
Democrats, the delegates from the State at large 
stood 16 to 16.2 

In the same year the Congress of the United 
States considered a supplementary reconstruction 
bill, to which Hon. C. R. Buckalew, the Democratic 
senator from Pennsylvania, offered an amendment 
providing for the cumulative vote. A sub-com¬ 
mittee, of which Senator Buckalew was chairman, 

1 Dutcher, p. 41. 2 jbid., p. 42. 


248 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


reported to the Senate in 1869 a bill providing 
for the cumulative vote. Senator Buckalew sup¬ 
ported his amendment with great ability. Two 
extended debates occurred in the House in 1870 
and 1871, on the motion of Mr. Marshall of Illi¬ 
nois to apply the cumulative vote to the new 
members of Congress, provided for in the new 
apportionment Act of those years. But both in 
the Senate and in the House the amendments 
were defeated. Congress was in no mood to grant 
this concession to the minority. 

The significance of proportional representation 
in the event of Negro enfranchisement, and the 
reasons why it did not at that time appeal to the 
party in control of Congress, are strikingly por¬ 
trayed by the proceedings of a convention of tax¬ 
payers of South Carolina, assembled at Columbia 
in May, 1871. The convention adopted the re¬ 
port of a committee favoring the cumulative vote 
for the State legislature. Among the speakers 
was Mr. D. H. Chamberlain, attorney-general of 
the State, who said : — 

“ In the first place, gentlemen, it is necessary to modify 
the absolute control which a mere numerical majority has 
obtained over the State, and to secure for intelligence and 
property a proper representation in the affairs of the gov¬ 
ernment. And looking about for some device which, with¬ 
out violence to the fundamental principle on which our 
government rests, will bring relief from the grievances 


ITS PBOGRESS. 


249 


which afflict our people, I have fixed upon this system of 
cumulative voting, because it is not only just in its theory, 
but it will prove itself right in its results. It takes noth¬ 
ing from the rights of the majority. It gives them a pre¬ 
dominating control, but not an absolute disposition of the 
entire fortunes of the State. Do you believe for a moment, 
then, when you put into an ignorant assembly, many of 
whom can neither read nor write, forty-seven gentlemen 
whom I might select in this body, that you would not shame 
them into decency, or frighten them from crime? Who 
does not know that the presence of one honest man puts to 
flight a band of robbers ? Now, according to this system, 
you deny nothing which belongs to the majority, but from 
the moment you place in the lower house forty-seven of 
your ablest citizens, bad legislation will cease, and good 
legislation will begin.” ^ 

Although rejected by Congress, the cumulative 
or limited vote was adopted, to a greater or less 
extent, in various States. The most important 
action was that taken by the constitutional con¬ 
vention of the State of Illinois, which met Decem¬ 
ber, 1869. The convention adopted the report 
of a committee of which Mr. James Medill was 
chairman, dividing the State into 51 senatorial 
districts, each electing a single senator, but creat- 
insr a lower house of 153 members, to be elected 
in the senatorial districts by threes by the cumu¬ 
lative vote. This section was voted upon sepa¬ 
rately by the people, July 2, 1870, and carried 
by a vote 99,022 in favor, and 70,080 against. 

1 Dutcher, p. 62. 


250 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


High expectations were entertained of the re¬ 
form. Mr. Medill in convention said: — 

“ Perhaps no proposition has come before this conven¬ 
tion that has more fully taken possession of my mind, be¬ 
cause I believe it is one of the greatest and most valuable 
improvements in a free government ever devised by the 
wisdom of man since representative government has been 
established. I believe it is only a question of time when 
the principle of minority representation will be applied to 
all legislative elections in Europe and America, from Par¬ 
liament or Congress down to village aldermen, and in all 
other cases when two or more officers are to be voted upon 
at the same time, for the same office. By this plan, and 
this only, can the democratic equality of the citizen be 
asserted, and carried into practice in public life. . . . The 
whole people, instead of a plurality or majority, will be 
represented by this plan; and it is as much superior to the 
old method of representation as the whole is greater than 
the half. It does not attempt to take away any of the 
rights of the majority. The majority, under this system, 
will still rule, having full and ample control, and still being 
responsible for the law's made. But this gives the dis¬ 
franchised minority, who may amount to almost one-half 
the community, some voice, some representation in govern¬ 
ment, some chance to be heard. It secures representation 
with taxation, which the existing one-sided system does 
not. It gives the minority some opportunity to present 
their views, and defend their principles and interests, in the 
halls of legislation. What can be more just than that, or 
more correct in principle ? ” ^ 

How these bright hopes have been disappointed 
is shown by the previous discussions of this book. 

1 Dutcher, p. 55. 


ITS PBOGBESS. 


251 


The action of the New York legislature and 
the veto by Governor Hoffman in April, 1872, 
of the bill providing for the cumulative vote in 
the election of aldermen in New York City, 
m^rk the highest point attained in America in 
the discussion of minority representation. The 
Personal Representation Society of New York 
had appeared before the constitutional conven¬ 
tion of 1867, to urge the adoption of the Hare 
plan. Mr. Horace Greeley, as a member of that 
convention, had moved an amendment requiring 
the cumulative vote in the election of senators 
and representatives. After considerable discussion 
it was defeated by a vote of 93 to 20. Later an 
amendment requiring minority representation in 
the election of directors of private corporations 
was defeated by 71 to 32. It remained for a 
Republican legislature, desirous of breaking the 
hitherto impregnable Tammany majority in New 
York City, in 1872 to provide, in an Act creating 
a new charter for that city, that the board of al¬ 
dermen should be elected by the cumulative vote 
in five districts of nine aldermen each. The dis¬ 
cussion in the legislature and in the press attracted 
national attention. Without previous experience, 
it was impossible to foresee all its consequences. 
Yet with districts as large as the bill provided for, 
there would have been opportunity for the rep¬ 
resentation of minor parties, though the waste of 


252 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


votes would have prevented their greatest influ¬ 
ence. The arguments of Governor Hoffman in 
his veto message present such a mixture of spe¬ 
cious falsity and shrewd knowledge of the situa¬ 
tion, and the document is of so great historic 
importance in the movement for true representa¬ 
tion, that it is here given in full: ^ — 

“ Executive Chamber, Albany, 30, 1872. 

“ To the Assembly, — I return, without approval. Assembly 
Bill No. 118, entitled, <An Act to reorganize the Local 
Government of the City of New York.’ 

The bill provides a new charter for the City of New 
York, the main features of which are these : One board of 
forty-five aldermen, elected nine in each senate district, 
by a novel method called the cumulative vote, under which 
one man may vote nine times for one candidate, and 
whereby a minority can elect its candidate or candidates, 
against the will of the majority in the district; this board 
of aldermen to appoint (by the same vote) four out of the 
five heads which are given to each of the administrative 
departments. . . . 

The remedy which is relied on against the evils of mis- 
government under this charter is the cumulative system of 
voting, which it introduces in order to secure fuller repre¬ 
sentation of the minority. It is claimed that this will re¬ 
sult, not only in a better class of representatives, but in 
greater power on the part of the minority to restrain the 
majority. Nine aldermen are to be elected in each district; 
and every elector is authorized, instead of voting once for 
each of nine candidates, to cast, if he chooses so to do, nine 
votes for any one candidate, or to cast three votes each for 

1 Quoted by Dutcher, pp. 168-161. 


ITS PROGBESS. 


253 


any three candidates, and so on. This plan seeks to let the 
party which is in a minority in any political subdivision 
put into office its candidate, in spite of the opposition of 
the political majority. Experiments are now being tried in 
one or two of the other States, of this cumulative method 
of voting as to some of their local elections; but these have 
been inaugurated so recently that they afford us no guide 
to sound judgment derived from actual practice and expe¬ 
rience. It is proposed by this bill that we shall try the ex¬ 
periment in the chief city of the continent, with its vast 
and complicated interests exposed to great injury if this 
new theory prove to be a failure. A city of a million in¬ 
habitants is not the place for trying experiments in govern¬ 
ment, especially an experiment which many of the most 
thoughtful of our people believe to be visionary, impracti¬ 
cable, and unconstitutional. It would be much wiser for 
us to await the result of the trials now going on elsewhere. 
This would not be the first time that a scheme to allow the 
minority to put men into office, in spite of the opposition 
of the majority, has been tried in this State. For many 
years the Board of Supervisors in ISTew York was elected 
upon this principle. In that instance the minority were 
allowed, practically, to choose just half the Board. This 
experiment, warmly and earnestly advocated at its intro¬ 
duction as a valuable improvement, resulted, as all admit 
now, in a disastrous failure, and was abandoned with gen¬ 
eral consent. There is this difference between that instance 
and the method now proposed — that there the minority 
were secured an equal share of power, while here it is ex¬ 
pected that they will obtain only a share proportioned to 
their actual numbers. 

A very serious question arises whether this method of 
voting is in conformity with the provisions of the Con¬ 
stitution. Many of the ablest lawyers of the State have 


254 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


not hesitated to express their convictions that it must be 
held to be unconstitutional. It is said, and with great 
force, that the election, as regulated by this charter, is not 
an election in the sense in which that word was understood 
at the time the Constitution was made, and in the sense in 
which it has always been understood among us. An elec¬ 
tion is the choice of a public officer by his receiving a 
larger number of votes than any other candidate in the 
district entitled to fill the office, all the electors being en¬ 
titled to vote once at such election for a candidate for 
the place to be filled. It is suggested also that the Con¬ 
stitution guarantees that all electors shall be entitled to 
vote for all officers who are to be elected by the people, 
and that if any elector exercises his right to vote once 
for each of the nine aldermen to be chosen for his dis¬ 
trict, his single vote as to any one of the candidates can¬ 
not be overridden by one of his neighbors voting nine 
times for some one man for the same place without an in¬ 
fraction of his equal right of suffrage as an elector under 
the Constitution. . . . 

The fundamental principle of our government, familiar 
to the people, is that elective officers shall be chosen by a 
majority of the votes of the people entitled to take part in 
the choice. In all cases submitted to the people, the major¬ 
ity decides. When any other principle is sought to be in¬ 
troduced, a revolutionary change of great magnitude is 
proposed, which ought not to be tried under the sanction 
of an Act of the legislature only; if so great a change is to 
be made at all, it should be done only wdth the careful de¬ 
liberation which pertains to revisions of the Constitution. 
Independent of the constitutional question is that of the 
expediency of this change in the method of choosing repre¬ 
sentatives. I am not disposed to take the ground that 
some form of minority representation may not prove to be 


ITS PROGBESS. 


255 


an improvement. This has nowhere been tried long enough 
to prove anything. 

In aU free government the people divide themselves into 
two great parties. This tendency is so universal that it is 
not statesmanship to ignore it. Enactments will not over¬ 
come it. It is a natural, useful, and wholesome division ; 
it insures a large body of men among the people interested 
in and intent upon fault finding with the party in power, 
and struggling by means of exposure of their errors to 
bring over to the side of the minority enough of the elec¬ 
tors to convert it into a majority, and so to take over the 
government. In politics, as in other things, it is agitation 
which purifies. Under this proposed new system of voting, 
the minority carry in their candidates without effort. The 
majority do the same. In a district where it is known that 
the political majority usually casts about two-thirds of the 
whole vote, there being nine aldermen to be elected, the 
caucus or nominating convention of the political majority 
will naturally concentrate all their votes upon six can¬ 
didates ; the caucus of the minority will concentrate on 
three. There will be no actual contest before the people. 
The decrees of the party caucus will be absolute. IN’either 
side will be in fear, lest, by putting forward unfit candi¬ 
dates, it may lose the election. For the two parties will be 
acting at the polls, not against each other, but independent 
each of the other. This condition of things, where the de¬ 
crees of the party caucuses on both sides are final, naturally 
gives rise to secret combinations between the leaders on 
both sides for an agreed-upon division of power, against 
which combinations the mass of the voters might, under 
this system, struggle in vain. It is true that there is an 
opportunity for a combination in favor of one or two candi¬ 
dates of independent voters, who may be regardless of party 
associations. But when the power of the regular party or- 


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258 PBOPOBTIOXAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N. 


is it weakened for the performance of its proper duty, — 
that of vigilance over those in authority, — just so far is its 
inclination to be vigilant lessened. It is only a minority 
out of power that will be faithful to the duties of a minor¬ 
ity. Every member of the minority who is admitted to 
take part in the actual administration of public affairs, and 
aU. of his party whom he can influence, naturally acquire a 
tendency to defend the administration of which he forms 
a part; and where they ought to be exercising a restrain¬ 
ing power by their vigilance, they are often found helping 
to cover up things that need exposure. An administration 
that has its corps of defenders in both political parties will 
be much more likely to continue improper practices than 
if it relies for its defence only on its own party friends, 
and feels that the opposite party is ready, in solid ranks, 
promptly to assail it if guilty of wrong-doing. I believe 
the clear, complete, and undivided responsibility of one ot 
other of the political parties into which people in all free 
communities divide themselves, is essential to good govern 
ment. For vigilance on the part of the people themselves, 
this bill proposes to substitute the services of a few indi¬ 
viduals put into partial power by the minority as watchers, 
w'hich will tend to make the people rely on these few, and 
indifferent to their own duty of vigilance in their own 
affairs. These few hired watchers may become screens for 
errors and neglect of duty on the part of their associates 
and themselves. 

The government of the majority is the only govern¬ 
ment recognized by the Constitution of the United States 
and of the State. The majority controls, and must con¬ 
trol, in legislation, and ought to be solely responsible for 
administration. When its representatives prove recreant 
to the trusts committed to them, a vigilant minority is 
quick to take advantage of the fact, and in turn it becomes 


ITS PB0QBES8. 


259 


the majority. The existence of a strong, vigilant minor¬ 
ity, which, not being a sharer of power, has no motive to 
defend those in power, but every motive to expose them 
when doing wrong, is quite as essential to honest and faith¬ 
ful administration of the affairs of the republic, as is the 
existence of the majority in whose hands the actual manage¬ 
ment of public affairs is placed. This cumulative method 
for appointing heads of departments may have the effect 
of fatally lessening at once the sense of responsibility on 
the part of the majority and the vigilance of the minority.” 

There are three features of the foregoing mes¬ 
sage which will be noticed here, the others having 
been mainly anticipated in the preceding chapters. 
It is a patent fallacy to assert that, by giving to 
every voter nine votes instead of one, thereby the 
influence of venal voters and bad politicians with 
a personal following is increased ninefold. If the 
votes of the corrupt are multiplied by nine, so also 
are the votes of the good, and relatively they all 
retain the same influence. 

Again, the provision for constituencies electing 
nine aldermen makes possible the representation 
of third and fourth parties of independents and 
good citizens, though with a great waste of their 
votes. They could not be entirely excluded as in 
the Illinois “ three-cornered ” constituencies. 

The arguments of Governor Hoffman against 
minority representation in the board of aldermen 
are not altogether invalid, and his objections to 
a similar representation in the administrative 


260 PBOFOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N. 


departments are well considered. Later experi¬ 
ence has shown that administrative boards are 
incompetent as compared with single heads of de¬ 
partments, and that bi-partisan boards are not 
superior to those composed of members of a single 
party. Minority representation in an executive 
department dissipates the energy and responsibil¬ 
ity of administration; but minority representation 
in the legislative branch is necessary to enable the 
minority “ to watch the governing body, to expose 
its wrong-doing, if any, to restrain it by this vigi¬ 
lance and exposure.” 

The crude cumulation in constituencies elect¬ 
ing as many as nine members might possibly have 
been of some advantage to good government in 
New York City; but the limited vote, which was 
successfully adopted a year later, was no better 
than the single district. This law, enacted in 
1873, provided for the election of aldermen in 
nine districts of three members each, no voter 
to cast more than two votes. The limited vote 
is apparently in contradiction to the State Consti¬ 
tution, by which every elector is entitled to vote 
“ for all officers that now are or hereafter may be 
elective by the people.” At any rate, it of course 
proved unsatisfactory, and was repealed in 1882. 

The State of Pennsylvania has experimented 
with the cumulative and limited votes in various 
directions. 


ITS PBOGBJESS. 


261 


On March 4, 1870, the legislature provided by 
special act for the cumulative vote in the town of 
Bloomsburg, the home of Senator Buckalew, for 
all offices of two or more incumbents. In June, 
1871, the act was extended to all elections of 
members of town councils throughout the State. 
This was repealed in 1873. 

By a provision of the Constitution of 1874, the 
limited vote is applied in the city of Philadelphia 
to the election of police magistrates. The legis¬ 
lature in 1875 created twenty-four courts with the 
same number of magistrates, who are elected on a 
general ticket; but no voter can vote for more 
than two-thirds of the number to be chosen at a 
single election. The same Constitution requires 
the limited vote in the election of judges of the 
supreme court of the State. There are seven 
judges elected, and the elector votes for six. 

These various experiments with crude forms of 
minority representation furnish in part an expla¬ 
nation of the entire subsidence of the movement 
since 1874. To have extended the cumulative or 
limited vote after the exhibitions of their short¬ 
comings in three States was not to he expected. 
Indeed, the only places where minority representa¬ 
tion now remains are in the States of Illinois and 
Pennsylvania, where it is incorporated in the Con¬ 
stitutions. Doubtless at the first general revision 
of these Constitutions it will he dropped. 


262 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


There are also other reasons why the speculative 
political thought of the country has not turned 
to the problems of representation. Other pressing 
subjects, growing out of the war, such as the tariff, 
the greenback, specie payments, have engrossed the 
public mind. The attention of speculative reform¬ 
ers has been occupied with the civil service, and 
the protection of those subordinate offices which 
are the spoils of party victory and the demoraliza¬ 
tion of the people. It is probable, indeed, that, 
in the practical sequence, civil service reform was 
necessary to prepare the way for proportional rep¬ 
resentation. The American people needed educa¬ 
tion upon the matter of rotation in office, and, 
indeed, upon the very nature of government. 
They did not want a system of bureaucracy, with 
officials holding for life. They felt that public 
offices were “ common property; that the right to 
hold them, like the right to pre-empt government 
land, is a natural incident of citizenship,” and that 
government service is an asylum for the unfortu¬ 
nate. They lacked “ confidence in expert knowl¬ 
edge of every kind.” ^ 

Correct views on these points could practically 
be first impressed upon the public only in con¬ 
nection with those minor civil service offices of 
a routine character which do not carry political 

1 A. B. Hart, “Practical Essays on American Government," 
p. 91. 


ITS PROQBESS. 


263 


responsibility. With the ground cleared in this 
way, the nature of other higher offices can more 
plainly come to view, and thus the way be pre¬ 
pared for substituting appointive heads of depart¬ 
ments for elective heads. Finally, with the 
administrative branches of government accurately 
comprehended, the people are beginning to concen¬ 
trate thought upon the legislative branch, to in¬ 
quire into the principles of representation, and to 
perceive the need of abler and more experienced 
men with life-long service in legislative halls. 
Even now the weightiest popular objection to pro¬ 
portional representation springs from that partisan 
sympathy with the spoils system which denies the 
right of representation to minor groups of voters 
not included in the two dominant parties. 

Another political reform which has cleared the 
way for proportional representation is the secret 
ballot, with all the party tickets printed on a 
single large sheet. This encourages independence, 
and facilitates that choice of individual candidates 
on various tickets which is an important feature of 
the bill recommended by the American committee. 

After these important preliminary reforms are 
accomplished, it can be more clearly seen that the 
very citadel of political power, the legislative as¬ 
sembly, is the source of the degradation of Ameri¬ 
can politics, and that with a reformed legislature 
all other reforms can be perfected. A revival of 


264 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N, 


interest in proportional representation lias begun 
within the past five years. The civil service 
reformers of the country with unanimity have 
espoused it. This interest took definite shape in 
1893, through the organization at Chicago of the 
American Proportional Representation League, and 
the launching of the Proportional Representation 
Review. Magazine articles have appeared, two or 
three books have been published, bills have been 
introduced into legislatures and Congress, and an 
enthusiastic and capable agitation has been inaug¬ 
urated. 

In 1891 the people of South Dakota voted upon 
a minority representation clause to their Constitu¬ 
tion, copied after the Illinois system, which they 
rejected by a vote of 46,200 against 24,161. 

The cumulative vote has been applied by the 
Constitutions of the eleven States of Illinois, Ne¬ 
braska, California, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, 
Missouri, Mississippi, Idaho, Kentucky, North Da¬ 
kota, and Montana, to the election of directors of 
private corporations. I shall not enter at length 
into this and other minor phases of its application, 
but shall only observe that, among the evils at¬ 
tending the rise of corporations in the United 
States, has been prominent the practice known as 
“freezing out” the minority stockholders. Says 
a well-informed writer:^ — 

1 Isaac F. Rice, Forum, vol. xiv., p. 206. 


ITS PR OGEESS. 


265 


“ All our public affairs having become permeated "with 
the poison of dishonesty, it necessarily has affected our 
quasi-public relations as well. Indeed, our great public cor¬ 
porations, such as railroads, are in themselves species of 
communities, of which the security holders are the citizens, 
and in these communities the right to steal under certain 
legal forms and sanctions has in certain directions become 
fully recognized. 

Whatever frauds are perpetrated under advice of counsel, 
or by resolutions duly passed by a majority vote, at a regu¬ 
larly constituted meeting, security holders have long since 
come to regard as unobjectionable, or at least beyond the 
reach of successful attack. . . . Indeed, quite frequently, as 
soon as a board of directors is elected, it considers itself the 
absolute owners of the property, to manage or mismanage, 
as its private interests may dictate. These private interests 
are sometimes in such direct conflict with the interests of 
the corporation as to involve it in bankruptcy.” 

Proportional representation in private corpora¬ 
tions would partially meet the evils above described, 
though of course many other factors are involved 
in the problem. 

There remains to be noticed the constitutional 
aspects of proportional representation. Of course, 
just as in Switzerland, the American people can 
adopt the reform by a referendum vote, by way of 
amendment to their Constitutions; and possibly in 
many States a constitutional amendment would 
be required; but the machinery of amendment 
is so very cumbersome and dilatory that direct 


266 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 

action of the legislature is preferable whenever 
legal. Congress unquestionably has power, with¬ 
out constitutional amendment, to adopt the system 
for congressional elections. Indeed, it is only the 
Act of Congress of 1842, prescribing the present 
district system, which legally prevents individual 
States from adopting it. 

In the election of State legislatures, there are 
serious difficulties in the interpretation of Con¬ 
stitutions. So strict are the courts in holding 
legislatures to the terms of the Constitution, that 
amendments would be required, probably, in nearly 
every State. Yet the following considerations are 
offered. 

The first condition for proportional representa¬ 
tion is a consolidation of the present single- 
membered districts into a smaller number, each 
electing several members. The Constitutions of 
all the States require that State senators shall be 
elected by districts. In only nineteen States,^ 
however, is it specifically asserted in one way or 
another, that but one senator shall be elected in 
each district. In each of these States a Consti¬ 
tutional Amendment would be required for the 
Senate. In the other twenty-five States, so far 
as a fair interpretation is concerned, counties can 

1 Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro¬ 
lina, South Dakota, Vermont, Texas, Wisconsin. 


IT8 PB0GBES8. 


267 


be grouped together, and two or more senators 
elected from each district. Furthermore, there 
would seem to be no constitutional inhibition 
against enlarging these groupings, even to the 
extent of dividing the State into only two districts. 
These could then either elect their senators at the 
same election or in alternate elections, as the larger 
number of Constitutions require. 

As regards the lower house, seven State Consti¬ 
tutions ^ require that members shall be elected by 
single districts. Counties which are entitled to 
more than one representative are to be divided 
into districts by either the legislature or the county 
supervisors.2 Thirty Constitutions guarantee at 
least one representative to each county or town, but 
permit counties entitled to more than one to elect 
them on a general ticket. In these States, the 
proportional plan could be adopted without consti¬ 
tutional amendment only in the counties electing 
more than one member. 

There remain six States, not counting Illinois, 
in which the system could probably be adopted 
over the entire State without amendment. Dela¬ 
ware allots seven representatives to each county, 
and the legislature is free to prescribe either the 
general ticket or the single district. Indiana, 

1 California, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New 
Vork, Wisconsin. 

2 New York and Michigan. 


268 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


Minnesota, Nevada, and Washington permit their 
legislatures to create districts as they may see fit, 
only requiring that representatives shall be pro¬ 
portional to the population^ Iowa permits four 
counties to he combined into a single district. 

Whenever, as in the above cases, a general 
ticket is permitted, proportional representation 
may be adopted by the legislature. There is a 
second condition, namely, that each voter may be 
permitted to cast as many votes as there are candi¬ 
dates to be elected, which he may also distribute 
as he pleases. Five Constitutions actually require 
this condition in the provision that every elector 
shall be entitled to vote “ for all the officers that 
are now or hereafter may be elective by the 
people.” 2 It would seem that this provision ex¬ 
cludes the Hare system and the limited vote, but 
does not stand in the way of the Swiss ‘‘free list ” 
or the cumulative vote. Other Constitutions 
merely provide that persons of the proper age, 
etc., shall be “entitled to vote at all elections.” 

The third condition is that the legislature must 
be free to provide rules for the canvass of the 
votes and the apportionment between political 
parties. Nearly all the States have adopted in 
their Constitutions the plurality rule, by which 

1 In the apportionment Act of 1895, Indiana has actually com¬ 
bined various counties into districts electing two representatives 
on a general ticket. 

2 New York, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey. 


ITS PBOGBESS. 


269 


candidates having the highest number of votes 
are declared elected. Applied to a general ticket, 
this rule would exclude minority representation, 
except in the case of the simple cumulative vote. 
In twenty-seven States, however, the Constitutions 
do not apply this rule to the election of members 
of the legislature.^ The legislatures of these 
States are, therefore, free to change their plurality 
rule, and to adopt the proportional plan of the 
addition and transference of votes within party 
lines, and the selection of candidates according to 
their standing on their respective party tickets. 

In the matter of local government, all of the 
Constitutions give the legislature almost complete 
power to provide for the organization of counties, 
cities, incorporated villages. The only restrictions 
are of a general nature, imposed either by the 
prohibition of special legislation, or by the collat¬ 
eral articles of the Constitution. This sovereign 
power of the legislature carries the right to create, 
define, and abolish offices, and to determine the 
method of selection, either by appointment or elec¬ 
tion, at large or by wards. Where election is 
determined upon, the collateral provisions of the 

1 New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illi¬ 
nois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Maryland, 
Delaware, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, California, Nevada, Colo¬ 
rado, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia. See Stimson, American 
“ Statue Daw,” vol. i., p. 56. 



270 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

Constitution hold, which set forth the qualifica¬ 
tions and rights of voters, and the manner of 
conducting elections and canvassing the returns. 
These provisions have just been referred to. As 
they apply in the same manner to city and county 
as to legislative elections, they leave all the legis¬ 
latures free to apply the Swiss system or the cumu¬ 
lative vote to the municipal council. 


APPENDIX 1. 


271 


APPENDIX I. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS. 

The significance of proportional representation in 
the United States consists not so mucli in a mathe¬ 
matically accurate assignment of representatives to 
the several parties, as in the freedom of the voter 
from machine rule, and the introduction of leader¬ 
ship into legislative assemblies. Yet the mathe¬ 
matical calculations are important. Several plans 
have been suggested for a just distribution of seats, 
but fault can be found in every one. 

The difficulty of the problem lies in the fact that, 
when the several party votes are divided by the 
unit of representation, the sum of the quotients 
does not equal the number of representatives to be 
elected, and consequently the remaining representa¬ 
tives must be assigned to parties on the basis of 
remainders. Now, these remainders may be scat¬ 
tered about in such a way as to destroy the sym¬ 
metry of the result, especially where they fall to 
minor parties. For example, in the Belgian election, 
described on page 127, the unit of representation, 
found by dividing the number of votes by the num¬ 
ber of representatives, is 11,523. This unit pro¬ 
vides for but fifteen seats, and the other three are 
assigned to the Flemish Democrats, the Indepen- 



272 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 

dents, and the Catholics, on remainders. The result 
is an advantage to the smaller parties, and a disad¬ 
vantage to the larger. The Independents, for ex¬ 
ample, who did not have even a single unit, secured 
their only seat on a remainder, giving one represen¬ 
tative for 8,425 votes, whereas the Socialists, who 
receive no seat on a remainder, have but one repre¬ 
sentative for 13,170 votes.^ 

It will be seen that, the smaller the unit of repre¬ 
sentation, the less probability will there be of re¬ 
mainders. If, instead of dividing the total vote by 
the exact number of representatives to be elected, 
we divide by that number plus one, our proceeding 
would be more accurately mathematical, and would 
produce a smaller unit. In the Belgian election, 
instead of 11,523, it would be 10,917. The princi¬ 
ple here involved is the evident one that, if one can¬ 
didate is to be elected, he will require only one-half 
the votes plus one; if two are to be elected, each 
one will require but one-third plus one, and so on. 
That is to say, the denominator of the fraction 
which elects is a unit larger than the number to be 
elected. 

This was the rule adopted by the Swiss canton of 
Solothurn in 1895, and is known as the Droop 


1 Socialists. 106,687 

Progressists.39,512 

Flemish Democrats.21,713 

Catholics.19,405 

Moderates.11,693 

Independents. 8,425 


207,429 -M8 = 11,523 








APPENDIX L 


273 


quota, having been proposed by Mr. H. K. Droop of 
London, in 1869.^ In the Belgian election it happens 
that the result would be the same as in the division 
by the exact number of representatives, although but 
two candidates are assigned on remainders instead 
of three. The chances, however, would be in favor 
of a fairer representation for the larger parties. 

Still another plan of distribution, which finds a unit 
of representation so small that it does away with 
remainders entirely, is that of Professor Y. D’Hondt 
of Brussels. This is the plan actually employed in 
the Belgian election, and is explained by the Commis¬ 
sion as follows : — 

“We write, in the order of their importance from left to 
right, the electoral vote of the six tickets. Socialists, Progress¬ 
ists, Flemish Democrats, Catholics, Moderates, and Indepen¬ 
dents, and then proceed to reduce the unit of representation by 
successive divisions, until a unit is found small enough to be 
contained eighteen times into the party votes. 



SOCIAL¬ 

PRO¬ 

FLEMISH 

CATHO¬ 

MODER- INDE- 


IST. 

GRESSIST. 

DEM. 

LIC. 

ATE. PENDENT. 

1. 

106,681 

39,512 

21,713 

19,405 

11,693 8,425 

2. 

53,000 

19,000 

10,000 

9,700 

5,000 

3. 

35,000 

13,000 

7,000 



4. 

26,000 

9,878 




5. 

21,000 





6. 

17,000 





7. 

15,000 





8. 

13,000 





9. 

11,000 





10. 

10,000 





11. 

9,600 






1 “ On the Political and Social Effects of Different Methods 
of Electing Representatives,” London, 1869. 


274 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


We then reason as follows: If there had been only one seat 
to fill, it would have fallen to the largest party, the Socialists; 
we therefore write down the figure 106,681, which assigns the 
first seat. For the second we find what would be the number 
of votes required of the Socialists if the two seats were distrib¬ 
uted equally. This would require 53,000 votes for each seat, 
more than that obtained by any other party. We write down 
the 53,000, which assigns the second seat. Next, 106,681 
divided by three gives only 35,000, a figure less than that of 
the Progressists, 39,512, and the latter figure is therefore en¬ 
titled to the third seat. We write down this figure, and then 
determine that if the Progressists had a second seat they would 
have had only 19,000 votes to each seat. The fourth and 
fifth, therefore, go to the Socialists, who have 26,000 votes for 
each of four candidates elected. The sixth and seventh seats 
go to the Flemish Democrats and Socialists, the unit of rep¬ 
resentation now descending to 21,000 votes for each seat. The 
eighth and ninth go to the Progressists and Catholics, who 
would still have 19,000 votes for each candidate to be elected. 
The tenth and eleventh go to the Socialists; the twelfth 
and thirteenth to the Socialists and Progressists (13,000 
votes to the seat) ; the fourteenth and fifteenth to the 
Moderate Liberals and Socialists (11,000 votes per seat); 
the sixteenth and seventeenth to the Flemish Democrats 
and Socialists (10,000 votes per seat); and, lastly, the eigh¬ 
teenth to the Progressists, who thereby secure one seat for 
9,878 votes. 

The Socialists have now obtained ten representatives, the 
Progressists four, Flemish Democrats two. Catholics one, and 
Moderate Liberals one, total eighteen; and 9,878 is the unit of 
representation, which obviates the assignment of representa¬ 
tives to any party on the basis of a remainder. This number 
is contained ten times in the vote of the Socialists, four times 
in that of the Progressists, two times in that of the Flemish 
Democrats, and one time in that of the Catholics and Moderate 
Liberals, ^and it is not contained in the vote of the Indepen¬ 
dents.” 


APPENDIX I 


2T5 


The main difficulty in the distribution of seats, it 
will be noticed, springs from the fact that a small 
party, whose vote is not equal to a single unit of repre¬ 
sentation, may, nevertheless, secure a representative 
on the score of having a remainder larger than the re¬ 
mainders in other parties. To meet this difficulty, I 
proposed, in the Proportional Representation Review^ 
March, 1894, that every party whose total vote is less 
than, say, 85 per cent of the unit of representation, be 
excluded altogether from the apportionment, and that 
a new unit be found on the basis of the remaining 
votes. In the Belgian election the Independent vote 
is only 73 per cent of the unit 11,523; and if it be 
excluded, the total number of votes of other parties 
would be 199,004 (207,429 minus 8,425). Dividing 
this by eighteen, we have a second, or effective unit of 
representation, 11,055, which provides for sixteen 
full quotients, and gives the Catholics and Flemish 
Democrats each one additional on remainders. 

The same result could be reached in a simpler way. 
The legislature could fix specifically the fraction or 
percentum of the aggregate vote, falling below which, 
no party should be granted a representative. For ex¬ 
ample, in the above election, one-eighteenth would be 
5.55 per cent of the aggregate vote. Let all parties 
be excluded (where eighteen are to be elected) whose 
total vote is less than one-twentieth, 5 per cent, of the 
aggregate vote (in this case 10,371). If ten are to 
be elected, the parties to be excluded would be those 
casting less than 9 per cent of the aggregate vote. 
And, supposing ten to be elected. Sec. VI. of the law. 


276 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION 


as given on p. 121, could be amended so as to read: 
“ Sec. VI. In determining the results of the election, 1. 
From the aggregate number of valid votes cast for all 
tickets, shall be deducted the votes of all parties 
whose total vote is less than 9 per cent of the aggre¬ 
gate, such parties to be excluded altogether from 
representation. The remainder shall be divided by 
the number of candidates to be elected; the quotient, 
ignoring fractions, to be known as the unit of repre 
sentation,’’ etc. 

If fifteen representatives are to be elected, the 
parties excluded would be those receiving less than, 
say, 6 per cent of the aggregate vote. With such 
a distribution the election returns given on page 107, 
where fifteen presidential electors are chosen,^ would 
have excluded the People’s party, whose total vote, 
328,392, was less than 494,406 (6 per cent of the aggre¬ 
gate, 8,240,106), and the result would have been eight 
Democrats and seven Kepublicans, instead of seven 
Democrats, seven Republicans, and one Populist. 

Returning to the application of these four plans to 
the Belgian election, we should have the following 
units of representation in the order of size: — 

UNITS OF EEPRESENTATION. 

1. Dividing by number of candidates . . . 11,523 

2. Droop (number of candidates plus one) . . 10,917 

3. Excluding parties less than 5 per cent . . 11,055 

4. D’Hondt.9,878 

1 Republican . . 3,910,390 People’s.... 328,392 

Democrat . . 3,808,791 Prohibition . . 192,533 

8,240,106 

Simple unit = 549,340. Effective unit = 514,612. 




APPENDIX L 


277 


The comparative distribution among the several 
parties would be as follows : — 





EXCLUDING PARTIES 


SIMPLE 



LESS THAN 5 


DIVISION. 

DROOP. 

D’HONDT. 

PER CENT. 

Moderates 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Progressists 

3 

3 

4 

3 

Socialists 

9 

9 

10 

10 

Flemish Democrats 2 

2 

2 

2 

Independents 

1 

1 

0 

0 

Catholics 

2 

2 

1 

2 


As exhibiting the difficulty in securing accurate 
proportional representation, the following table shows 
the number of votes in each party required to secure 
one representative, under the various plans : — 



SIMPLE DIVISION 

AND DROOP. 

D’HONDT. 

EXCLUDING 

PARTIES 

LESS THAN 

5 PER CENT. 

Moderates . . 

1 seat for 11,693 votes 

1 for 11,693 

1 for 11,693 

Progressists 

1 

“ “ 13,170 “ 

1 

“ 9,878 

1 “ 13,170 

Socialist . . . 

1 

“ “ 11,853 “ 

1 

“ 10,668 

1 “ 10,668 

Flemish Dem., 

1 

“ “ 10,856 “ 

1 

“ 10,856 

1 “ 10,856 

Indejiendent . 

1 

“ “ 8,425 “ 

0 

“ 8,425 

0 “ 8,425 

Catholics . . 

1 

“ “ 9,702 “ 

1 

“ 19,405 

1 “ 9,702 


It will be seen that, in this particular election, 
M. D’Hondt’s highly complicated plan, though dis¬ 
pensing with remainders, is yet the most unequal of 
all, seeing that the Progressists get one representa¬ 
tive for 9,878 votes, while the Catholics get only one 
for nearly twice as many (19,405). 

Considering the complexity of all plans except the 
simple division, and the practical objections against 
overloading the reform with too many explanations. 








278 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBE8ENTATI0N. 


besides the impossibility in any case of an absolutely 
perfect result, it is probable that the bill as pre¬ 
sented by the American committee will appeal most 
strongly to the public. However, it seems that a 
feasible plan, which would obviate too great influ¬ 
ence of such parties as are too insignificant to com¬ 
mand a single unit of representation, would be just 
and expedient. 


APPENDIX IL 


279 


APPENDIX II. 


THE LEGALIZATION OP POLITICAL PARTIES.i 

It is now generally recognized that political parties 
are essential to popular government. But our Federal 
and State constitutions were originally framed under 
the conviction that parties were the deadliest rocks in 
the path of freedom. Parties were identified with 
factions. Washington’s farewell address was inspired 
almost solely by this dread. He said: — 

“Let me . . . warn you in the most solemn manner against 
the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally. This spirit 
unfortunately is inseparable from our nature, having its root in 
the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under dif¬ 
ferent shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled 
or repressed ; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its 
greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy. . , . All 
obstructions to the execution of laws serve to organize faction, 
to give it an artificial and extraordinary force*; to put in place 
of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party, often a 
small but artful and enterprising minority of the community; 
and according to the alternate triumphs of different parties to 
make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted 
and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of 
consistent and wholesome plans digested by common counsels 
and modified by mutual interests.” 

In this last solemn warning Washington stated the 
convictions of those who framed our constitutions. Our 

1 Address before the National Conference on Practical Reform 
of Primary Elections, New York, January, 1898. 



280 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

early statesmen, therefore, instead of incorporating 
parties into the constitutional framework of govern¬ 
ment, made every effort to suppress them. It was 
natural for a people who had just emerged from a life- 
and-death struggle with a foreign foe, where unanim¬ 
ity was required for success, to look with anxiety on 
the personal, factional, and sectional struggles that 
followed. Washington himself could hardly see that 
the differences in his cabinet between Hamilton and 
Jefferson were anything more than the personal differ¬ 
ences between an energetic business man and a theorist. 
But we know that each stood for deep and lasting 
principles which since that time have competed for 
supremacy. These opposing principles, if not recog¬ 
nized in the organic structure of the Constitution, 
must make a place for themselves outside and above 
the Constitution. 

But there is a familiar and valid distinction to be 
made between thej9rmc?}?Zesfor which a party contends 
and the organization by which it gains success. Its 
principles are all the selfish and the patriotic interests 
which its members strive to have embodied in law and 
enforced upon the people. Its organization is the 
machinery by which it marshals together a majority 
or a plurality of the voters. The success of organi¬ 
zation depends not only upon the number of voters, but 
also upon their discipline. Consequently organization 
tends to monopoly and centralization. This is shown 
in the history alike of warfare, of government, of 
religion, of industry, and of politics. In the struggle 
for existence the best disciplined and largest organi¬ 
zation, if backed by the motive power of desires and 


APPENDIX IL 


28: 


conscious interests, will survive. In our system of 
election by plurality vote there can be but two great 
parties, and every advance in organization of the one 
must be copied or bettered by the other, under penalty 
of lasting defeat. So urgent is this necessity that 
widely divergent principles and interests are usually 
forced into the same organization. It does not follow, 
because there are two parties, that there are also but 
two opposing principles animating their membership. 
It is the overpowering demand for success that gives 
organization preponderance over minor divergent prin¬ 
ciples. Various subordinate groups and factions of 
the party may be unrepresented in the ruling faction, 
but they must yield. And with this yielding of fac¬ 
tions within the party for the success of the whole, it 
has followed that parties have become more powerful 
than the Constitution itself. The Federal and State 
constitutions recognize only the individual candidate 
and the individual voter. But parties strive to elect 
those men who will above all things else enforce the 
party’s principles, and in so doing they have forced 
the Constitution to their necessities. This is shown 
notoriously in the election of the President on a party 
ticket, instead of the election of a non-partisan, like 
George Washington, as contemplated in the Constitu¬ 
tion. It is shown also in the appointment of the sub¬ 
ordinate civil service officials in nation. State, and city 
on the basis of partisan activity — a policy of appoint¬ 
ment introduced by those early prophets of the po¬ 
litical machine, George Clinton in New York and 
Andrew Jackson in the Union. This policy has greatly 
strengthened party organization by enabling the party 


;82 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


to hold together between elections, and by fortifying 
the leaders in their supremacy over the government 
and over their own partisans. 

This centralizing tendency in party government was 
resisted by the American voters in the same way that 
centralization in national government has been resisted, 
by the formation of peoples’ clubs in various localities, 
meeting together to criticise and take independent 
action against their leaders. These local clubs gradu¬ 
ally compelled recognition and secured as the au¬ 
thoritative organs of the party the substitution of a 
party-nominating convention composed of their own 
delegates in place of the legislative or congressional 
caucus of party leaders. Thus the primaries originated. 
They tended to democratize the parties and to give 
voice to the wishes of the party membership as a whole. 
They thereby greatly strengthened the party organiza¬ 
tion, not by lessening the power of leadership, but by 
reconciling the members to the leadership of those they 
believed to have been fairly chosen. When there is 
harmony between leaders and led, we may, in America, 
usually depend upon the minority to act faithfully 
with the majority, for they have the hope through 
education and discussion of becoming themselves the 
majority. 

With the completed recognition of the primary in 
the first thirty-five years of this century, party govern¬ 
ment came to be firmly established in the hearts of the 
people. The increase of power coming from it led the 
parties to seize upon the machinery of government, 
the subordinate offices, and the laws in order to keep 
themselves in control. It then became necessary for 


APPENDIX 11. 


283 


the opposing parties in self-protection to use legisla¬ 
tion to hold each other in check. Consequently the 
first legal cognizance of parties appears in the effort to 
put both parties on an equal footing in elections. The 
first intimation which I can find in the statutes of New 
York that political parties actually existed is in the 
election law of 1842, which provided for the election 
of three inspectors of elections, but permitted the 
electors to vote for only two. This was doubtless 
designed to give the minority party one of the inspec¬ 
tors. But the party organization as such was not yet 
acknowledged, the theory still being that candidates, 
not parties, were being voted for. Not until after the 
war, in the election law of 1870, which provided for 
bipartisan police and election boards in New York City 
and Brooklyn, were parties recognized as actual factors 
in elections. This act provided specifically that the 
choice of the third inspector should not be left to 
chance, as in the law of 1842, but that he should be 
chosen from the party in general political opposition 
on State issues to the party electing the two successful 
candidates.’’ An act of 1880 provided for a board of 
registration in counties of more than 300,000 popula¬ 
tion, to be appointed from both political parties. And 
a general law of 1880 provided that every political 
organization that shall present a candidate or candi¬ 
dates ” should appoint watchers to oversee the inspec¬ 
tors in counting the ballots. This legislation embodied 
merely a negative recognition of parties; it did not 
give them a place in the legal machinery of govern¬ 
ment, but merely protected them against each other. 
The same was true of the first primary law, that of 1882, 


284 PBOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


providing penalties for those who should wilfully 
obstruct the primaries, and placing the presiding 
officer under oath. 

Another negative legal recognition of parties is 
found in the so-called civil service reform legislation. 
The appointment of strictly administrative officials 
to strengthen the party organization is, from the 
standpoint of the public, an unwarranted use of these 
offices and is dictated only by party necessity. Civil 
service reform aims to exclude this necessity. Here 
for the first time legislation deals with political parties 
by taking away one of the strong props of their organ¬ 
ization. Such legislation is an effort not to incor¬ 
porate parties into the machinery of government, but 
to exclude them from a large part of this machinery. 

The first positive recognition of parties came with 
the Australian or legalized ballot. The principles of 
this legislation were the following:— 

1. A rough definition of political parties, based 
upon the party convention and the general and execu¬ 
tive committees of the party, but not based on the 
rank and file of the membership. 

2. Party nominations as certified by the aforesaid 
party authorities. Here for the first time it was 
legally recognized that the American voter does not 
vote for candidates, but for parties, and the party was 
accordingly made a constituent element in the machin¬ 
ery of government. 

3. While recognizing parties as belonging to the 
legal machinery of government, the law deprived these 
same parties of their most important mechanical func¬ 
tion — the management of elections, the printing and 


APPENDIX II. 


285 


distributing of ballots. This function does not pertain 
to the essential nature of parties in so far as they are 
based on principles, but is only an accident of their 
organization; the State, therefore, in assuming to 
execute the function itself through its own sworn offi¬ 
cials, in no way interfered with the role that parties 
must play in popular government. It rather liberated 
the true spirit and function of parties from the shell of 
organization. Originally the ballot was a piece of paper 
prepared by the voter himself; afterward the party or¬ 
ganization, in the interests of economy and superior 
efficiency, assumed the performance of this strictly me¬ 
chanical service ; and finally the State took upon itself 
this service, because it had become in the hands of the 
party organization an instrument of autocracy, tending 
to check a free spirit and a free expression of party 
principles in the mass of the party membership; 

We have therefore, now, the official or legalized ballot 
instead of the private party ballot, and the results are 
noteworthy. It greatly increases the influence of the 
individual citizen in the elections. It gives, as far as 
it goes, a preponderance to the principles rather than 
to the mere organization of parties, and so tends to 
bring to the front in party leadership those who stand 
for principle rather than mainly for shrewdness and 
manipulation. Finally it puts both parties on a 
higher level of competition by eliminating from party 
strife the factitious elements of bribery and intimida¬ 
tion, depending as these do upon private control of the 
machinery of election, and so increases rather than 
lessens devotion to party by giving the voters more 
confidence in their leaders. 


286 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPRESENTATION. 


But we know that much remains to be done. The 
next step is in the same direction: the further legal 
recognition of parties as belonging to the structure of 
government, and the further assumption by the State 
of certain merely mechanical incidents of party organ¬ 
ization. Having legally incorporated the party ma¬ 
chinery into the system of government, the law must 
now more carefully define what is meant by a party. 
A party is not its general committee nor even its party 
convention — a& the ofiicial ballot law assumes. It is 
primarily all the voters who support its principles. 
The election law leaves this definition to those in 
control of the organization, — a palpable instance of the 
suppression of the individual citizen by the conquer¬ 
ing power of monopoly. Parties having been legalized 
and made a constituent element in the organization of 
government, it follows that the individual citizen has 
as inalienable a right to be a member of a party as 
he has to be a citizen. By this is meant that his 
right to part}'- membership must be defined and en¬ 
forced by the same power as that which defines and 
enforces his right to citizenship; namely, the law of 
the land. Just as we do not leave the definition of 
citizenship and the machinery of naturalization to the 
private interests of any body of men, so we cannot 
leave the definition of party membership to even the 
party organization. Political parties are no longer 
private concerns organized for agitation, but they 
are public institutions organized to name the officers 
of government and so to control the government 
itself. They are now constituted by the ballot law 
for precisely this purpose. The individual citizen has 


APPENDIX IL 


287 


practically no voice in government except througli 
these party organizations. Consequently the State, 
which protects his rights of citizenship, must protect 
his rights of partisanship. If this protection is left 
to a private syndicate, the test will be his past 
devotion to the syndicate. If it is put in the hands 
of the State, the test will be his present intention to 
support the party of his choice. This declaration of 
intention, rather than previous affiliation, is the test 
of citizenship whenever needed, as in naturalization, 
and should also be the test of partisanship whenever 
needed. The only safeguard of such a test is the 
sovereign power of law. 

A primary election law must first of all increase 
the influence that may be exerted by each voter upon the 
committees and the nominations of the party of his 
choice. In the legalized ballot such an increase of in¬ 
fluence is secured especially by secrecy. I know the 
sentimental objections to secrecy, — that it is degrad¬ 
ing and hypocritical. But I know that it protects the 
voter from something far more degrading if not hypo¬ 
critical ; namely, bribery and intimidation. And now 
that the official ballot is secret, so that a voter’s 
declaration and oath of affiliation at the primary are 
only nominally binding, it would seem to be the true 
interest of parties, in framing a primary election law 
in order to protect themselves from nominations by 
voters under duress, to make the primary also secret. 
This could be done by providing a blanket ballot con¬ 
taining the names of all candidates for nomination by 
all parties, and by dispensing with all declarations or 
oaths of party affiliation. This expedient is perhaps 


288 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


not practicable at the present stage of the discussion, 
though it may ultimately be adopted by amendment 
after the law is once enacted. It would both simplify 
the voting at the official primary and materially in¬ 
crease the influence of the upright voter within the 
organization.^ 

Such primary election law gives a preponderance to 
the principles animating the members of the party 
rather than to the machinery of its organization; and 
this is done by putting into the hands of the State, 
which is the common representative of all parties and 
all citizens, the machinery of the primary itself, such 
as the printing and handling of the ballots, the ap¬ 
pointment of officials, inspectors, and judges. This, of 
course, gives a further guaranty of the rights of the 
Individual voter to a place in the party membership, 
by protecting him in the enrolment and counting 
o:^ his vote and the certificate of the result. But it is 
also a subordination of the machinery of organization 
to the principles of the party. Party success will then 
depend not so much upon control over the mechanical 
details, as upon enthusiasm for common principles. 
And these principles will therefore become broader 
and more patriotic, because they must be broad enough 
to hold together the various factions and minor in¬ 
terests which must be combined to get a majority. 
Patriotic principles rather than shrewd organization 
will be the banner of party success. It is petty fac¬ 
tions and intractable parties whose principles are dan¬ 
gerous, and great parties become dangerous when they 

1 In the primary election laws of Wisconsin and Oregon this 
principle is substantially adopted. 


APPENDIX II. 


289 


are ruled by a faction, — a situation which arises 
usually through the imperfections of organization. It 
is the business of election and primary laws to remove 
these mechanical imperfections. 

A primary election law of this kind will not lessen 
the hold of parties upon the hearts of the people. It 
will, rather, like the official ballot, increase the devo¬ 
tion to party and the acquiescence of the minority to 
the leadership of the majority. Neither will it de¬ 
prive parties of the eminent leaders who have justified 
their position by the decisive criterion, success. The 
same abilities which have subserved the demands of a 
faction in the party or the inordinate love of power on 
the part of their possessors will, instead, be made sub¬ 
servient to the party as a whole. 

Thus primary election reform is one of the steps 
away from the early dread of political parties toward 
the legal recognition of parties as a constituent of our 
governing machinery. Only when recognized as such, 
can they be controlled in the interest of the people. 
They ought to exist not for themselves, but for the 
country as a whole. Yet they have in themselves 
what larger patriotism does not always possess, the 
powerful motive of self-interest. Their so-called prin¬ 
ciples consist mainly in the common interest of their 
members. This is their constant impelling force. This 
is the source of that energy in them that gets results. 
The problem of politics is how to direct this self- 
interest for the common good. At first the problem 
was attacked negatively, the endeavor being to prevent 
one party from getting unfair advantage over the 
other. Next the attack was positive, in the interest of 


290 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


the people at large, endeavoring through the official 
ballot to deprive parties of those artificial and facti¬ 
tious means of success which depend only upon the 
machinery of organization. Now the problem is the 
internal organization of the parties themselves, the 
legalized primary, the very heart of the party situation. 
The party primary is peculiar to American self-govern¬ 
ment. We cannot get lessons from other countries. 
The primary is democratic in its origin. It has 
become oligarchical only through the unregulated de¬ 
velopment of organization. The problem of politics is 
to recognize organization as necessary and then so to 
order its conditions and terms as to make the party 
an agent for securing equal opportunities for all its 
members and all citizens. When this is done, we may 
look with confidence upon the arena of party strife 
not as dividing the country and leading to the des¬ 
potism which Washington feared, but as promoting 
those principles which truly subserve the good of all 
the people. 


APPENDIX III. 


291 


APPENDIX III. 


DIRECT LEGISLATION. —THE PEOPLE’S VETO.i 

By direct legislation is meant the following: — 

1. The Optional Referendum. — The right of a frac¬ 
tion of the voters, say five per cent, to require by 
petition that a law or ordinance adopted by the legis¬ 
lature, Congress, or a municipal council shall be sub¬ 
mitted to popular vote. 

2. The Compulsory Referendum. — The constitu¬ 
tional requirement that all laws and ordinances (ex¬ 
cepting urgency measures and existing budget) be 
submitted to popular vote. 

A majority of the votes cast decides in each case. 

American examples of the compulsory referendum 
are the vote on State constitutions and constitutional 
amendments; local option on liquor-selling; municipal 
and town vote on borrowing money, purchasing or 
erecting water-works, gas, or electric-light plants, or 
constructing large public improvements. The optional 
referendum and the initiative have been adopted with 
various modifications in South Dakota, Nebraska, 
Missouri, and Oregon. The Swiss Confederation and 
Swiss cantons have adopted the three forms of direct 
legislation. The genuineness of direct legislation de¬ 
pends upon the details. It may be so hedged in by 
hostile restrictions as to be almost worthless. Such 

1 From the Arena, December, 1899. 



292 PItOPORTIOl!TAL REPRESENTATION. 


restrictions are, for example, the excessive number of 
petitioners required, as in Nebraska — fifteen per cent; 
vexatious obstacles to legal signatures; formalities, 
time limits, etc. The system as adopted in Oregon is 
the most effective and genuine of the American ex¬ 
amples. Constitutional obstacles have been ingen¬ 
iously surmounted in some localities by the Winetka 
system,’’ which is merely a rule of procedure adopted 
by the municipal council requiring an ordinance to 
lie on the table for thirty days in order to give op¬ 
portunity for a referendum petition, the councilmen 
having promised to vote as instructed by the majority 
at the referendum. The details of this transitional 
system have been worked out by the National Federa¬ 
tion for People’s Rule, Washington, D.C. 

Some of the explanations offered to account for the 
success of direct legislation in Switzerland show a 
curious reversal of cause and effect. They seem to 
imply that the Swiss people dropped into the initiative 
and referendum through some unexplained hereditary 
instinct, just as a bug flies to its proper food without 
being taught. It is said that direct legislation is suc¬ 
cessful in Switzerland, while it would not be so in 
England and America, because the Swiss have no 
hard-and-fast parties ’’; because they have greater 
respect for one another’s opinions; because they do 
not have wide extremes of wealth; because they do 
not vote against legislators for re-election even though 
they vote against the laws of these same legislators at 
the referendum; because they are a quiet, peaceable, 
home-staying folk, etc. It is true that these qualities 
accompany successful direct legislation; but they are 


APPENDIX III. 


293 


its fruits, not its soil. They are results of the refer¬ 
endum, not its causes. The Swiss were at one time 
the mercenary soldiers of European kings and dukes, 
and they brought to their homes the low morals and 
turbulence of such a life. Yet it is agreed that in the 
cantons that formerly were noted for violence and 
bloodshed there has been a marked decline in homi¬ 
cide and other forms of crime since the introduction 
of law-making by the people. 

The Swiss people re-elect their legislators even when 
opposed to their politics — not because they have a 
kind of quaint, absurd instinct for keeping the same 
man always in office, but because they know that he 
does not have the final decision, anyhow, and they are 
willing to have his expert advice even though they do 
not accept it. They employ their law-makers as we 
our lawyers and doctors — not to dictate what we 
shall buy and sell, eat and drink, but to arrange the 
details; to tell us how to buy and sell, and how to 
keep our health. Our family doctor is not a boss, and 
we keep him even when we violate all his good advice. 
So the Swiss re-elect their law-makers, not as law¬ 
makers, but as a statutory revision commission. This 
is a result of the referendum, not a condition precedent. 

The Swiss have not developed political parties, be¬ 
cause their direct law-making obviates the need of 
parties. It is an easy matter to get together a new 
party on each new question of importance as it arises. 
To introduce a measure into politics and get it enacted 
into law, it is not necessary first to find a party that 
will adopt it in a platform, but those interested can 
place it directly on the statute book by petition and 


294 PBOPOETIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


popular vote. Where a party is relied upon to take 
up an issue, there is prospect of its repudiation aftdr 
election, and the voters must stay by the party and 
must accept all its other planks even against their 
judgment, or else lose their favorite one. Conse¬ 
quently party organization and party solidarity are 
the first conditions of success, and voters are even 
prone to place party above principles. Bitter execra¬ 
tion follows the man who abandons his party, —more 
bitter than that heaped upon the long-standing foe, — 
because the party is the only means of successful po¬ 
litical action. All this is absent in Switzerland. A 
standing party, with machinery always at work, is a 
waste of effort where the people can get the laws they 
want by direct vote. 

Why do the Swiss people respect one another’s 
opinions and consider it an indignity to influence 
another’s vote at elections Because they know that' 
each man’s opinions count. Each man votes directly 
upon issues; his votes for candidates are secondary. 
He is never humiliated by seeing his opinions spurned 
by the very legislators who before election were 
pledged to support them. Opinions, like men, are 
seriously respected only when they have power. 
Then only do they truly command respect. 

In so far as the Swiss people are free from the cor¬ 
rupting extremes of wealth and poverty, it is mainly 
because direct legislation headed off the encroachments 
of boodlers, bribers, and monopolists, and all kinds of 
special legislation, by which so many American for- 

1 See article by Professor Jesse Macy, “ The Swiss and their 
Politics,” in American Journal of Sociology, vol. i., pp. 31-33. 


APPENDIX III, 


295 


tunes have been created. Prior to the referendum 
Switzerland was going through an era of political 
villainy quite similar to that which the American 
people know so well. In fact, Swiss politics from 
1830 to 1860 reads quite like a chapter in current 
America. It was no abstract philosophy nor demo¬ 
cratic instinct that brought the referendum. The 
people were driven to it as the only certain means of 
expelling corrupt wealth from politics. The alliance 
between the private corporations — the railways and 
the banks — that furnished the funds and the politi¬ 
cians'who manipulated the people was exactly that to 
which Americans are now opening their eyes. No 
matter which of the two parties elected its candidates, 
the result was the same. Election promises were 
violated — the people were ^^sold out.^’ Franchises 
were granted, subsidies and tax exemptions were be¬ 
stowed, and extremes of wealth and poverty were 
forced upon the people by law, simply because the 
law-makers were abs61ute. They voted these special 
privileges; they received their share and their per¬ 
quisites from the boodlers; they were building up 
political machines and controlling elections with these 
funds taken from the people, and there was no re¬ 
straint. The referendum was the remedy. The can¬ 
ton of Vaud adopted it immediately following an 
especially exasperating grant of a subsidy to a rail¬ 
road corporation.^ Other cantons followed. The 
movement is likened by Deploige to a perfect wave of 
democracy sweeping over the country. The remedy 

1 Deploige, “The Referendum in Switzerland,” London, 
1898, p. 82. 


296 PROPOUTIONAL BEPRESENTATION. 


was complete. Switzerland was rescued from evils 
that now threaten the life of other democracies. No 
longer could law-makers sell out the people; they 
could no longer ‘^deliver the goods.” The people 
themselves must ratify the sale. The referendum 
was the people’s veto. 

It must not be thought that in America the people 
have not been as wide awake as in Switzerland. 
They have had similar experience. They have seen 
their representative bodies violate pledges and sell 
the people’s birthright to corporations. They have 
struggled vigorously to stop the abuse, but they have 
developed, not the people^s veto, but the executive veto 
and the judiciary veto. To understand the present 
need of the referendum, we need to understand this 
diverse development in Switzerland and America in 
the effort to resist the same political outrages. 

Eepresentative government originated in the Swiss 
cantons in much the same way that it did in the 
American colonies. The government had been feudal 
and aristocratic. The people arose in revolt and con¬ 
ducted their revolt through the leadership of their 
own elected representatives. This was in Switzerland 
in 1830 as in America in 1776. When revolution was 
successful in both countries, the legislatures thus 
elected became naturally sovereign in the place of the 
expelled rulers. There was no division of power be¬ 
tween the three branches of executive, judiciary, and 
legislature, but the legislature was the sole and abso¬ 
lute sovereign. Judges and governors were appointed 
by it. In five States it was even a court of appeals, 
like a house of lords. It contained the ablest men 


APPENDIX III. 


297 


of the cantons or the colonies — men who were truly 
representative and who showed their ability by their 
management of a successful rebellion. 

These legislatures, however, were not elected by 
universal suffrage. They were legislatures of prop¬ 
erty owners. It was not until the decade of the 
twenties in America and following the revolution of 
1830 in Switzerland that universal manhood suffrage 
without qualification of property, religion, or educa¬ 
tion became established as the basis of electing the 
legislators. This introduced a new and inconsistent 
feature. It had been firmly asserted in both countries 
that the people were sovereign, but it was thought 
that their sovereignty would be fully assured if every 
man had a vote for a delegate who actually exercised 
sovereignty. The result was disappointment. Uni¬ 
versal suffrage introduced conflicting interests into the 
elections. Property owners, when voting alone as a 
class, could elect their own best men, just as a private 
corporation of stockholders can elect their directors 
without interference from outside. But when the 
property owners were compelled to vote with the non- 
propertied, with the uneducated, the foreigner, the 
unbeliever — all these discordant elements were un¬ 
able to agree on one man who should represent all. 
It was as if the stockholders of a railway corporation 
should be forced to admit their employees to an equal 
vote on the basis of numbers in electing their presi¬ 
dent. Such a president would not be a leader either 
of the stockholders or employees; he would be a com¬ 
promise— a ^^dark horse— of some kind. So it 
was with the legislatures. They quickly fell into the 


298 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


hands of professional politicians and wirepullers whose 
shrewdness could marshal majorities or pluralities 
from these conflicting classes. Immediately these 
politicians allied themselves with the new class of 
speculators and capitalists who were coming upon the 
stage with the railway, the bank, the corporation, the 
mechanical inventions, and the new sources of unpre¬ 
cedented wealth. We have seen the outcome. The 
legislatures degenerated and became the tools of the 
speculators, and the latter seized upon the property 
and privileges of the people. The people must now 
either depose their legislators or tie their hands. The 
former was impossible, for headship must reside some¬ 
where. They proceeded to tie their hands. 

In Switzerland the only way to do this was to give 
the people a veto over the specific acts of the law¬ 
makers. There must be a veto somewhere, because 
the people had found that no matter how they voted 
for candidates they could only displace one party by 
another — one set of ringsters by another set. The 
only veto they could adopt was the people’s veto, 
because they could not call in foreigners, and they 
had never conceived the idea of an executive or a 
judge independent of the legislature. 

But in America a different course was open. While 
the legislatures were supreme in the new State consti¬ 
tutions formed during the revolution and in the Con¬ 
tinental Congress, yet when it came to the federal 
constitution, a new theory was adopted. This theory 
was supposed to have come from the English constitu¬ 
tion, but it came by the way of France and was more 
logical but less truthful than it would have been had 


appendix in. 


299 


it been stated by Englishmen. It was the theory of 
the three branches of government — the executive, the 
judiciary, the legislature — each independent of the 
others and each a check and a balance on the others. 
Influenced by this theory, the framers of the federal 
constitution made the president elective — not by the 
people indeed, but by an electoral college independent 
of Congress, and, it was hoped, independent of the 
people. In the early years, however, it was still the 
congressmen of the two parties who actually nominated 
the presidential candidates. Not until the time of 
Andrew Jackson and the rise of the party convention 
did the people take the nomination away from con¬ 
gressmen. The reason for this innovation was plain. 
They believed that Congress was controlled by the 
wealth and aristocracy of the land. They saw the 
deal it had made with the private corporation known 
as the United States Bank. This bank, with its 
powerful monopoly of money, threatened to control 
the government, to intimidate the voters, and to fleece 
the people. The people turned to Andrew Jackson. 
They made him almost dictator. They took advantage 
of his constitutional veto to break the alliance between 
private speculators and Congress. For the time being 
the executive veto was successful and overwhelming. 
It was not necessary to invent a people’s veto. 

In the State governments the executive’s power over 
the legislature has been introduced by direct and 
formal revision of the constitution; whereas in the 
federal government, as we have just seen, it was 
brought about by subordinating the electoral college to 
the party convention. In the thirteen revolutionary 


300 PEOPOETIONAL EEPEESENTATION. 

constitutions the governor had no veto, except in 
Massachusetts and New York, where it was narrowly- 
limited.^ In no State did he appoint officers. These 
were chosen by the legislature. His term was the 
shortest possible — only one year in ten States. In 
six States re-election was prohibited. Every State 
legislature elected a privy council to sit with him, 
whose advice and consent he was required to secure on 
all important acts. He was plainly dreaded. But in 
the constitutions of the new States, beginning with 
Ohio in 1802, the federal plan was imitated. And 
when, after the War of 1812, the older States grew 
dissatisfied with their legislatures, the revisions of 
State constitutions restored to the governor the power 
he had held as colonial representative of the king. 
Every State revision since then has added to his power 
and, in turn, has stripped the legislature. He has now 
the veto in nearly all. He appoints officials and judges. 
But, more significant, the constitutions place all kinds 
of obstacles in the way of legislatures. They cannot 
hold annual sessions. They cannot sit more than 
two or three months. Special legislation is pro¬ 
hibited. Minute regulations are prescribed as to the 
introduction, reading, and adoption of bills. Where 
these restrictions have not yet been imposed, there is 
scarcely any other demand so popular. In fact, the 
legislatures, more than the governors, now are dreaded. 

1 Historical statements here given are based on the mono¬ 
graph by Judge Horace Davis in the “ Johns Hopkins Uni¬ 
versity Studies in Historical and Political Science,” entitled 
“ American Constitutions : The Relations of the Three Depart¬ 
ments as Adjusted by a Century,” Baltimore, 1885. 


APPENDIX III. 


301 


Yet more striking is the suppression of the munici¬ 
pal legislatures. These were also originally supreme 
in the cities. But here the federal plan’^ has over¬ 
reached itself. The mayor has not only been given 
the veto, but he and his appointees are the government. 
There is no pretext of checks and balances. The 
board of aldermen has practically disappeared, or 
where it still holds a vestige of authority, its power 
is believed to be a ^‘mischievous relic.’^ 

So much, briefly, for the executive veto. The judi¬ 
ciary veto is the unique feature of American govern¬ 
ment. We do not appreciate its novelty nor the 
grounds of its popularity and urgency. Two develop¬ 
ments of the judiciary have occurred, both provoked by 
the degeneracy of the legislatures. The one is the veto; 
the other is the popular election of the judges. When, 
through the revision of constitutions, the legislatures 
were hemmed in and tethered, there was urgent need 
of machinery for holding them to the restrictions thus 
prescribed. The legislature could not be effectively 
muzzled by a written constitution, if it continued to 
be the final interpreter of that constitution. In lieu, 
therefore, of a popular veto the judiciary was naturally 
given the final decision as to the constitutionality of 
the acts of the legislature. And the governor, too, 
was put under judicial dominion, for the constitution 
also definitely limited his powers. 

At the same time the judges were made elective by 
popular vote. This again is unique and peculiar to 
America. No other great country elects its judges. 
It also is recent and dates only from those constitu¬ 
tional revisions that accompanied and followed univer- 


802 PEOPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


sal suffrage and legislative incompetency. New York 
was the first to make this provision for the highest 
courts, and this was done as late as 1846. The reason 
is plain. Judges could not veto the legislature and 
governor if their positions and salaries were dependent 
upon them. They must get their authority direct 
from the people if they were really to be a third 
branch of government. The federal judiciary has 
escaped this fate, because the federal constitution is 
hardly amendable. But the federal Supreme Court 
has seldom used its veto on the president and Con¬ 
gress. Its principal field has been in the control 
of the State governments. The State judiciary, on 
the other hand, in thirty-three States is now elected 
by the people, whereas it formerly was elected by the 
legislature.^ 

Thus in nation. State, and city the legislative 
branch of government has been fettered and sup¬ 
pressed. The executive and the judicial branches 
have been exalted over it. But, instead of curing the 
legislature, the remedy has only infected the other 
branches with the legislature’s vices. The executive 
is equally the creature of the politicians. After re¬ 
formers in New York had bestowed on the mayor the 
powers of the obsolete aldermen, they were surprised 
to hear him announce that it was not he but Tammany 
Hall that had taken the contract for governing the me¬ 
tropolis. The President’s veto gives him large powers 
in legislation, but for that very reason he has been 
made the creature of partisan machinery. The con- 

1 See article by Frank Gaylord Cook in the Atlantic Monthly 
for June, 1899, “Politics and the Judiciary.” 


APPENDIX III. 


303 


stitution attempted to provide for a non-partisan like 
George Washington. But, so long as the president 
has political power, the politicians and the corpora¬ 
tions are compelled to exert themselves to control his 
nomination and election. The federal judges are ap¬ 
pointed by the president from members of his own 
party, or from those who agree with him on corpora¬ 
tion law. The State judges are ominously the creatures 
of political methods. Candidates for the judiciary in 
New York City have paid Tammany Hall ^5000 to 
$10,000 for their offices. Candidates for the chief- 
justiceship of the State have been nominated by the 
State central committee, without the trouble of calling 
a convention of the people.^ Professor Kenneson, of 
New York University, says publicly to his graduating 
class of youthful lawyers: Profound knowledge of 
your profession, high ideals of your calling, never will 
commend you to the boss for nomination to the bench, 
nor lead the average judge to name you as referee. 
Such things go by political preferment, and not by 
merit.” ^ 

Did the facts conform to the theory, the judiciary 
veto would be consistent. The theory holds that the 
people are sovereign; that they express their will in 
a written constitution; that the judiciary is merely 
their agent in enforcing their constitutional will upon 
the other departments. But the constitutions are care- 

1 See article by Mr. Cook, above cited. Mr. Cook argues for 
return to appointment of judges. This is not possible so long as 
judges have a veto on the other branches of government. New 
York has voted it down by 3 to 1. 

2 New York daily papers of June 16, 1899. 


304 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

fully guarded so as not to express the people’s will. 
It is inaccurate to hold that a federal constitution 
adopted one hundred years ago and amended only 
through civil war ^ should express in all its parts the 
will of the living generation. To amend the constitu¬ 
tion requires a two-thirds vote in Congress and a three- 
fourths vote of the States. Practically this means that 
the politicians now in ofiS.ce are impregnable. So with 
the State constitutions. Pennsylvania permits only 
one amendment in five years. Others permit only one 
at a time. All amendments must originate in the very 
legislatures whose privileges the people are striving 
to lessen. Even then, in many States, two successive 
legislatures must agree on the amendment.^ And 
finally, the people have often only the choice of either 
accepting an amendment that is doctored contrary to 
their taste, or of retaining a provision that has been 
outgrown or has been interpreted by the courts without 
their consent. 

The case is worse when a total revision of the con¬ 
stitution is attempted. Total revisions ought never 
to be needed, but sometimes they are the only way of 
getting the partial amendments demanded. Then a con¬ 
stitutional convention, elected under the party system 
like the legislature, submits a completed instrument, 
minute in details and involved in technicalities, and 
the sovereign people are given the empty option of 
approving it as a whole or retaining the existing con- 

1 The original twelve amendments belonged properly to the 
original adoption of the whole. 

2 See Borgeaud, “Adoption and Amendment of Constitu¬ 
tions in Europe and America,” New York, 1895, pp. 188-189. 


APPENDIX III. 


305 


stitution. This decision usually turns on one or two 
paragraphs, and the many important parallel clauses are 
swallowed or overlooked. No wonder we do not have 
lawyers or judges nowadays emphasizing the old theory 
that the courts in declaring a law unconstitutional are 
merely applying the will of the people to their law¬ 
makers. Instead, we hear the pious lauding of the 
courts as a check on the passions and frailties ” of the 
people; as the representative, not of the people, but of 
“ law — impersonal, impassive, and serene in the inner¬ 
most shrine of the temple ” of popular government.^ 
But the constitutions are not clear on every point. 
They are susceptible of opposite interpretations. Law¬ 
yers differ. The courts of last resort seldom, if ever, 
render a decision on a constitutional question by a 
unanimous vote. With such differences of interpreta¬ 
tion it is plainly not the constitution, but the judges’ 
idea of the constitution, that settles the case. Judges 
are human; they begin as lawyers; they are generally 
elected or appointed as partisans; the ablest of them 
have made their standing as corporation attorneys; 
and, though we gladly acknowledge that they succeed 
better than the rest of us in forgetting politics and 
former clients, yet they must have opinions on ques¬ 
tions of property and constitutionality. They certainly 
do extend the scope of the constitution with the ap¬ 
pearance of new industrial conditions. In nothing is 
this more patent than where they have treated corpo¬ 
rations as artificial persons,’’ and have transferred to 
them those “natural rights” which the constitution 
of the United States grants to “ natural persons.” 

1 Judge Horace Davis, in monograph cited above. 


306 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


Can it be true that the people’s will, expressed in a 
constitution drawn up a hundred years ago when a 
private corporation was almost unknown, could have 
anticipated the rights that fifty years later it wished 
to see bestowed on these artificial beings yet unthought 
of ? We cannot answer this question until we make 
it possible for the people freely to express their will 
at the appearance of each new issue of importance. 
As long as they fail to do this, the judges can only 
do the best they can — declare the constitution as 
they themselves believe it. But let us remember 
that the real decision is merely the judge’s opinion^ 
in place of the legislature’s opinion, of what the law 
ought to be. 

The apparent solution of the matter is to make the 
constitution promptly amendable by the people. In 
Switzerland this is nothing more nor less than the 
initiative. I am not ready to say that the initiative as 
now formulated in Switzerland is satisfactory. The 
Swiss people themselves, while unanimously in favor 
of the referendum, are somewhat disappointed in the 
existing initiative. Those who favor it in general are 
willing to amend it in details. The referendum is 
negative. It is a check — a veto. By its provisions 
every important act of the legislature must be sub¬ 
mitted to popular vote for final acceptance or rejection. 
But the initiative is intended to be positive. By it a 
small number of citizens can draw up a bill, present 
it to the legislature, and require a popular vote upon it 
without amendment. The legislature can express its 
opinion and submit an alternative bill at the same 
time; but it cannot obstruct the petitioners’ bill. This 


APPENDIX III. 


307 


criticism of the initiative does not strike its principle. 
The initiative in some form is the necessary comple¬ 
ment of the referendum. It has indeed done its best 
work where it has served as a perpetual power of repeal¬ 
ing laws, whereas the referendum proper must be voted 
within thirty or sixty days, or where it has forced the 
legislature to take action and to present to the refer¬ 
endum some kind of a bill. But the initiative does 
not directly accomplish progressive legislation. The 
Swiss radicals are especially disappointed in it. Peti¬ 
tions are drawn up by small fractions of the people; 
sometimes they are whimsical and abstract, and are 
nearly always voted down. But I consider this one of 
the truest guaranties of the initiative. It is the strong¬ 
est justification of the position taken by those who 
hold that law-making is soundest when it most frankly 
trusts the people. Direct legislation in Switzerland 
has abundantly shown that the people are safer than 
their rulers. Extremists have no hope in them. They 
vote down the bills of both reactionaries and radicals. 
This is true not merely in the country districts, but 
also in the cities, where the unpropertied working 
classes are supposed to show disregard of property 
rights. Direct legislation gives voice and influence to 
the great mass of home-loving, peaceable, industrious 
people, who make little agitation and who are not 
heard in the ordinary clamor of politics. Such people 
are fair-minded and love justice. They want only 
what they earn, but they want it themselves. They 
are the bulwark of democracy. They cannot be 
crowded or dazed. They wait until they understand. 
Yet in the long run, at the second or third voting, it 


308 PBOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


is found that they are ready to accept progressive 
measures. They voted down government railroads 
twice, partly because of the exorbitant price the legis¬ 
lature agreed to pay to the private owners; but finally, 
when the question reached the stage where it excited 
almost no discussion, they voted in its favor by a large 
majority. So with other measures. Says M. Sttissi, in 
his notable account of direct legislation in the city of 
Zurich : All laws useful to the canton have been ac¬ 
cepted, even those which demanded considerable money 
sacrifices from the people. No law which would really 
have advanced either moral or material progress has 
been definitely laid aside. In those rare cases which 
seem to contradict this conclusion, the referendum has 
simply displayed its inherent ultra-conservative char¬ 
acter and delayed an advance which would seem to 
most to be too rapid.’’ 

The foregoing discussion is intended to show that 
many of the arguments usually advanced for and 
against direct legislation miss its true position. Direct 
legislation is not strictly a means of legislation: it is 
a check on legislation. It is a veto. But none the less 
it is the most urgent proposition before the American 
public. While theoretically basing our government 
on the will of the people, we have been experimenting 
for a century to find a machine that will run itself 
independently of the people. But government is not 
merely a nice set of checks and balances, of vetoes and 
countervetoes. It is the outcome of the whole life of 
the people. The executive veto and the judiciary veto 
are irritating substitutes for the people’s veto. Yet 
too much must not be expected from direct legislation. 


APPENDIX III, 


309 


It is to be classed, not with legislation proper, but 
with such devices as the secret ballot, the official 
primary, the corrupt practices acts. Its urgency is not 
as a means of bringing in reforms, but as a cure for 
bribery, spoils, and corruption. These are indeed the 
pressing evils of American politics. No reform move¬ 
ment, no citizens’ union, or the like can fully cope 
with them. A despotism, a monarchy, an oligarchy, or 
an aristocracy can be corrupt and survive ; for it de¬ 
pends upon the army. A republic or a democracy 
depends on mutual confidence; and, if bribery and 
corruption shatter this confidence, it is of all forms of 
government the most despicable. It can survive only 
by the army and the police. 

The referendum is the only complete and specific 
cure for bribery. It alone goes to the source of cor¬ 
ruption. It deprives law-makers and executives of 
their monopoly of legislation. The secret ballot, 
official primaries, civil service reform, proportional 
representation — these are all needful, but they leave 
to a few the monopoly of government and the power 
to sell at a monopoly price. If they should all be 
adopted, the immense interests dependent on legisla¬ 
tion will pay not less but more money in order to 
control them. Even public ownership of public en¬ 
terprises, although it ultimately destroys the largest 
corruption fund, must first be brought about by legis¬ 
lation; and this, unless checked by the referendum, 
will be the signal for exorbitant prices and a car¬ 
nival of bribery more profligate than any hitherto 
seen. But with the referendum this corruption is 
almost abolished. The way, then, is open to such 


310 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


affirmative action as the initiative can secure. This 
will appear mainly where an unrepresentative legisla¬ 
ture has restrained the people’s will so long that it 
has had time to become united. Several such measures 
might be mentioned, as the popular election of United 
States senators and the direct primaries. In the early 
stages of an agitation the initiative is usually futile — 
in the advanced stages, when public opinion is formed, 
it is a welcome portage around the dam of an obstruc¬ 
tive legislature. 


APPENDIX IV. 


311 


APPENDIX IV. 


REFERENDUM AND INITIATIVE IN CITY GOVERN¬ 
MENT.! 

The theory of recent municipal reform in the 
United States is that of a “business corporation rather 
than an integral part of the state.’’ Upon this theory 
power and responsibility have been transferred to the 
mayor, on the ground, as stated by Mr, Seth Low, 
one of the earliest exponents of the theory, that “ in 
the administration of large business enterprises some 
one man must be given the power of direction and the 
choice of his chief assistants.” Perhaps its earlier 
advocates did not intend to carry their theory as far 
as it has gone; but, however this may be, the mayor 
in the larger cities has been made, under the influence 
of the theory, not only the chief executive, but also 
the chief legislative authority. The climax was 
reached in New York in the charter of 1897, wherein 
the initiative in matters of taxation, indebtedness, 
franchises, and improvements was bestowed upon the 
mayor and the boards appointed by him, with a joint 
and absolute veto upon the common council, and a 
personal veto of the mayor equal to a five-sixths vote 
of the council. It is significant that in the revision 
of 1900 a reverse step was taken, and the excessive 
power of the mayor was slightly reduced. At present 

1 From the Political Science Quarterly^ vol. xvii., p. 609 
(1903). 



312 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


there is a lull in the progress of the theory throughout 
the country, caused, perhaps, by its admitted failure 
in many cases. As shown by the results, the theory 
neglects factors which demand recognition. What 
these are should be, if possible, determined. 

Political science and economic science are alike in 
that they seek a basis in psychology. If the city is 
exclusively a business corporation, it must call into 
play only the psychic factors which belong to business. 
If it is also a political corporation, it must call into 
play also the psychic factors which underlie politics. 
These personal factors operate through social organi¬ 
zation, and to operate effectively the organization must 
be so shaped as to furnish to each factor its own proper 
machinery of expression. An analysis based on this 
principle shows that there are in city government 
three distinct problems, corresponding to three distinct 
types of mind, namely, the technical, the business, and 
the political problem; and that two distinct forms of 
organization are required for these problems, namely, 
the business and the political organization. 

By far the greater part of the people living in a 
city, whether engaged in private pursuits or employed 
by the city government, are occupied in working up 
the material of physical nature for the satisfaction of 
human wants. They are engaged in manufacturing, 
transporting, and delivering goods, or in fitting up 
the machinery, buildings, and highways for such pur¬ 
poses. The work is planned by architects and engi¬ 
neers, whether mechanical, electrical, or civil, who 
are more or less equipped in the technology of their 
peculiar callings and in the sciences of mathematics. 


APPENDIX IV, 


313 


physics, and chemistry. The work is executed by fore¬ 
men, artisans, and laborers, who have varied skill in 
handling the material to be worked up. Here is 
suggested the first problem of the city, — a technical 
problem, dealing with physical material. 

The same considerations apply to that large army 
of people which includes the teachers who are super¬ 
vising the children at home or in the schools and 
churches, the policemen and prison officials who are 
dealing with the anti-social classes, the charity work¬ 
ers, and pauper overseers who are dealing with the 
sub-social classes. These workers are fitting social 
material for society just as the other workers are 
fitting physical material for society’s use. As in the 
latter, so in the former case, the work is technical, 
requiring knowledge gained more or less from the 
sciences of psychology, penology, and sociology, and 
skill gained from experience in the application of sci¬ 
entific principles. Whether these two classes of 
technical workers are the employees of the city or of 
private parties, is not at all a matter of concern, seeing 
that the psychic qualities required are the same in 
either case. Here the problem is a purely intellectual 
one, — the problem of knowledge and skill. The higher 
this knowledge goes, as in the case of engineers, chem¬ 
ists, penologists, the more nearly it becomes science; 
and the larger the experience and the greater the apti¬ 
tude of the individual in disciplining his mind and 
members under the guidance of science, the more nearly 
does he become an expert. Science and technique are 
the goal of the intellectual factors, knowledge and 
skill. 


314 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


But a high development of technical ability is not 
possible without a minute division of labor and 
a specialization of knowledge and skill in limited 
fields of work. This necessitates transfers of goods, 
the selling of one’s own special products, and the 
buying of the products of others for one’s personal 
and industrial needs. Furthermore, this technical 
ability must also be specialized within a single indus¬ 
try, and a hierarchy of knowledge and skill must be 
organized on a large or a small scale according to the 
extent of the market and the character of the produc¬ 
tion. Here we have a new problem, that of buying 
and selling, and the organization of responsibility. 
Material must be bought and sold, wages and salaries 
must be paid, employees must be selected and fitted 
into the processes according to their equipment in 
knowledge and skill, and the highest productive energy 
must be evoked from each employee by the proper 
play upon his motives. All together the problem is one 
of economizing the technical abilities of individuals; 
that is, of increasing the productive power of each 
group with the least sacrifice of strength and the 
least concessions to other groups and to the individuals 
within the group. This is usually known as the 
problem of business or administration. It deals with 
individuals, and the intellectual qualities required for 
handling it are tact and intuition. These qualities 
are seen in the successful business manager, who 
generally has but little technical ability, knows but 
little of the sciences and the various branches of 
technology over which he presides, and has no skill 
in handling material, but who, nevertheless, is able 


APPENDIX IV. 


315 


to ^^deal with men’’ through the personal qualities 
of foresight, diplomacy, courtesy, persuasion, blan¬ 
dishment, and firmness. His predominant intel¬ 
lectual qualities are not accuracy but shrewdness, 
not knowledge but insight, not skill but strategy, 
not breadth but intuition. Here, again, we are not 
concerned with the question of public or private 
management. The same qualities are required in 
a business manager, whether he be employed by 
the city or by a private company, or whether he be 
“ his own employer.” 

The intellectual qualities corresponding to a tech¬ 
nical and to a business problem respectively having 
thus been established, what is the nature of a political 
problem? 

Society is made up of individuals working each in 
his own field. Division of labor is the instrument 
for creating wealth. The product is not the work 
of one man or of one set of men, but of society as a 
whole. All that the individual uses in his work and 
his pleasure—his tools, food, clothing, luxuries—is the 
joint product of all society, past and present. These 
things simply represent the services which his fellows 
everywhere are contributing to his life. Society is 
mutual service. But the motive which leads each 
individual to contribute his share to the joint prod¬ 
uct is mainly the share which he and those he 
loves can get in turn. Society is opportunity. Eree- 
dom is command over the services of others. But the 
larger opportunities may be monopolized and the 
rewards for services may be unfairly distributed. 
Freedom of opportunity and increase of reward are 


316 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION, 


the objects for which individuals are continually 
yearning. Opportunity and reward are the twofold 
aspect of the benefits which society renders. Yet 
in acquiring these benefits the lone individual is help¬ 
less against the pressure of others. Consequently 
those with common interests are compelled to join 
together for the power which united effort secures. 
That which holds them together is their common 
beliefs and opinions regarding rights. Here the intel¬ 
lectual element merges with the ethical, the ethical 
element being founded on wishes and interests. Be¬ 
liefs and opinions in social matters are concerned with 
the distribution of wealth and social opportunities. 
This is essentially a problem of social classes, and 
differences of opinion on this problem are based on 
differences in the wishes and interests of social classes. 
Self-interest is elevated from gross selfishness into a 
moral enthusiasm, partly by ide/itification with the 
interest of a social class and partly by the claim 
that the interest of this class is the interest of soci¬ 
ety as a whole. On this high plane self-interest is 
armed for the political arena, and its demands aspire 
to the dignity of a public policy. But public policy, 
in domestic affairs, is a matter of the distribution of 
social benefits, and there would be no political prob¬ 
lem were there no social classes; for there would be 
no problem of the distribution of wealth and oppor¬ 
tunity. The problem here is not one of knowledge 
and skill in handling material, nor of tact and intui¬ 
tion in handling individuals, but of beliefs and 
opinions concerning the just and expedient disposi¬ 
tion of social advantages. In solving this problem 


APPENDIX IV, 


317 


the conduct of the individual is modified, not through 
argument, but through change of heart; not through 
proof, but through conversion; not through logic, but 
through ethics; not through enlargement of his knowl¬ 
edge or increase of his tact, but through change of 
his opinion; and in last instance, if all these fail, his 
conduct is modified by compulsion. 

Here we have the mark which separates the political 
from the technical and business problems. In the 
technical field there is no power of compulsion. One 
must act according to unchangeable laws governing 
human nature and physical nature. ^‘We conquer 
nature by obeying her,’^ f.e., by knowledge and skill, 
not by opinion and prejudice. In the business field 
we apparently come nearer to compulsion. Successful 
business enterprise depends partly upon control of the 
supply of the commodity produced, and successful 
business discipline depends on the power to appoint, 
promote, and discharge subordinates. In each case the 
power is that of reward and punishment. But this 
power exists only so far as the laws of person and 
property permit and enforce it. Here the business 
problem depends upon the political decisions that 
regulate property. The business manager is allowed 
to use compulsion only to the extent that the people, 
through their laws, have chosen. His success within 
this area is based primarily on tact and persuasion. 

The political problem of society appears exactly at 
this point. It is concerned with the extent to which 
compulsion shall be used by private persons, by sects 
or classes, in promoting their interests. History is 
full of the uprisings of sects and classes, of riots, wars. 


318 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


and strikes, brought about by the struggle to share in 
a larger degree the rewards and opportunities which 
society vouchsafes. This struggle is not always 
violent. It may be constitutional; that is, the ma¬ 
chinery of government may be so constructed and the 
suffrage so extended that each sect and class may in¬ 
crease its share of social services by simply getting 
control of the constituted authorities through recog¬ 
nized channels and without resorting to violence. The 
power of compulsion, belonging thus to the realm of 
practical politics, is the power to put one’s own opin¬ 
ion or desire into effect regardless of the desires and 
opinions of others. This power cannot dominate in 
the technical field, where only knowledge and skill 
control, nor in the business field, where tact, intuition, 
and enterprise hold sway, but is limited to the ethical 
field, where opinions, beliefs, and prejudices contend 
for authority. Yet compulsion is not independent of 
technology and business. It depends upon them for 
execution. It cannot override them, but it can use 
their results. It deals only with the question. Who 
shall get the social advantages derived from them ? 
The answer is given by one’s desires, opinions, preju¬ 
dices, with an ultimate appeal to force. It is for 
this reason that the political problem takes precedence 
over all other social problems in the hearts of the 
people. Men are first of all creatures of desire. 
Knowledge, skill, tact, are useful only as they satisfy 
the desires. Then when desire is hallowed by ethics, 
and what one wishes is what one along with others has 
a right to have, this union of desire, justice, and 
fraternity dominates and guides all one’s powers and 


APPENDIX IV. 


319 


activities. Consequently if the structure of govern¬ 
ment does not provide separately for the problem of 
compulsion, the voters will assuredly subordinate con¬ 
siderations of technical and business efficiency to the 
interests of their political preferences. 

It is a mistake to suppose that political consider¬ 
ations are mainly to be found in State and Federal 
politics. It is often held that voters elect their aider- 
man and mayor on the basis of their opinions con¬ 
cerning the tariff or the currency or other federal 
policy. This may hold of a few highly educated and 
philosophical-minded persons and of business men 
with large national interests, but for the majority of 
the voters it is their class traditions, friendships, lik¬ 
ings and dislikings, their clubs, saloons, social gath¬ 
erings, neighborhood acquaintances, their habitual 
preferences and prejudices that determine first their 
local alliances and then their national alliances. 

The most inveterate and deep-seated of these po¬ 
litical preferences has been that based on religious 
belief. In the United States, where Church and 
State are separated and where religious opinions are 
allowed no place in determining the laws, these 
opinions are nevertheless sometimes injected into the 
election of officials who will throw the balance of ad¬ 
vantage to the side of their religious confreres. But, 
on the whole, the separation of Church and State 
removes religious opinion from politics. If there were 
a State or city church supported by taxes, then violent 
political contests would arise between Catholics and 
Protestants as to which should get the benefit of 
the taxes and the clerical appointments. All ques- 


320 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


tions of business and technical efficiency would be 
subordinated to this political question of the distri¬ 
bution of social privileges among religious classes. 

As the religious hold weakens, both through decay 
and through the separation of Church and State, the 
majority turns to material pleasures. There then 
arises a determined insistence on the right of the 
voters to enjoy themselves in their own way, to spend 
their money as they choose. Freedom of consumption 
now takes precedence over all other desires in the 
hearts of the voters. 

Again, with the growing density of population, with 
the increase in technical improvements, with the de¬ 
velopment of wide extremes between propertied and 
non-propertied classes, new political prejudices spring 
up. The contests between capital and labor begin, and 
the labor unions, with their emphasis on the class-con¬ 
sciousness of the working classes, soon show themselves 
in resistance to the business and property interests 
which have hitherto controlled the cities and which 
are also the overt antagonists of the unions in private 
dealings. Important questions affecting the diffusion 
of property among the different classes in the city now 
begin to emerge. Such is the question of municipal 
ownership of monopolies. Whether these monopolies 
shall be owned by the city or by private persons, what 
shall be the charges for services, whose real estate shall 
be benefited — these are political questions affecting 
social classes. The economical administration of the 
monopolies, the appointment and discharge of sub¬ 
ordinates, are business and technical questions. So 
with the choice between the contract system of public 


APPENDIX IV. 


321 


work and the system of direct employment; which of 
these systems the city shall adopt, is a political ques. 
tion of opposing class interests. On one side the con¬ 
tractors and their friends, politicians and spoilsmen; 
on another side are the taxpayers; and still another 
class is the wage earners. Wage earners want high 
wages and short hours; taxpayers want low taxes. 
Contractors and politicians play them against each 
other. Naturally enough these questions, which are 
really political in their nature, since they are class 
questions, are held by adherents of the business theory 
to belong solely to the business field and to be de¬ 
terminable only by business considerations. But this 
claim is really that of a particular social class ac¬ 
customed to think in terms of competition, cost of 
production and profits, and the demand that these 
political questions shall be left to a business decision, 
is a demand that the interests of but one of the 
classes concerned shall be considered. But the strictly 
business and technical questions are subordinate to 
the political questions at stake. Whichever side wins 
in the conflict over the latter, the conditions de¬ 
termining the former are much the same. They are 
concerned solely with the economic execution of the 
work upon the basis of the hours, wages, and taxes 
previously settled by politics. 

Other political questions are the relative taxation 
of personal property, real estate, and land values ; the 
maintenance of public schools in place of private 
schools; and in the public schools, if maintained, the 
provision of free text-books, free meals, manual 
training, etc. 


322 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


Perhaps the most obvious of political questions is 
that concerned with the distribution of offices and 
employments. The traditional aristocratic and feudal 
notion finds in public office a means of privilege and 
leisure and of protection of personal and class in¬ 
terests at the expense of society. Modern political 
parties which have grown up on the soil of feudalism 
have merely elevated the strife for office from the 
secret and devious ways of court favoritism to open 
contest before the people. The early notion of privi¬ 
lege and leisure is still the animating motive. Only 
as room is made for business and technical qualities 
inside the political organization of the city does a 
different view of office prevail. The struggle for office 
and public employment grows intense on account of 
unstable conditions in private employment. For this 
reason the high wages, short hours, leisurely work, 
and sure pay of municipal employment are well fitted 
to enlist in opposing political parties the anxious 
crowds of competing laborers. The distribution of 
public employment becomes a dominant political 
question. Here the business theory is undoubtedly 
the correct one. When public office and public em¬ 
ployment have come to be merely the execution and 
not the choice of a policy, the problem is one of 
dealing with individuals and not with social classes. 
It is a business problem and cannot be successfully 
solved by those who are interested mainly in the 
political problem. 

We may sum up now the radical differences between 
the three problems of city government. The city is 
both a business corporation and a political corporation. 


APPENDIX IV, 


323 


Both, business and politics are grounded upon techno¬ 
logical problems, dealing with the raw material of 
nature in order to fit it for man’s uses or with the 
undeveloped material of society in order to educate 
it for society’s uses. In these problems the mental 
qualities required are knowledge and skill. 

The business problem deals with individuals in 
order to economize and stimulate their energies. It 
is a problem of buying and selling and the organiza¬ 
tion of responsibility. The mental qualities required 
for its solution are tact, intuition, and enterprise. 

The political problem deals with social classes; or 
it consists in the dealing of social classes with each 
other. It is a problem of the distribution of the 
wealth and privileges, the rewards and opportunities, 
which are being created through the solution of 
technical and business problems. The mental factors 
are the class desires and class opinions concerning jus¬ 
tice and expediency. The problem is one of choices 
and is essentially ethical. 

These problems are not, in the existing political 
organization, distinct and separate. They overlap. 
The same person is often called upon to meet more 
than one. But they are essentially different and the 
mental qualities required in dealing with each are rad¬ 
ically unlike and are seldom found together in a 
marked degree in one person. Consequently, for 
proper solution, the problems should be distinctly sep¬ 
arated. Individuals should find their field and line of 
promotion in the solution of but one of them. This is 
impossible if the city government is so framed that 
the different problems necessarily overlap; especially 


324 PBOPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


if the political problem must be solved by the very 
same person whose field is the technical or business 
problem. In American cities there are two notable 
sources of this compulsory overlapping. One is the 
State legislature; the other is the mayor. 

The American state gives to the city the privilege 
of electing its own officials, but gives to the state 
legislature the power of enacting laws which these offi¬ 
cials are to enforce. It follows that when these social 
and class questions of beliefs, enjoyments, and incomes 
pertaining to cities are settled by the State legislature, 
the only means which the voters have of enforcing 
their predominant desires is to elect officials, not on 
the question of their business ability or integrity, but 
on the question of enforcement or non-enforcement of 
state law. That is to say, not a man of business, but 
a man of politics, is necessarily their choice. 

In order, therefore, that the American city may ac¬ 
quire technical and business efficiency it must have, 
first of all, legislative home rule. When the state 
legislature continues to enact laws for the city, it is 
compelled sooner or later to appoint and remove the 
city’s officials. The tendency in this direction has 
shown itself in a State or metropolitan ” police sys¬ 
tem for Boston, St. Louis, and other cities. To what 
extent the city should have home rule in order to offset 
this centralizing tendency, is a matter of expediency; 
it should probably include local option on liquor 
excise questions and on all financial and business 
questions of strictly local concern, like municipal 
ownership, objects of taxation, free text-books, etc. 

Here, however, we are met by the business or eco- 


APPENBIX IV. 


325 


nomic theory of the city: the city is only a business 
corporation organized to collect and expend the taxes, 
and it should therefore be organized like a private 
corporation with responsibility centred in a general 
manager; that is, in the mayor. 

If the city were really a business corporation with 
the one purpose of saving money for its stockholders, 
this theory might result in the election of a capable 
business manager for its chief. But it is a political 
corporation with the power of coercion; and since 
the political interests of the voters are as various and 
antagonistic as their passions and opinions, the mayor 
is elected, not for his business capacity, but for his 
political and social preferences. 

The business theory is not even true to its business 
analogy. If the mayor is to be the executive head of 
the city, he will correspond, in the comparison with 
a private corporation, not to the president, but to the 
general manager or the superintendent, or to the 
cashier of a bank. The president of a corporation, 
as such, is merely a presiding officer of the board of 
directors. He has one vote, like every other direc¬ 
tor. He has no veto and no legislative discretion. The 
general manager, on the other hand, is the executive 
head, and he has no voice in the board. He merely 
executes the policy which the board and the president 
determine. The president, indeed, controls the mana¬ 
ger, but he does so only as the intermediary between 
the board and the manager. The business theory, if 
true to itself, would deprive the mayor of veto power 
and would make him a responsible executive without 
political discretion. 


326 PBOPOBTIONAL bepbesentation. 

Seeing, then, that the city is both a business and a 
political corporation, the mayor, if he is to be the 
head of the business side, should be deprived of all 
political discretion. He should have no veto what¬ 
ever, no initiative, no power over franchises, taxes, im¬ 
provements, or excise, but should merely execute the 
wish of the voters; and this wish should have an 
entirely separate avenue for expression. In European 
cities this avenue is furnished by the common council, 
and the council has discretion in all matters, including 
the appointment and removal of subordinates. It is 
both the political and the business head of the city. 
But the council system has broken down in the 
United States. The reason usually given is the al¬ 
leged injection of “politics” into the councils and 
boards of aldermen. But politics is always predomi¬ 
nant in a municipal government. This predominance, 
however, is not a source of business confusion when 
the suffrage is limited to a single class, as is the case 
in a private corporation, or in the mediaeval guild, or in 
the municipal governments of a country like Germany. 
But with the extension of the suffrage to conflicting 
classes it follows that conflicting policies are injected 
into the directorate, which otherwise would give its 
whole attention to the mere execution of its single 
policy. This is why municipal governments in 
France are less efficient than those in Germany, and 
why the extension of the suffrage in England is trans¬ 
forming the municipal council from a business man¬ 
agement into a debating society. It is not that 
political considerations are subordinate when the suf¬ 
frage is limited, and paramount when the suffrage is 


APPENDIX IV. 


327 


extended; for political questions always precede busi¬ 
ness questions so long as there are social classes, 
whether suffrage is limited to one class or extended 
to all. The difference between the two conditions 
is that in one case there is but one policy, that of the 
represented class, and the only problem for solution 
is the method of executing that policy, while in the 
other case there are divergent policies of different 
classes, and the problem of execution must be held in 
abeyance pending discussion of the problem of poli¬ 
tics. But while suffrage is universal, this problem of 
politics can never be solved; or, rather, the apparent 
settlement of one political issue simply makes room 
for another, and this will continue as long as society 
is composed of divergent classes and interests. 

It is perhaps this practical failure of the council 
under universal suffrage, more than the abstract prin¬ 
ciples of the “ business theory,’’ that has driven Amer¬ 
ican cities to shift power to the mayor. If, then, 
the council cannot be trusted, and the mayor is to be 
deprived of political discretion, the only resort is the 
direct popular vote. This would be the referendum 
and the initiative on questions of policy. Without 
entering into the plan of the initiative and the refer¬ 
endum, or the necessary constitutional safeguards, it 
is enough here merely to indicate what are the sub¬ 
jects which would properly be dealt with by this 
method. These would include the tax rates and the 
classification of property for purposes of taxation; 
compensation for franchises; charges, fees, and licenses 
for public services; liquor and saloon regulation; 
municipal ownership and indebtedness; rates of 


328 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


wages and hours of employment; the choice between 
the contract system and direct employment; the loca¬ 
tion of public improvements and the distribution of 
assessments. Here is a wide field for discretion and 
political opinion — a field now occupied by the State 
legislature and the mayor, with participation in various 
degrees by the decadent municipal council. 

The practical operation of the referendum on a few 
of these subjects can already be seen in many places. 
The towns and cities of Massachusetts have for sev¬ 
eral years been permitted to vote upon the question 
of “ license or no license ” at a popular referendum. 
Partly as a consequence, the cities have been able re¬ 
peatedly to elect non-partisanor “independent’^ 
or “citizens’” candidates for mayor, — an achieve¬ 
ment which few other cities can boast of. It has even 
occurred that cities which have voted for licensing the 
saloon have at the same election given majorities for 
anti-saloon mayors. The simple device of the refer¬ 
endum subtracts the political preference of the voters 
from their choice of mayor, and by separating the po¬ 
litical from the business problem of the city enables 
them, in electing the business head, to attend solely to 
the business qualifications of the candidates. The 
two issues are clarified, and each is settled on its own 
merits. As an isolated proposition voters do not wish 
corrupt and ineffectual government, but as a subordi¬ 
nate proposition they prefer such a government to the 
restriction of those enjoyments and liberties which lie 
close to their habits of life. Furthermore, with honest 
and efficient administration the political problems of 
the city can be debated and decided on their merits. 


APPENDIX IV. 


329 


At present the honesty or dishonesty of the officials 
who are to execute the voters’will enters largely into the 
debate on these problems, and the solution in each case 
is determined less by the real wishes of the people than 
by their distrust of the administration to which the 
execution of their decision must be confided. 

We reach, then, this conclusion: If with a system 
of universal suffrage we are to have business-like 
municipal administration, we must recognize that the 
city is not primarily a business corporation; that it 
possesses the power of coercing those who do not will¬ 
ingly acquiesce in its policy; that if the city charter 
is so framed that to the business administration is 
given discretion in the control of this power of co¬ 
ercion, the voters will strive to use the administration, 
first of all, to control this discretion in their own 
diverse interests, and but secondarily to secure effi¬ 
ciency and honesty. But if the business head and 
the State legislature are deprived of political discre¬ 
tion through direct vote of the municipal constituency 
on questions of policy, then the charter will follow 
scientifically the social psychology of the voters, and 
the city government will be, as it should be, efficient 
on the business side and popular on the political side. 
The mayor’s only problem will be the selection, ap¬ 
pointment, promotion, and discharge of the technical 
experts and workers, who by their knowledge and 
skill execute the will of the voters. His own election 
will turn not on his beliefs, his habits, his pleasures, 
his prejudices, and opinions, but on his honesty, effi¬ 
ciency, and tact in organizing the staff of technical 
workers and in dealing with the contractors and 


330 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


merchants from whom labor and material are to be 
purchased. The voters themselves will decide, inde¬ 
pendently of the mayor and his appointees, what they 
wish to have done or not done, how much it shall cost, 
how the funds shall be raised, who shall bear the ex¬ 
penses, to what extent their beliefs, enjoyments, and 
habits of life shall be regulated. Thus the three 
problems of the city government — the technical, the 
business, and the political problems — will each be 
settled in its own field on its own intrinsic merits, and 
the minds of the voters will be freed from that maze 
of conflicting problems which bewilders them in the 
solution of each. 

The argument is frequently made by those who, 
notwithstanding the admitted disease and inefficiency 
of city government, yet favor the extension of mu¬ 
nicipal ownership and operation of public enterprises, 
that an increase of municipal responsibility will neces¬ 
sarily call forth improved business administration 
through civil service reform.” This reform will come 
because the voters’ attention will then be forced upon 
the administration on account of its increased im¬ 
portance. In justification of this view appeal is 
sometimes made to biology, where, it is urged, in the 
process of evolution the organ follows the function; 
the animal first does a certain act over and over 
again, and in doing it the necessary muscles and 
organs are built up by which it may be better done. 

Possibly these theories of heredity may be mistaken 
and may be displaced by others, but however that may 
be, the biological analogy is not safe ground for socio¬ 
logical conclusions. The evolution of government has 


APPENDIX IV, 


331 


been twofold: it has developed an increase of func¬ 
tion in one direction and a decrease in another direc¬ 
tion. Government has decreased its activity and 
interference in the control of personal beliefs and 
enjoyments and the regulation of personal earnings. 
It has separated Church from State and has repealed 
sumptuary laws. During the same time it has in¬ 
creased its control over the administrative and 
economic conditions which make up the framework of 
society. It has displaced private police by public 
police, voluntary fire companies by a municipal de¬ 
partment, private toll roads by free public highways, 
private water supply by municipal ownership, private 
autocracy in industry by factory laws, and so on. 
Thus it has gained control of the merely mechanical 
conditions of society, but has let go the personal appe¬ 
tites, desires, beliefs, and initiative of individuals. 
One movement has been as important as the other, but 
neither movement has been blind or aimless. Both 
have been brought about by the demand of the masses 
for more and more personal liberty. Freedom of 
belief, freedom in the pursuit of happiness, free enter¬ 
prise— these have been the banners of armies and 
parties which have overthrown monarchs and church, 
have nullified sumptuary laws, and abolished monopo¬ 
lies and privileges. From the standpoint of the peo¬ 
ple this demand for freedom is the first and paramount 
demand. It comes directly from their desires, their 
faiths, their passions. They are more eager to have 
government take its hands off their beliefs and enjoy¬ 
ments than to have it lay its hands on their business 
and industries. So long as government keeps its 


332 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


hands on the former, the attention of the people is 
largely absorbed in that direction. They care more to 
see the administration devoting its coercive power 
to the emancipation of their beliefs and desires than 
to see it economical, honest, and efficient. Hence no 
matter how much the business functions and the civil 
service of government are expanded, the voters under 
universal suffrage will not give perceptibly increased 
attention to them so long as suppressive and sumptu¬ 
ary activities are undiminished. 

The conclusion from the foregoing is that progress 
and development in the scope of municipal operations 
and in the efficiency of municipal civil service must 
necessarily be accompanied by a curtailment of sump¬ 
tuary and restrictive legislation. The two movements 
have gone together in the past and must probably go 
together in the future. But if, as is undoubtedly true, 
restrictive legislation in the interests of morals can¬ 
not be altogether abandoned, and if, in the nature of 
the case, government must deal with the distribution 
of wealth and privilege, then new machinery must be 
devised by which these matters can be managed with¬ 
out interfering with the questions of business and ad¬ 
ministration. The initiative and referendum furnish 
this machinery. They provide a means outside the 
administration for the discussion and settlement of 
questions of policy, questions of class interest, ques¬ 
tions of the distribution of wealth and privilege, ques¬ 
tions of control over morals, beliefs, and enjoyments. 
They make it impossible for municipal officials to have 
political influence one way or the other. They sepa¬ 
rate the political from the business problem. 


APPENDIX IV. 


333 


With the proviso, therefore, that some such separate 
channel be furnished through which the debate on 
political questions may flow, we may admit that an 
increase of municipal responsibility will bring in¬ 
creased attention to and improvement of the civil 
service — that increase of “ function ” will bring im¬ 
provement of “ organ.’’ But without this proviso — 
without a separation of political questions from the 
questions of the civil service — there is little hope 
that the latter will be solved in a business-like 
manner. 

In addition to the reasons already given for pro¬ 
viding that questions of policy should be decided 
through the initiative and referendum, there are other 
reasons based also on the nature of democratic govern¬ 
ment. In the United States the council is over¬ 
shadowed by the mayor. It has not prestige or 
standing as against his influence. It does not speak 
with authority and does not influence the voters at 
election time. It is easily swerved by special inter¬ 
ests — by private corporations, political organizations, 
and trades unions, which hold the balance of power 
through their control of wealth or votes. On the 
other hand, at a popular vote under universal suffrage 
there are so many diverse interests and so many 
voters with scattered interests, that no special in¬ 
terest can hold the balance of power, much less 
secure a majority. For this reason a popular vote 
tepds to moderation, and is neither conservative nor 
radical. Each issue is voted upon separately, and this 
breaks up the log-rolling combinations of divergent 
interests which, in voting for a candidate who stands 


834 PBOFORTIONAL BEPBESENTATION, 


on a party platform, are compelled to vote for extreme 
policies with which they have little or no concern, in 
order to obtain the policy in which their concerns are 
predominant. Furthermore, innovations require too 
much explanation, and those who are undecided and 
not influenced by log-rolling are more inclined to reject 
and wait than to approve and repent. And on the as¬ 
sumption that the popular vote is to be taken on politi¬ 
cal questions only and that by political questions are 
meant those which affect the distribution of wealth and 
privilege among social classes, it follows that the widest 
discussion and participation in the decision should be 
accorded to every interest, party, faction, and individual. 
This is possible in city governments, since the ques¬ 
tions of policy, though all-important and basic, are not 
continuously up for solution. Administration is much 
the larger part of municipal government in point of 
time occupied, though not in point of popular passion 
excited. The political questions arise only on some¬ 
what rare occasions, and a settlement once reached on 
any point guides the administration for years. 

Again, the psychological influence upon the voters 
of a direct voice in their settlement is a prime argu¬ 
ment for the initiative and referendum. These ques¬ 
tions take precedence in their minds over all other 
questions, and to vote directly upon them is that form 
of personal compliment which prepares the voter to 
accept philosophically the decision of the majority, 
where that decision, if made by a council, would pro¬ 
voke resentment through the knowledge or suspicion 
of undue influence. The very fact that the settlement 
of a given political issue consists in overriding a mi- 


APPENDIX IV, 


335 


nority by compulsion makes it necessary to devise a 
method that will pacify that minority. This can be 
done only when the minority is satisfied that it has 
had its just share in the decision and that it always 
will have an opportunity to bring up the issue again in 
the same or other form if it seems worth while. 

The psychological and sociological analysis above 
advanced furnishes a basis for an explanation of the 
power of the political organization and the political 
boss in American cities. The boss is the avowed agent 
of a social class in the distribution of wealth and priv¬ 
ileges. He secures for his adherents either favorable 
legislation or exemption from unfavorable legislation. 
His avowal is not always thus brutally expressed, but 
with his growing importance he tends to throw aside 
the subterfuge of general welfare ’’ and to speak 
boldly of his proper function. Especially is this so 
when the classes to which he appeals are those who 
are, or think they are, unprivileged classes. With 
them he frankly takes the attitude of Robin Hood, 
acknowledges that he is in on the graft,” but that 
he uses his position to get jobs for his constituents, to 
furnish medicines and doctors for their families, to 
pay their bills for groceries and rent, and to relieve 
them from the harsh enforcement of laws in whose 
enactment they have had no voice. And even with 
the business and propertied classes, whose especial 
boss is still obliged to put great stress on the public 
welfare,” it is the special services which he renders to 
corporations and property-owners that give him his 
hold. In every case the political machine and the 
political platform which the boss constructs are clev- 


336 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


erly designed to take in enough divergent interests to 
secure a majority of the votes. And since the officials 
who care for the business side of the city government 
have discretion in the political field, which is his 
province, he necessarily strives to secure control of 
the business management. He is not himself a candi¬ 
date for elective office, except in a few wards where a 
single class predominates, because he must appeal to a 
variety of classes and consequently must seek his end 
by naming such candidates as are sufficiently indefi¬ 
nite in their beliefs to stand on his mosaic platform 
and sufficiently docile to do his bidding. The referen¬ 
dum and initiative are a specific for the social disease 
which gives him power. They deprive the business 
management of the political discretion through which 
privileges are distributed; they separate and individu¬ 
alize issues which are essentially distinct, and thus 
insure that no single platform or candidate can be 
set up broad enough to attract from divergent interests 
a plurality of all voters; and they remove the animus 
which springs from the sense of helplessness in con¬ 
trolling the distribution of privileges and which there¬ 
fore condones the irregularities of the boss in securing 
for his constituents whatever share he can. 

A probable criticism may be met at this point. It 
naturally is objected that the distinctions here made be¬ 
tween the technical, the business, and the political quali¬ 
ties and functions cannot, in actual city government, 
be rigidly observed. Conceding that the distinctions 
may hold true in abstract psychology and metaphysical 
politics, yet the human mind, it will be said, does not 
operate in separate compartments, nor can government 


APPENDIX IV. 


337 


be so nicely split as to take all political discretion 
from business heads and technical subordinates. 

In city government there are, it must be admitted, 
three departments — those, namely, of police, of edu¬ 
cation, and of charity — where the technical and the 
business qualities required of subordinates merge into 
the qualities that pertain to political authority. These 
departments do not deal with physical material, where 
knowledge and skill suffice for the required end, but 
they deal with human beings who, in the execution 
of the law, may be actually coerced. The policeman 
must necessarily retain a large element of discretion 
in the enforcement of a law, since he determines first 
in his own mind whether or not a given person is vio¬ 
lating it. He is partly judge and partly executive. 
But there is a qualification to be observed. In pro¬ 
portion as any department of government or of social 
life develops scientific principles based upon an under¬ 
standing of the human nature to be controlled, and in 
proportion as the law conforms to these principles and 
the administrators of the law become versed in them, 
in that same proportion does the mere empirical 
discretion, which bunglingly drives by means of 
coercion, give way to scientific insight which leads by 
persuasion. The science of pedagogy reduces the 
school-teacher’s personal discretion by revealing the 
uniformities in the operation of the minds of children; 
as a consequence persuasion displaces coercion, and 
we see illustrated the social counterpart of the maxim 
in physics, that we conquer nature by obeying her. 
The charity agent who learns through the science of 
sociology how to transform the beggar into the useful 


338 FnOFOETIONAL MEFRE8ENTATI0N, 


worker does this by reducing the penal and coercive 
features of his office and by enlarging its educational 
and persuasive features. Likewise the policeman, 
were he to become the scientific penologist instead of 
the empiricist, would be recognized as an educational 
rather than a repressive agent of the city. Some such 
outcome might reasonably be expected if a direct 
popular vote and local self-government on questions of 
morals and enjoyments should be instituted. If those 
whose morals are to be controlled have a direct voice 
in determining the kind and extent of control, and if 
they must exercise this voice by securing a majority 
of their local fellow-voters rather than by diverting 
the policeman, they will be more obedient to the law 
thus determined and so will endeavor to influence the 
discretion, not of the policeman, but of the voters. In 
this way, automatically, the police discretion will be 
shifted from the policeman to the voters, and the 
officer himself will have a wider field for his scientific 
and reformatory functions through the lessening of his 
coercive and discretionary functions. The referendum 
and initiative with home rule, therefore, when once 
adopted, would tend to develop more clearly, both in 
the individual psychology and in the city government, 
the very distinctions which furnish the ground for 
their adoption; namely, the separation of the political 
from the technical and business problems. 

Another objection sometimes raised against the ref¬ 
erendum and the initiative is their alleged reversal of 
the trend toward specialization. One writer asserts 
that “ the referendum idea rests on the theory that all 
men are specialists in everything,’^ and that “ this is 


APPENDIX IV. 


339 


an extraordinary development, in view of the opposite 
trend of legislation towards relieving the individual of 
having to guard his own food, his own plumbing, his 
own milk supply,’’ etc. 

But the direct popular vote, as shown in the preced¬ 
ing pages, tends to increase rather than diminish spe¬ 
cialization. It does this by separating clearly the several 
provinces of government in harmony with the corre¬ 
sponding mental aptitudes of individuals, especially at 
the most exasperating point of the present overlap¬ 
ping. This is the point where politics interferes with 
technical and business qualities. If the mayor and 
his subordinates shall be deprived of the greater part 
of their discretion, they will be left free for a degree 
of specialization that is impossible under present con¬ 
ditions. This specialization will be developed in the 
only field where, in a democracy, it is desirable; namely, 
that of technical and administrative problems. But 
in the field of politics, which is the field of choice and 
coercion, specialization means despotism. Here the 
specialist is the king, the tyrant, or the boss. In a 
democracy there can be no specialization in dealing 
with questions of the distribution of wealth, privileges, 
and enjoyments among social classes. The separation 
of political questions from technical and business 
questions is indeed the vital problem of democracy. 
This must be effected in such a way that the general 
will of the electors can be exercised without changing 
the administrative and technical agents who enforce 
it. These agents will then become experts, who in 
turn will have their part to play as expert advisers on 
the political questions. And this advice will be far 


340 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION, 


more influential than it is at present, because, the ad¬ 
vice-givers having no discretion in executing the policy 
finally decided upon, the acceptance or rejection of 
their advice affects in no way their tenure of position. 
Their advice is listened to by all classes, since it does 
not carry the suspicion of being influenced in behalf of 
one class to the detriment of others. In this way the 
proper reciprocity between the several provinces of 
government is secured, and the political questions, 
which must always be decided with reference to tech¬ 
nical and business questions, are raised to a more dis¬ 
passionate level of discussion and decision. 


APPENDIX F. 


341 


APPENDIX V. 


PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FROM 
AN AMERICAN POINT OP VIEW.l 

In order to appreciate the need of proportional rep¬ 
resentation from an American standpoint, we need to 
understand the peculiar defects of American politics 
and the particular remedies which have found popular 
approval. The defects, I should say, can be summed 
up in what is called boss politics.’^ The remedies in 
the chronological order of popular acceptance are civil 
service reform, legalized primaries, referendum, and 
proportional representation. 

The nature of the boss system will appear in a dis¬ 
cussion of the primaries. In theory the political party 
in the United States is the most democratic in its or¬ 
ganization of all parties in modern nations. The pri¬ 
mary is the local mass meeting of all the voters of 
the party. It holds its meetings prior to a campaign, 
elects its officers, nominates its candidates to be voted 
upon at the following election, and elects a standing 
committee to conduct the campaign and to call future 
meetings. As thus conceived and originally organized 
the primary was a remonstrance against the authority 
of the party leaders in the legislature and Congress, 
who for the first twenty to thirty years of the republic 

1 Prepared for the Congress of Comparative Law at the Paris 
Exposition, 1900. 



342 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


assumed the privilege of nominating candidates and 
managing the party. This is even yet the practice in 
European countries. The parliamentary representa¬ 
tives and their friends constitute themselves a set of 
committees for making the nominations and managing 
the affairs of the party in the several districts. Such an 
arrangement was too highly centralized and autocratic 
for American democracy. At a very early time local 
clubs of the party voters were organized, usually secret, 
in order to work against this authority of their repre¬ 
sentatives. Eventually these clubs were federated by 
means of delegates elected to a central convention, and 
this delegated convention nominated its own candidates 
for the State legislature and Congress. The party con¬ 
vention, being thus a representative body of the voters 
themselves, forced recognition as the only means where¬ 
by the candidates of the party could be vouched for. 
Only the “ regular ” candidates thus nominated could 
command the strength of the party vote. The local 
clubs whose delegates thus created the party conven¬ 
tion now became the recognized primary’’ of the 
party, no longer secret, but open to all the local voters 
of the party. The theory of the party convention and 
the party primaries is therefore the theory of repre¬ 
sentative democracy applied to the party organization. 

At this point the unique feature of the American 
form of government came into play; namely, popular 
election of the executive and judiciary. Had the State 
legislature or the national Congress been superior to 
the executive, as in France, or had the executive been 
hereditary, then the highest grade of convention would 
have been only the one for nominating legislative and 


APPENDIX F. 


343 


congressional candidates. But the State governor and 
judges and the national President are also elected 
directly by popular vote. This is a practice not origi¬ 
nally contemplated but latterly forced into the con¬ 
stitutions by the same democratic spirit that forced the 
primaries and conventions into the political parties. 
Consequently the principle of representation within 
the party was consistently carried to the nomination 
of candidates for the highest offices. State and na¬ 
tional conventions were organized for nominating 
State officers and the president. These higher grades 
of conventions are composed of delegates elected not 
by the primaries directly, but by the lower grades of 
conventions. Thus we have a hierarchy of conven¬ 
tions built upon the primaries in the following order. 
The primary is organized for each ward and township, 
and nominates directly its candidates for ward and 
township officers. It also elects delegates to the city 
and county conventions which in turn nominate city 
and county candidates. These conventions in turn 
elect delegates to the congressional and State conven¬ 
tions which nominate their respective candidates, and 
the congressional and State conventions elect delegates 
to the national convention which nominates candi¬ 
dates for the offices of President and Vice-President.^ 

But this representative hierarchy of primaries and 

11 have described only the typical situation. In so extensive 
a country as the United States, with so great local independ¬ 
ence, there are many varieties of party practice, but they all 
tend by evolutionary steps |toward the most perfect organiza¬ 
tion—a tendency in which the city and State of New York have 
taken the lead. 


344 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 

conventions must be accompanied by a corresponding 
hierarchy of standing committees elected by vote of the 
delegates and primaries to manage campaigns, collect 
funds, and issue calls for future primaries and conven¬ 
tions. These standing committees are the recognized 
party ‘^organization,” Here we come to the Boss. 

Each primary is wholly independent and self-gov¬ 
erning. But it has two entirely different problems to 
meet. In electing its standing committees and its 
delegates to conventions, it consults only its own 
wishes, but in nominating candidates for public office 
it must consult the wishes of all the voters at the 
coming election. Its committees and delegates may be 
strong partisans and recognized leaders among the 
party workers, but its candidates must be able to get 
the votes of outsiders. This situation arises solely 
from the fact of plurality elections. Eor the first half 
century of national independence all elections required 
a majority vote. If no candidate received a majority, 
then second and third elections were held, just as 
second elections continue to be held in France and 
Germany. So expensive was this and so favorable to 
minor parties to the disadvantage of the two leading 
parties that quite generally the legislatures changed 
the law so that the candidate receiving the highest 
vote on the first election should be declared elected. 
This method of plurality election discourages third- 
party movements. It narrows the election down to 
the two leading parties. He who votes for a third 
party “ throws his vote away.” This is the appeal 
made by the party leaders to stand by the party, and 
it is decisive with the bulk of the voters. 


APPENDIX V. 


345 


At the same time the party membership itself 
is not homogeneous. This is especially true in the 
larger cities where rich and poor, foreigners and 
natives, whites and blacks, are thrown together in 
the same wards. It is scarcely appreciated by Euro¬ 
peans that American cities are ruled by voters born 
in Europe. London has only two per cent of its 
population foreign born. Paris and Berlin have 
even less. But a third of the voters in Kew 
York and Chicago were born in Europe. Moreover, 
the foreigners are from different nations. Kew York 
is not only a large Irish city, but also a German city 
and an Italian city. 

These various races continue to speak their own 
languages and to live together clannishly, following 
their own leaders. But they are not distributed ac¬ 
cording to ward lines. Consequently a party which 
can get a majority from them must be managed in 
such a way as to unite antagonistic interests. Here is 
the opportunity for manipulation. It consists in se¬ 
lecting candidates, usually by distributing different 
elective offices and making pledges of appointive offices 
to the different nationalities and interests. This is the 
work of the Boss. He sets up a ticket that will get a 
majority from these heterogeneous voters. He is not 
concerned with party principles — this is a matter of 
cold bargaining. He buys and sells with the various 
leaders. The strongest of them can force themselves 
upon him. He is not exactly a dictator — he is a 
manipulator. And since the election is narrowed down 
to the two leading parties, only one of which can be 
successful, there are two bosses — one for each party. 


346 PBOPOETIONAL REPPESENTATION. 


Each boss is elected by the party primary and is 
usually the executive head of the standing committee. 

The foregoing is a description of the ward or pri¬ 
mary boss, the lowest in the scale. But the same holds 
true for the standing committees of the larger areas. 
The city boss and the county boss are elected by the 
delegates chosen from the primaries — that is, by the 
ward and township bosses who control the primaries. 
The State boss is elected by the delegates to the State 
convention — that is, by the city and county bosses. 
Of course these higher bosses have influence in all the 
primaries and conventions which elect the lower bosses, 
and the tendency is for each State to concentrate its 
party system under the State boss, who really dic¬ 
tates the election of the local bosses. The system 
has not yet been perfected in the national organization, 
although in the campaign of 1896 the party in power 
came under the influence of one of the State bosses 
who was able to name the candidate for president. 

Now, naturally enough, throughout this entire hier¬ 
archy of bossism the boss is a man who cannot get 
elected to office by popular vote. His strength does 
not lie in his popularity or his principles, but in his 
strategy. Wherever he holds an office, it is an ap¬ 
pointment which he has received from the mayor, the 
governor, the president, or the legislature whom he 
has nominated and elected to office. The State bosses 
usually direct their own election by their creatures, 
the State legislatures, to the United States Senate, and 
the Senate has thereby become the House of Bosses. 
The seats in the lower branch of Congress, the House 
of Kepresentatives, like those in the House of Com- 


APPENDIX F. 


34T 


mons in early days, are the appurtenances of the 
bosses in the upper branch. 

It is this federation and hierarchy of bosses in each 
party controlling elective offices, appointive offices, con¬ 
tracts, and legislation that is known as boss politics. 
The bosses have protected themselves by ingenious 
legislation. When the secret ballot was introduced, 
some ten years ago, as a protection against bribery, it 
was generally so framed as to legalize the two leading 
parties in their practical monopoly of nominating the 
candidates. This has led, in the past two years, to the 
most remarkable extension of the party system yet 
devised in any country; namely, the legalized primary. 
Hitherto the primary had little or no recognition in 
law. The boss controlled it in two ways—first, by 
his arbitrary power of defining membership and there¬ 
fore of excluding his opponents, and, second, by his 
appointment of the judges and watchers at the pri¬ 
mary elections from among his faithful servitors. The 
legalized primary, however, places partisanship upon 
the basis of citizenship — that is, it frames a legal 
definition of the qualifications to membership in the 
party primary; usually defining a party member as 
one who supported the leading candidate of the party 
at the last election. It also substitutes State officers 
for the party judges and watchers. In these two ways 
it was intended to give to the independents ” within 
the party a right to vote for the party committees 
and to nominate the party candidates, and thus to 
overcome the autocracy of the boss by making him 
elective and therefore responsible to all the party 
voters. But these hopes are already decadent. The 


348 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


bosses retain their control just as powerfully as before. 
It is not that the boss is irresponsible, but that the 
boss is absolutely necessary for party success. He 
harmonizes differences. He selects candidates who 
can win. He gets majorities. He is a survival of the 
fittest. His ability rises by natural selection, not by 
artificial election. He is not popular — he is only in¬ 
dispensable. The legalized primary is not a remedy 
for bossism — it is only a remedy for dissatisfaction 
among the boss’s henchmen. 

The power of the boss in the primaries depends 
largely on the number of faithful workers who attend 
the primaries and do his bidding. These men are held 
together by the possession or promise of offices and 
public employment for themselves and their friends. 
The boss controls the appointments and removals in 
these offices and jobs through his control over the 
elected officers and chiefs of departments. He dis¬ 
tributes the appointments to his followers as the 

spoils ” of victory. Here is the most glaring exhibi¬ 
tion of the power of the boss, and here has been the 
first point of attack by the reform elements, under the 
name of civil service reform. 

The significance of civil service reform in America 
is quite different from that on the continent of Europe. 
In England it was introduced by the middle-class 
parliaments as a means of depriving the aristocracy 
of their monopoly of appointments in the public 
service. In France the system of competitive exami¬ 
nations was introduced by Napoleon that he might 
organize a perfect machine of government with every 


APPENDIX V, 


349 


official from top to bottom dependent, like an army, 
upon his immediate superior, and all dependent on the 
Emperor himself. This is true also of the bureau¬ 
cracy in Prussia. But in America civil service reform 
has its popular strength in that it strips the boss of 
power. This is shown by the form of machinery 
designed to enforce it. Whereas in France and Prus¬ 
sia the civil service examiners are themselves subor¬ 
dinates of the chiefs of departments who make the 
appointments, in England and the United States the 
examiners are the subordinates of an independent 
civil service commission. This commission draws up 
a list of eligibles ’’ based on examinations, or, in 
the case of laborers, based on the order of registra¬ 
tion, and the chief of the department is restricted 
in his appointments to a limited number of these 
eligibles. He has no control over the commission, 
and, in fact, certain laws in the United States make 
the commission an administrative court, competent 
not only to control appointments, but also to reinstate 
subordinates whom the chief has dismissed. Civil 
service reform laws in England and in the United 
States are alike in that they are designed to break 
down the favoritism which in the one case gave to 
the aristocracy the monopoly of offices and in the 
other gives to the boss the same monopoly. Although 
advocated on the ground of introducing business ’’ 
methods into government it really violates the basic 
principle of effective business which makes the busi¬ 
ness manager responsible for his subordinates. The 
civil service commission deprives him of power to 
appoint and remove subordinates, and therefore les- 





350 PROPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


sens his responsibility for his department. It is not 
business efficiency that makes civil service reform 
popular in America, but popular hatred of boss rule. 

Civil service reform exhibits the defect of striking 
at effects rather than causes. It reaches only the 
lower appointive officers and employees and not the 
elective officers nor the chiefs of departments. The 
chiefs are the key to administration. As long as 
they are controlled by the boss, they resist the civil 
service commission, and they often nullify the law. 
After fifteen years of trial in Massachusetts, New 
York, and the federal service, the people begin to 
feel the need of striking higher. 

The next weapon of attack cuts closer to the boss’s 
sinews of war. This is the referendum and the 
initiative. The enormous expenses of political cam¬ 
paigns require enormous contributions. These natu¬ 
rally come from those corporations and individuals 
who hope to get public contracts and favorable legis¬ 
lation or to prevent hostile legislation. Formerly 
these corporations appeared in the person of their 
agents or lobbyists before the committees of the legisla¬ 
ture. Now they have discovered a less obtrusive and 
more effective method: they contribute a lump sum 
to the State boss for campaign expenses. With these 
large contributions the State boss controls the local 
bosses, and together they nominate and elect a State 
legislature which quietly votes as the boss commands. 
The referendum is the people’s veto on this con¬ 
spiracy. If all contracts and legislation required 
approval by a majority vote at a popular election. 


351 


[appendix V. 

then the corporations could not afford to spend their 
money upon the boss. He would be impotent to ful¬ 
fil his part of the contract. If, moreover, the people 
had the initiative, so that they themselves could intro¬ 
duce positive legislation, then the corporations would 
be compelled to go directly to the people instead of 
the boss for protection. The boss’s treasury would 
be short. 

But the referendum and the initiative, like civil 
service reform, are negative. The experience of 
Switzerland shows that it is very difficult to enact 
positive legislation through the initiative. In a popu¬ 
lar government the source of power ultimately lies 
in the elective officers. They enact the laws, award 
the contracts, and appoint the subordinates. Whoever 
controls elections controls the government. There 
may be checks and hold-backs, like civil service re¬ 
form and the referendum, but these tend to obstruct 
the government rather than make it go. They deal 
with the effects of boss politics and not its causes. 
They are necessary as a beginning. Like all improve¬ 
ments, whether in mechanics or politics, the first 
inventions are directed to check evils, not to readjust 
causes. The last reform espoused is that which goes 
to the roots. This is the place of proportional repre¬ 
sentation. Thirty years ago, when the boss system 
was infantile, there was frequent reference to minority 
representation, and several States enacted laws em¬ 
bodying that idea. But the arguments were wholly 
different from those of the present. At that time 
the suffrage had just been extended to the negroes 


352 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION, 


in the South, and universal suffrage was just reveal¬ 
ing its results in the large cities of the North. The 
argument of John Stuart Mill in favor of minority 
representation was the only argument of force; namely, 
that without it the educated and propertied classes 
would be overwhelmed by the majorities of ignorant 
and irresponsible voters. 

The situation now is quite different. The growth 
of large corporations has made business dependent 
on legislation. The bosses who control the legisla¬ 
tures, the municipal councils, and the Federal congress, 
have these corporations at their mercy. They can 
demand campaign contributions from banks, trusts,’’ 
railways, insurance companies, and city monopolies. 
The corporations are compelled to make alliance with 
the bosses. Together they build a bulwark of bossism 
in both politics and business. Proportional repre¬ 
sentation is no longer needed to defend the rich 
against the poor. Its problem now is to defend the 
masses against the monopolists. It is the only remedy 
that utterly disintegrates the power of the boss. How 
this occurs is apparent from the description just 
given of the primaries and elections. Plurality voting 
forces divergent interests into one party in order to 
get a majority. The boss arranges the details of the 
union. The one criterion, success, makes him indis¬ 
pensable. Now proportional representation removes 
the very keystone of his arch — the plurality. It 
enables any one of his constituent groups to go ahead 
independently. If the group has only enough voters 
to form an electoral quotient,” it can elect at least 
one candidate without joining any other group or 


APPENDIX V. 


353 


confiding itself to the boss. After election these 
independent candidates can form such alliances as 
they wish. But they are not forced into alliance. 
They are not responsible to this irresponsible boss 
who has dictated the nomination of them all. 

We can now see the relation between these four 
reforms which are aimed against boss rule. The 
legalized primary assumes that the boss is inevitable, 
but hopes to elect him by the votes of partisans. The 
referendum places a veto on the legislatures and exec¬ 
utives whom the boss has elected and the chiefs of 
departments whom he has appointed. Civil service 
reform deprives him of the lower appointive offices 
and the labor service. Proportional representation 
deprives him of the elective offices. The latter are 
the sources of power, and, when once controlled by the 
people, they lessen the field for the other reforms. 
The boss need not be legalized if he is not inevitable. 
With proportional representation he is wholly dis¬ 
placed. The lower appointive offices will be properly 
filled when once the chiefs of departments stand for 
all the people instead of the bosses. Such is their 
position where they are themselves appointed by a 
truly representative body, as in the cities of England 
and Germany, and not by an executive controlled by 
a boss. The referendum is essential only as a veto on 
unrepresentative law-makers. Where the legislature 
represents all the people instead of the bosses, then 
the referendum, while retained as a safeguard, will 
gradually drop into disuse. Proportional representa¬ 
tion, from the fact that it makes the elective officers 
responsible directly to the people who elect them, 


354 PBOPOUTIONAL EEPRESENTATION. 

restores the essential principle of representative gov¬ 
ernment. Only in this way is irresponsible bossism 
cut down at the roots. Other reforms which clip the 
branches of bossism without destroying it are needed. 
They lessen the power of resistance, and they open 
the way for the reform that strikes at the roots. 

The foregoing argument for proportional represen¬ 
tation is based on the peculiar features of American 
politics. There are, of course, other arguments more 
akin to those put forward by the European advocates. 
At the present time there is a situation in current poli¬ 
tics which reminds one of political conditions in France 
and Germany. This is the break-up of the two lead¬ 
ing parties into third, fourth, and fifth parties, and 
into citizens’ ” movements. This break-up, if we may 
judge by the lesson of anti-slavery politics fifty years 
ago, is temporary, provided the plurality system is 
retained. Eealignments, more or less incongruous, are 
already taking place. “Fusion” tickets are appearing 
in every part of the country. These small parties, 
most unjustly deprived of their proper share in govern¬ 
ment by the plurality system of election, are peculiarly 
open to the arguments for proportional representa¬ 
tion. It is possible that this break-up of parties, as 
was the case in Belgium, will bring proportional rep¬ 
resentation into the field of practical politics. 


APPENDIX VL 


355 


APPENDIX YI. 


REPRESENTATION OP INTERESTS.i 

Lincoln said that in politics a nation needs, at least 
once in a generation, to get back to first principles. 
It is now a generation since Americans finally aban¬ 
doned the original idea of representative government, 
and this generation also has seen as a result the prac¬ 
tical collapse of the representative institution itself. 
The board of aldermen has almost disappeared from 
New York City, and boards of aldermen in other cities 
have been moving in the same direction. To get back 
to the first principles of representative government, we 
need to inquire into the social conditions out of which 
it originated. These conditions were found in the free 
cities of the Middle Ages. The free cities were at 
first private business corporations of merchants, ped¬ 
lars, and hucksters, chartered by the king in order 
that they might manage their private affairs and 
might travel over the king’s highways free from inter¬ 
ference of the feudal lords. This corporation of mer¬ 
chants elected a president whom they called the maire. 
After a while, in one way and another, the different 
trades of handworkers, such as weavers, armor-makers, 
shoemakers, and so on, also organized their own cor¬ 
porations, and elected their own presidents whom they 
called ealdormen. These aldermen met together as a 
iFrom The Independent, June 21, 1900. 



356 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


kind of trades assembly, or central labor union, or 
board of walking delegates, and finally demanded 
and secured a veto on the maire. In this way the city 
became a representative government in which the mer¬ 
chants were represented by their president, the mayor, 
and the labor unions by their several presidents, the 
board of aldermen. Each had a veto on the other, 
and therefore the consent of each was necessary to 
enact laws and ordinances. 

Now, notice the method of election. Neither the 
mayor nor the aldermen were elected by universal 
suffrage. Each was elected by the members of his 
own corporation or trade union. Each represented 
frankly and openly, not ‘‘ all the people,’’ like the 
modern politician, but his own organized interest. 
The mayor spoke for the merchants, just as much as 
Chauncey M. Depew spoke as president for the stock¬ 
holders of the New York Central Railway. Each 
alderman spoke and voted for his union, just as much 
as P. M. Arthur spoke for the locomotive engineers, 
and E. P. Sargent for the locomotive firemen. The 
city business could not be conducted unless the mayor 
and the aldermen agreed, just as the New Y^ork Central 
Railway could not carry on business unless Mr. Depew 
had an understanding with Mr. Arthur and Mr. Sargent. 
And just as the stockholders in the Central Railway 
do not vote in the elections of the labor unions, and 
the engineers and firemen do not vote in the meetings 
of the stockholders, so the merchants did not vote for 
the aldermen, and the handworkers did not vote for 
the mayor. The system was a representation of inter- 
estSf not a representation of individual voters. 


APPENDIX VI. 


357 


It was with, this form of city constitution that the 
liberties and the parliaments of Anglo-Saxon govern¬ 
ment were fought for and won. Parliament was origi¬ 
nally only a national convention of mayors, aldermen, 
attorneys, and head men, representing the merchants 
and handworkers of the several corporations. This 
convention met at intervals in order to ‘^parley,” to 
pass resolutions, and to send up petitions to the king 
and his Grand Council, just as the American Bankers’ 
Association, or the National Board of Trade, or the 
American Federation of Labor nowadays holds its 
annual convention and sends petitions to the Presi¬ 
dent and Congress. The small farmers also had their 
national Farmers’ Grange and Farmers’ Alliance. Lat¬ 
terly, when these small farmers and these merchants 
and handworkers felt the heavy hand of king and 
nobles, they began to hold joint conventions and to 
send up joint petitions. Lastly these petitions be¬ 
came “ bills,” and the king was prohibited from vio¬ 
lating them without the consent of those who sent 
them up. Thus a national convention became a par¬ 
liament,” and a mutual veto became established in the 
nation as it had already been established in the cities. 
The result is known as constitutional government in 
the place of absolutism. 

To-day we can see history repeating itself. Eep- 
resentative bodies — congress, legislatures, boards 
of aldermen — are becoming less and less com¬ 
petent and representative, just as the king and his 
Grand Council had ceased to represent the people. 
And, on the other hand, private organized inter¬ 
ests are gaining political power, just as the guilds 


358 PBOPOBTIONAL BEPBESENTATION. 


of mercliants and handworkers gained power. These 
two movements should be studied and understood. 

The decay of representative bodies has come about 
through universal suffrage. As long as each corpora¬ 
tion elected its own representative in its own meeting, 
by itself, it could elect its truly representative man. 
But when all classes of voters — capitalists and labor¬ 
ers, Catholics and Protestants, educated and ignorant, 
natives and foreigners, whites and blacks — are 
thrown into one district or ward and are commanded 
to elect one man who shall represent all, plainly they 
can elect only a colorless candidate who represents 
none. 

To get back to first principles of representative 
government historically as well as logically, each of 
these diverse interests should be permitted to assem¬ 
ble by itself and elect its spokesman. The negroes 
would then elect Booker T. Washington; the bankers 
would elect Lyman J. Gage and J. Pierpont Morgan; 
the trusts would elect S. C. T. Dodd and J. B. Dill; 
the railroads would elect Chauncey M. Depew; the 
express companies. Senator Platt; the trade unions 
would elect Samuel Gompers and P. M. Arthur; the 
clergy would elect Archbishop Corrigan and Dr. Park- 
hurst; the universities would elect Seth Low and 
President Eliot. These were the type of men with 
whom representative government originated. They 
are to-day representative men in the true meaning of 
the word. As long as representative government 
enlisted such men, it was brilliantly successful. But 
scarcely one of these men could to-day be elected by 
popular suffrage and majority vote in those limited 


APPENDIX VL 


359 


wards or districts where they happen to sleep. Their 
admirers are scattered throughout the city or State. 
It is only compromise and colorless men who can get 
majorities in the wards and districts, — men who have 
few enemies because they have no backbone, — men 
who are outspoken for no interest, and who, for that 
very reason, are the tools of special interests. Such 
men are kindly furnished to the voters by the boss, 
and they are his tools. Consequently representative 
government has decayed and the irresponsible boss 
has emerged, because no device has yet been discov¬ 
ered by which we can return to the original principle 
of representation of interests on the higher level of 
universal suffrage. 

But at the same time this original principle is un¬ 
consciously forcing its way forward. There is no 
social movement of the past twenty years more quiet 
nor more potent than the organization of private in¬ 
terests. hTo other country in the world presents so 
interesting a spectacle. Almost every trade, industry, 
and profession has its national association and its 
State, county, and city associations and conventions. 
Every city has its chamber of commerce composed of 
the associated capitalists; its trades assembly, com¬ 
posed of delegates from the laborers; its several asso¬ 
ciations of clergymen, ministers, lawyers, scientists, 
and engineers. Lastly, where the struggles of com¬ 
petition have been severe, these associations in both 
city and nation have taken on a more compulsory 
organization, in the form of pools, corporations, trusts, 
and labor unions. 

This new grouping of interests is brought about 


360 PROPOBTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


for several reasons: partly as the natural association 
of those with common ways of thinking; partly to 
lessen destructive competition among the members; 
partly to control legislation and politics. It is in the 
last-mentioned object that these private associations 
and corporations have developed the lobby, and the 
lobby is both a cause and a result of the decay of 
representative government. The lobby is now the 
unofficial but controlling factor in legislation. At 
the same time, it is, in the original sense of the word, 
more representative than the legislature. Each inter¬ 
est is represented in its lobby by its ablest spokes¬ 
men. They are freely chosen without dictation from 
bosses or outsiders. The corporations select their own 
lobbyists just as they select their attorneys. The 
labor unions have their “ legislative committees and 
have established their national headquarters at Wash¬ 
ington. There is also the liquor lobby and the tem¬ 
perance lobby ; the school-teachers’ lobby and the 
woman-suffrage lobby; the insurance lobby and the 
bankers’ lobby; the permanent lobby and the casual 
lobby; the lobby eloquent and the lobby silent; the 
lobby with cash and the lobby with votes. 

These various lobbies struggle among themselves to 
control the legislature, just as the mediaeval lobbies 
struggle to get control of the king and his Grand Coun¬ 
cil. The shrewdest or wealthiest wins. If now these 
lobbies were officially recognized and legalized; if they 
were all thrown into one body and required to fight out 
their struggles for control according to published rules 
of order, we should have almost the exact steps by 
which the House of Commons originated. Such a 


APPENDIX VI. 


361 


movement is already taking place in our cities. The 
Merchants’ Association of New York has become a 
definite factor in the city government. It held up the 
Ramapo contract pending an investigation by its own 
engineers, and finally secured legislation protecting 
the city. The Merchants’ Association of San Fran¬ 
cisco actually carried through the reconstruction of the 
city charter. Everywhere the Trades Assembly, com¬ 
posed of delegates elected by labor unions, has a grow¬ 
ing influence on city wages, city hours of labor, and 
labor legislation in general. 

But it will at once be seen that a modern project for 
representation of interests exactly parallel to that of 
mediaeval times cannot be admitted. First, there is a 
large number of voters, perhaps a majority, who are 
not members of any organized interest. In mediaeval 
times a man had no political rights except as he gained 
them through membership in a legalized corporation. 
But to-day he has the suffrage as a man and not as 
a member of a guild. Consequently, as such, he is 
entitled to representation. Representation of interests 
cannot be merely representation of organized interests 
— it must also include the unorganized. 

Furthermore, mediaeval interests were rigid, and the 
corporation or guild absorbed the whole life of the man 
and his family. But modern interests are fluid and 
transitional. Membership can be changed from one to 
another. 

For these two reasons the voter must be permitted 
readily to shift his vote from one interest to another. 
In other words, while the organized interests should 
be permitted to elect their avowed representatives with- 


362 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 


out interference, the unorganized voters should be per¬ 
mitted, not to defeat the candidates of the organized 
interests and so to force compromise candidates upon 
the voters, as at present, but to elect also their own 
representatives, or to add their weight to the represen¬ 
tation of one interest or another as they choose. This 
end can be reached by what the late Dorman B. Eaton 
described as ^^free nomination” and ^‘free voting.” 
Free nomination is simply nomination by petition. 
Free voting is simply the provision that a minority 
shall have representation proportionate to its numbers. 
This requires election on a general ticket instead of 
single-membered wards and districts. A municipal 
council of thirty-five members, like that of New York, 
elected in this way, would enable any interest within 
the city commanding one-thirty-fifth of the voters to 
elect its own leading spokesman without compromises 
with any other interest or boss. One-third of the 
voters would elect ten or twelve, and so on. The labor 
unions could elect the very men who now compose 
their central federated union; the merchants’ associa¬ 
tion could elect their leading merchants; the bankers 
could elect a banker; the saloon-keepers and gamblers 
would elect a minority proportionate to their numbers, 
instead of their usual majority. The unorganized 
voters would distribute their influence according to 
the issues which to them seem uppermost. Free vot¬ 
ing, already adopted in Switzerland and Belgium, is 
the modern form of representation of interests. 

It is not to be inferred that representation of inter¬ 
ests is the same as government by special interests. 
Where all interests are fairly represented by their 


APPENDIX VL 


363 


leaders there is no one interest which can dominate 
the others. It is exactly the evil of existing forms of 
government that a few special interests with wealth 
and shrewdness have gotten control. Boss politics is 
possible only because the boss is not compelled to 
make concessions to any interests other than those 
of the “ organization and the campaign contributors. 
Let all substantial interests have an equal voice with 
the party organization and then representative govern¬ 
ment will take the place of boss government. The 
welfare of society as a whole will be cared for, because 
every interest in society will have weight in the legis¬ 
lature according to its social importance. And the 
legislature itself will be a notable body composed of 
the acknowledged leaders of men, instead of the parti¬ 
san tools of special interests. 





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INDEX 


A 

Ability of representatives, 39-43, 
152-162, 164-167, 183-184, 195, 
208-209, 217-218, 231, 233, 289. 

Absenteeism, 153-162. 

Adams, Charles Francis, quoted, 
209. 

Administration, boards, 5; 210 ff. 

Aldermen, origin, 24, 355; elec¬ 
tions, x, 70-72,77; single board, 
137. 

American Proportional Represen¬ 
tation League bill, 119-122. 

Andrae, M., Danish statesman, 
104. 

Arbitration, 231. 

B 

Balance of power, 40. 

Ballot laws, 112, 219, 220, 284, 
286. 

Basle, city, 241. 

Belgium, trial election, 122-130; 
adoption of proportional repre¬ 
sentation, vii. 

Berlin, 202. 

Berne, Swiss canton, 186. 

Berry, J. M., cited, 65. 

Bibliography, viii. 

Borely, M., cited, 111. 

Boss, political, 335, 341 ff., 363. 

Boston, original government, 5 
ff.; limited vote, 90; absentee¬ 
ism, 155. 


Bribery, 79-80, 138 ff., 166, 309. 

Bryce, James, cited, 84, 198. 

Buckalew, Senator C. R., 247. 

Burke, Edmund, quoted, 16, 17. 

Burkli, “Father of the Refer¬ 
endum,” 190; cited, 193. 

C 

California, ballot law, 117; ref¬ 
erendum vote, 187. 

Canada, parliament, 133; non¬ 
residency, 166. 

Capen, S. B., cited, 155. 

Capitalists, representation of, 
13 ff. 

Caucus, legislative, 81-82. 

Chamberlain, D. H., quoted, 247. 

Chamberlain, Joseph, 245. 

Checks and balances, 234. 

Chicago, aldermanic elections, 
70; absenteeism, 153. 

Cities, origin of council, 3, 4, 22- 
26; government of, 197 ff.; con¬ 
stitutionality of proportional 
representation, 268-270. 

City government, referendum 
and initiative in, 311 ff. 

Civil service reform, 166,175-176, 
211-216, 262, 348, 351, 353. 

Confederation, 21. 

Congress, origin, 21; elections, 
viii, ix, 55 ff.; constitutionality 
of proportional representation. 


365 




366 


INDEX 


Connecticut, bribery, 138; colo¬ 
nial legislature, 20. 

Considerant, Victor, cited, 111, 
238. 

Constitutionality of proportional 
representation, 265-270. 

Constitutional restrictions on 
legislatures, 5 ff. 

Corporations and lobby, 34, 35; 
and machine, 84; proportional 
election of directors, 264, 265. 

Corruption, 47, 309. 

County commissioners, election 
of, 87. 

Cumulative vote, 92-98; and free 
list, 113 ff. 

D 

Denmark, parliament, 104. 

D’Hondt, Professor V., distribu¬ 
tion of seats, 127, 271 ff. 

Distribution of seats, vii, 128, 
271 ff. 

Direct legislation, 186 ff., 291 ff. 

Droop, H. R., quota, 241, 272. 

Dutcher, Salem, cited, 73. 

E 

Eaton, Dorman B., cited, 362. 

Elections, congress, 16, 55 ff,; 
legislatures, ix, x, 65 ff.; Brit¬ 
ish Parliament, 62, 64; Italian 
Parliament,64; aldermen,70 ff. 

England, elections, 62,64; school 
boards, 97; non-residency, 166; 
party responsibility, 174; cit¬ 
ies, 202, 213; suffrage, 237. 

Executive department, 193 ff. 

F 

Fawcett, Professor, cited, 242. 

Forney, M. N., cited, 93. 

Foulke, William D., quoted, 182. 


Fourier, Charles, cited, 238. 

France, Chamber of Deputies, 
89; party responsibility, ,174; 
municipal suffrage, 203, 237. 

Fribourg, Swiss canton, 241. 

G 

General ticket, 86-89. 

Geneva, Swiss canton, 118, 136. 

Germany, party responsibility, 
174; cities, 201, 213; suffrage, 
237. 

Gerrymander, 48-81, 135, 139, 
140, 167, 175; original, 51. 

Giddings, Professor F. H., cited, 
79. 

Gilpin, Thomas, 110, 237. 

Gladstone, party leader, 44. 

Glasgow, suffrage, 202. 

Greeley, Horace, cited, 251. 

Guilds, representation of, 13, 14, 
24, 25, 355. 

H 

Hare system, 100-105, 243. 

Hart, Professor A. B., cited, 43, 
154, 262. 

Hoffman, Governor, veto, 252 ff. 

Holls, F. W., quoted, 153, 154. 

Home rule, legislative, 324. 

House of Lords, 135. 

I 

Illinois, gerrymander, 80; cumu¬ 
lative vote, 93-96,113, 249, 259. 

Independence of voters, 143-153. 

Indiana, congressional elections, 
78; legislature, 42, 65, 66; 
presidential electors, 106, 276; 
close state, 138. 

Initiative, 185 ff., 306 ff., 311 ff. 
351, 353. 

Italian election, 64. 



INDEX 


367 


j 

Johnson, Hon. Tom, bill for con¬ 
gressional elections, 114, 115. 

Judiciary, increased power, 17, 
194, 261. 

K 

Kansas gerrymander, 80. 

L 

Labor and capital, 230, 320. 

Labor unions, representations of, 
32. 

Legislation formerly limited, 33, 
34. 

Legislatures, failure, 4 ff., 135, 
232, 266, 298, 301. 

Limited vote, 90-92. 

Lincoln, Abraham, cited, 179, 355. 

Lobby and corporations, 34, 35, 
360; and the machine, 45-47. 

London, original government, 
24; reformed council, 224. 

Low, President Seth, cited, 201, 
203, 311. 

Lowell, A. Lawrence, cited, 189 ff. 

Lubbock, Sir John, 62-64, 104, 
245. 

Lucerne, Swiss canton, 242. 

M 

Machine, 4, 28; based on univer¬ 
sal suffrage, 33; its power, 37; 
described, 38, 142, 173, 198, 
335; coalition of both parties, 
84. 

Marshall, James Garth, cited, 243. 

Maryland, colonial legislature, 

17. 

Massachusetts, colonial legisla¬ 
ture, ,18-20; senate, 78, 79; 
ballot law, 117; absenteeism, 
153,154; civil service, 212. 


Mayor, origin, 2.3-24, 355; gov¬ 
ernment by, 198 ff., 207,234,325. 

McCook, Professor J. J., cited, 
79, 80. 

McKinley, William, 42, 167. 

Medill, Joseph, quoted, 250. 

Michigan legislature, 66. 

Mill, John Stuart, cited, 103, 
185, 243, 352. 

Minneapolis aldermen, 71. 

Morin, Antoin, cited, 237. 

Morrison, William, 41, 167. 

Municipal elections, 137,144-149 ; 
enterprises, 223; government, 
197 ff.; ownership, 320. 

N 

National Federation for People’s 
Rule, 292. 

Nationalization, original problem 
of representation, 11-21. 

Naville, Professor Ernest, cited, 
117, 239. 

Nebraska legislature, 175. 

Neuchatel, Swiss canton, 118,241. 

New York City, 3, 4, 198; aider- 
man, 71, 72; gerrymander, 80; 
limited vote, 90 ; absenteeism, 
153; suffrage, 202. 

New York, State Assembly, 66, 
67, 76; close state, 138; refer¬ 
endum vote, 186. 

Nominations, 144,156. 

Non-residency, 166. 

O 

Ohio, congressional election, 59- 
61; legislature, 66; referendum 
vote, 187. 

P 

Paris, suffrage, 203. 




368 


INDEX 


Parliament, British, 16, 17, 27; 
elections, 62-64; Italian, 64. 

Parties, defined, 133, 286; legal¬ 
ization of, 279 ff.; “responsi¬ 
bility ” of, 163 ff.; rise of, 
26-28; third and minor, 173 ff., 
183, 184, 271 ff. 

Pennsylvania, gerrymander, 80; 
limited vote, 260, 261. 

Philadelphia, limited vote, 261. 

Politics, defined, 133. 

Preponderance of choice, 158,159. 

President, veto, 3; not a party 
leader, 41. 

Presidential electors, 88. 

Primaries, 38, 39, 153-162, 282 ff., 
341 ff. 

R 

Referendum, 186 ff., 291 ff., 311 
ff., 350, 353. 

Reinsen, S. D., cited, 157. 

Representation of social classes, 
14-16, 326; of interests, 355 ff. 

Representative assemblies in 
colonies, 30-31; in India, 31 n. 

Represented and unrepresented 
voters, 72-78, 140-143, 179. 

Responsibility of representatives, 
168-171. 

Rice, Isaac F., cited, 264. 

Richardson, Charles, cited, 161. 

Russell, Lord John, quoted, 242. 


S 

Saloons, 38, 40. 

School board elections, 87, 97, 98. 
Sections represented, 209, 210. 
Senate, United States, 134-135; 
State, 136. 

Shaw, Albert, cited, 202, 214. 
Silver question, 177. 


Single transferable vote, 100-105. 

Slavery question, 197, 181. 

Social classes, representation of, 
14-16, 326. 

Social reform, 223 ff. 

Soluthurn, Swiss canton, 241. 

South Carolina, 80, 248; map of 
gerrymander, 55. 

South, unrepresented in Con¬ 
gress, 179. 

South Dakota, 264. 

Speaker of the House, 15, 43^5. 

Spence, Miss C. H., cited, 101- 
103. 

Stickney, Albert, cited, 167. 

St. Gall, Swiss canton, 242. 

St. Paul, aldermanic election, 
70. 

Stiissi, M., quoted, 308. 

Suffrage, 29-33, 143, 172, 185, 202 
ff., 224, 236, 237, 246, 358. 

Sullivan, J. W., cited, 190. 

Switzerland, Association Refor- 
miste, 112; Proportional Rep¬ 
resentation, vii; referendum, 
185 ff., 291, 292 ff.; suffrage, 
237, 297. 

Syracuse, municipal election, 
217 ff. 

T 

Tammany Hall, 38, 46, 71, 72, 
141, 225, 251. 

Tariff, 177. 

Taxation and representation, 12. 

Texas, gerrymander, 80. 

Ticino, Swiss canton, 240. 

Tuckerman, L. B., quoted, 158, 
159. 

U 

Unrepresented voters, 72-78,140- 
143,179. 



INDEX 


369 


V 

Veto, executive, 3, 296, 299, 302, 
311; judiciary, 301 fp., 321; 
people’s, 298, 299, 308, 350. 

W 

Wage-earning classes, 224. 


Ward, Lester F., cited, 230 n. 
Ward system, 24, 25, 42. 
Washington, George, quoted, 279. 
Wilson, Woodrow, cited, 33, 34. 
Winetka system, 292. 

Z 

Zug, Swiss canton, 116, 131, 241. 
Zurich, 161,186-190. 



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